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be limited to Five Hundred Copies, of which this is 



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GEBBTE and COMPANY. 



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Secretary. 



Copyright, 1901, Rockwood 




UNIFORM EDITION 



THE 
NAVAL WAR OF 1812 

OR THE 

History of the United States Navy during the last 
WAR WITH Great Britain, to which is appended 

AN ACCOUNT OF THE BaTTLE OF NeW OrLEANS 



Bv 

THEODORE ROOSEVELT 



^* 



Volume I. 



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GEBBIE AND COMPANY 
1902 






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COPY B. 



Copyright, 1882 
Copyright, 1902 

by 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



This edition of ** The Naval War of 1812 " is issued under 
special arrangement with G. P. Putnam's Sons 



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PUBLISHERS' PREFACE 

IN presenting for the first time the complete 
writings of Theodore Roosevelt in a uniform 
edition, we have accomplished an ambition 
which we have entertained for many years. The 
difficulty of publishing a uniform edition of these 
writings existed in the fact that the various vol- 
umes had been issued from time to time by 
no less than five of the leading publishers of the 
United States, and, had it not been for the prom- 
inence of the author, not only in literary circles 
but also as a public man, it would have been 
impossible to present this set to the public. 

Some years ago the President of this company 
conceived the idea of publishing a work such as 
we now have the honor to present. This was 
about the time Mr. Roosevelt returned from the 
campaign in Cuba ; but for various reasons it was 
not found possible to issue an edition then. As 
it is, we have been able to obtain permission to 
print only a very limited number of copies, and, 
while we should have liked to issue a popular 
and unlimited edition, we were not able to ob- 
tain that concession, as there were too many 
interests involved. 

VOL. I 

ra 



iv Publishers' Preface 

We have taken pride in making this set of 
books the finest example of the bookmaker's art. 
It is printed from new type which was made 
expressly for this set. The new illustrations, by 
some of our greatest artists, etchers, and photo- 
gravure makers, have been made expressly for 
these limited sets, and the plates of these will 
be destroyed as soon as the requisite number of 
impressions have been taken. 

It is difficult to estimate the value of these 
works, which are mostly of a historical and analy- 
tical character. The clear, concise mind of the 
author, trained as it has been in the school of 
statesmanship, has been lucidly transferred to 
the printed page; and gives us in brilliant and 
interesting phraseology a grasp of every subject 
on which he has written, which would require 
years of constant study to obtain in any other 
manner. 

In addition to the knowledge which may be 
obtained from a perusal of these writings, our 
attention and interest is held by a series of vivid 
pen pictures of the life led by those hardy men 
who opened up the great interior of this country. 
We find described with all the dramatic intensity 
of a Dumas their trials, hardships, and sufferings, 
as well as their rude pleasures and the gradual 
growth of the civilization to which they con- 
tributed so largely. 



Publishers' Preface v 

« 

We are indebted to Messrs. G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, of New York and London, for the privilege 
of utilizing in this special edition the fourteen 
volumes of Roosevelt's Works published by them, 
and to The Century Company, Messrs. Houghton, 
Mifflin & Company, Messrs. Charles Scribner's 
Sons, and Messrs. Longmans, Green & Company, 
for the courtesy which enables us to complete this 
undertaking; and each is given due credit in the 
volumes which we are able to issue only through 
their permission. 

It is unnecessary to go into detail in speaking 
of the author, as he is so well known to all our 
readers; and to those who have not yet become 
familiar with his literary efforts, we can say that 
in his writings, as in everything else that he has 
done, he has been thorough, careful, and impartial, 
and we feel sure they will find continually re- 
newed pleasure in the perusal of each page. 

Gebbie and Company. 

Philadelphia, 1902. 



PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION 

ORIGINALLY intended to write a companion 
volume to this, which should deal with the 
operations on land. But a short examination 
showed that these operations were hardly worth 
serious study. They teach nothing new; it is 
the old, old lesson, that a miserly economy in 
preparation may in the end involve a lavish outlay 
of men and money, which, after all, comes too 
late to more than partially offset the evils pro- 
duced by the original short-sighted parsimony. 
This might be a lesson worth dwelling on did it 
have any practical bearing on the issues of the 
present day; but it has none, as far as the army 
is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jefferson, 
and his follower Madison, to neglect to give us a 
force either of regulars or of well-trained volun- 
teers during the twelve years they had in which 
to prepare for the struggle that any one might 
see was inevitable ; but there is now far less need 
of an army than there was then. Circumstances 
have altered widely since 1812. Instead of the 
decaying might of Spain on our southern frontier, 
we have the still weaker power of Mexico. In- 

vii 



viii Preface to Third Edition 

stead of the great Indian nations of the interior, 
able to keep civilization at bay, to hold in check 
strong armies, to ravage large stretches of terri- 
tory, and needing formidable military expeditions 
to overcome them, there are now left only broken 
and scattered bands which are sources of annoy- 
ance merely. To the north we are still hemmed 
in by the Canadian possessions of Great Britain; 
but since 1812 our strength has increased so pro- 
digiously, both absolutely and relatively, while 
England's military power has remained almost 
stationary, that we need now be under no appre- 
hensions from her land-forces ; for, even if checked 
in the beginning, we could not help conquering in 
the end by sheer weight of numbers, if by nothing 
else. So that there is now no cause for our keep- 
ing up a large army ; while, on the contrary, the 
necessity for an efficient navy is so evident that 
only our almost incredible short-sightedness pre- 
vents our at once preparing one. 

Not only do the events of the war on land teach 
very little to the statesman who studies history 
in order to avoid in the present the mistakes of 
the past, but besides this, the battles and cam- 
paigns are of very little interest to the student of 
military matters. The British regulars, trained 
in many wars, thrashed the raw troops opposed 
to them whenever they had anything like a fair 
chance; but this is not to be wondered at, for 



Preface to Third Edition ix 

the same thing has always happened the world 
over under similar conditions. Our defeats were 
exactly such as any man might have foreseen, 
and there is nothing to be learned from the follies 
committed by incompetent commanders and un- 
trained troops when in the presence of skilled 
officers having under them disciplined soldiers. 
The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks, and 
panic routs of our armies can be all paralleled 
in the campaigns waged by Napoleon's marshals 
against the Spaniards and Portuguese in the years 
immediately preceding the outbreak of our own 
war. The Peninsular troops were as little able 
to withstand the French veterans as were our 
militia to hold their own against the British regu- 
lars. But it must always be remembered, to our 
credit, that while seven years of fighting failed to 
make the Spaniards able to face the French, ^ two 
years of warfare gave us soldiers who could stand 
against the best men of Britain. On the northern 
frontier we never developed a great general, — 
Brown's claim to the title rests only on his not 
having committed the phenomenal follies of his 

^ At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought between the 
allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so 
rapid and universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington 
the bitter observation, that "though he had seen a good 
many remarkable things in the course of his life, yet this was 
the first time he had ever seen ten thousand men running a 
race." 



X Preface to Third Edition 

predecessors, — but by 1814 our soldiers had be- 
come seasoned, and we had acquired some good 
brigade commanders, notably Scott, so that in 
that year we played on even terms with the 
British. But the battles, though marked by as 
bloody and obstinate fighting as ever took place, 
were waged between small bodies of men, and 
were not distinguished by any feats of general- 
ship, so that they are not of any special interest 
to the historian. In fact, the only really note- 
worthy feat of arms of the war took place at New 
Orleans, and the only military genius that the 
struggle developed was Andrew Jackson. His 
deeds are worthy of all praise, and the battle he 
won was in many ways so peculiar as to make it 
well worth a much closer study than it has yet 
received. It was by far the most prominent 
event of the war ; it was a victory which reflected 
high honor on the general and soldiers who won 
it, and it was in its way as remarkable as any 
of the great battles that took place about the 
same time in Europe. Such being the case, I 
have devoted a chapter to its consideration at 
the conclusion of the chapters devoted to the naval 
operations. 

As before said, the other campaigns on land do 
not deserve very minute attention; but, for the 
sake of rendering the account of the battle of New 



Preface to Third Edition xi 

Orleans more intelligible, I will give a hasty 
sketch of the principal engagements that took 
place elsewhere. 

The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by 
the campaign of General Hull on the Michigan 
frontier. With two or three thousand raw troops 
he invaded Canada. About the same time Fort 
Mackinaw was surrendered by its garrison of 60 
Americans to a British and Indian force of 600. 
Hull's campaign was unfortunate from the be- 
ginning. Near Brownstown the American Colonel 
Van Home, with some 200 men, was ambushed 
•and routed by Tecumseh and his Indians. In 
revenge, Colonel Miller, with 600 Americans, at 
Maguaga attacked 150 British and Canadians 
under Captain Muir, and 250 Indians imder Te- 
cumseh, and whipped them, — Tecumseh's Indians 
standing their ground longest. The Americans 
lost 75, their foes 180 men. At Chicago the 
small force of 66 Americans was surprised and 
massacred by the Indians. Meanwhile, General 
Brock, the British commander, advanced against 
Hull with a rapidity and decision that seemed to 
paralyze his senile and irresolute opponent. The 
latter retreated to Detroit, where, without strik- 
ing a blow, he surrendered 1400 men to Brock's 
nearly equal force, which consisted nearly one 
half of Indians imder Tecumseh. On the Niagara 
frontier, an estimable and honest old gentleman 



xii Preface to Third Edition 

and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of military 
matters, General Van Rensselaer, tried to cross 
over and attack the British at Queenstown; 
iioo Americans got across and were almost all 
killed or captured by an equal number of Brit- 
ish, Canadians, and Indians, while on the oppo- 
site side a larger number of their countrymen 
looked on, and with abject cowardice refused to 
cross to their assistance. The command of the 
army was then handed over to a ridiculous per- 
sonage named Smythe, who issued proclama- 
tions so bombastic that they really must have 
come from an unsound mind, and then made 
a ludicrously abortive effort at invasion, which 
failed almost of its own accord. A British and 
Canadian force of less than 400 men was foiled in 
an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight skirm- 
ish, by about 1000 Americans under Brown; and 
with this trifling success the military operations 
of the year came to an end. 

Early in 18 13, Ogdensburg was again attacked, 
this time by between 500 and 600 British, who 
took it after a brisk resistance from some 300 
militia; the British lost 60 and the Americans 20 
in killed and wounded. General Harrison, mean- 
while, had begun the campaign in the Northwest. 
At Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, Winchester's 
command of about 900 Western troops was sur- 
prised by a force of 11 00 men, half of them 



Preface to Third Edition xiii 

Indians, under the British Colonel Proctor. The 
right division, taken by surprise, gave up at once; 
the left division, mainly Kentucky riflemen, and 
strongly posted in houses and stockaded enclo- 
sures made a stout resistance, and only surren- 
dered after a bloody fight, in which i8o British 
and about half as many Indians were killed or 
wounded. Over 300 Americans were slain, some 
in the battle, but most in the bloody massacre 
that followed. After this. General Harrison went 
into camp at Fort Meigs, where, with about iioo 
men, he was besieged by 1000 British and Cana- 
dians under Proctor and 1200 Indians under 
Tecumseh. A force of 1200 Kentucky militia 
advanced to his relief and tried to cut its way 
into the fort while the garrison made a sortie. 
The sortie was fairly successful, but the Ken- 
tuckians were scattered like chaff by the British 
regulars in the open, and when broken were cut 
to pieces by the Indians in the woods. Nearly 
two thirds of the relieving troops were killed or 
captured; about 400 got into the fort. Soon 
afterward. Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort 
Stephenson, garrisoned by Major Croghan and 
160 men, was attacked by a force of 391 British 
regulars, who tried to carry it by assault, and 
were repulsed with the loss of a fourth of their 
number. Some four thousand Indians joined 
Proctor, but most of them left him after Perry's 



xiv Preface to Third Edition 

victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison, having 
received large reinforcements, invaded Canada. 
At the river Thames his army of 3500 men en- 
countered and routed between 600 and 700 British 
under Proctor, and about 1000 Indians under 
Tecumseh. The battle was decided at once by 
a charge of the Kentucky mounted riflemen, who 
broke through the regulars, took them in rear, 
and captured them, and then, dismounting, at- 
tacked the flank of the Indians, who were also 
assailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped by 
the skin of his teeth and Tecumseh died fighting, 
like the hero that he was. This battle ended the 
campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter 
it must be remembered that the war was, on the 
part of the Americans, mainly one against In- 
dians ; the latter always forming over half of the 
British forces. Many of the remainder were 
French Canadians, and the others were regulars. 
The American armies, on the contrary, were com- 
posed of the armed settlers of Kentucky and 
Ohio, native Americans, of English speech and 
blood, who were battling for lands that were to 
form the heritage of their children. In the West 
the war was only the closing act of the struggle 
that for many years had been waged by the hardy 
and restless pioneers of our race, as, with rifle and 
axe, they carved out the mighty empire that we 
their children inherit; it was but the final effort 



Preface to Third Edition xv 

with which they wrested from the Indian lords 
of the soil the wide and fair domain that now 
fonns the heart of our great Republic. It was 
the breaking down of the last barrier that stayed 
the flood of our civilization; it settled, once and 
forever, that henceforth the law, the tongue, and 
the blood of the land should be neither Indian, 
nor yet French, but English. The few French of 
the West were fighting against a race that was to 
leave as little trace of them as of the doomed 
Indian peoples with whom they made common 
cause. The presence of the British mercenaries 
did not alter the character of the contest; it 
merely served to show the bitter and narrow 
hatred with which the Mother-Island regarded 
her greater daughter, predestined as the latter 
was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond the 
Atlantic. 

Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans 
made successful descents on York and Fort 
George, scattering or capturing their compara- 
tively small garrisons ; while a counter descent by 
the British on Sackett's Harbor failed, the at- 
tacking force being too small. After the capture 
of Fort George, the Americans invaded Canada; 
but their advance guard, 1400 strong, under 
Generals Chandler and Winder, was surprised in 
the night by 800 British, who, advancing with 
the bayonet, broke up the camp, capturing both 



xvi Preface to Third Edition 

the generals and half the artillery. Though the 
assailants, who lost 220 of their small number, 
suffered much more than the "Americans, yet the 
latter were completely demoralized, and at once 
retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward, Colonel 
Boerstler, with about 600 men, surrendered with 
shamefully brief resistance to a somewhat smaller 
force of British and Indians. Then about 300 
British crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, 
which they took, but were afterward driven off 
by a large body of militia with the loss of 40 men. 
Later in the season the American General McClure 
wantonly burned the village of Newark, and then 
retreated in panic flight across the Niagara. In 
retaliation the British in turn crossed the river; 
600 regulars surprised and captured in the night 
Fort Niagara, with its garrison of 400 men; two 
thousand troopers attacked Black Rock, and, 
after losing over a hundred men in a smart en- 
gagement with somewhat over 1500 militia whom 
they easily dispersed, captured and burned both 
it and Buffalo. Before these last events took 
place another invasion of Canada had been at- 
tempted, this time under General Wilkinson, "an 
unprincipled imbecile," as Scott very properly 
styled him. It was mismanaged in every possible 
way, and was a total failure; it was attended 
with but one battle, that of Chrystler's Farm, in 
which 1000 British, with the loss of less than 200 



Preface to Third Edition xvii 

men, beat back double their number of Americans, 
who lost nearly 500 men and also one piece of 
artillery. The American army near Lake Cham- 
plain had done nothing, — its commander, General 
Wade Hampton, being, if possible, even more in- 
competent than Wilkinson. He remained sta- 
tionary while a small force of British plundered 
Plattsburg and Burlington; then, with 5000 men 
he crossed into Canada, but returned almost im- 
mediately, after a small skirmish at Chateaugay 
between his advance guard and some 500 Cana- 
dians, in which the former lost 41 and the latter 
22 men. This affair, in which hardly a tenth of 
the American force was engaged, has been, ab- 
surdly enough, designated a "battle" by most 
British and Canadian historians. In reality, it 
was the incompetency of their general and not 
the valor of their foes that caused the retreat of 
the Americans. The same comment, by the way, 
applies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, 
in the following year, which may have been lost 
by Sir George Prevost, but was certainly not won 
by the Americans. And, again, a similar criticism 
should be passed on General Wilkinson's attack 
on La Colle Mill, near the head of the same lake. 
Neither one of the three affairs was a stand-up 
fight; in each a greatly superior force, led by an 
utterly incapable general, retreated after a slight 
skirmish with an enemy whose rout would have 



xviii Preface to Third Edition 

been a matter of certainty had the engagement 
been permitted to grow serious. 

In the early spring of 1814, a small force of 160 
American regulars, under Captain Holmes, fight- 
ing from behind felled logs, routed 200 British 
with a loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 
8. On Lake Ontario, the British made a descent 
on Oswego and took it by fair assault ; and after- 
ward lost 180 men who tried to cut out some 
American transports, and were killed or captured 
to a man. All through the spring and early sum- 
mer the army on the Niagara frontier was care- 
fully drilled by Brown, and more especially by 
Scott, and the results of this drilling were seen 
in the immensely improved effectiveness of the 
soldiers in the campaign that opened in July. 
Fort Erie was captured with little resistance, and 
on the 4th of July, at the river Chippeway, Brown, 
with two brigades of regulars, each about 1200 
strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade of 
800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a 
total of about 3200 men, won a stand-up fight 
against the British General Riall, who had nearly 
2500 men, 1800 of them regulars. Porter's brig- 
ade opened by driving in the Canadian militia 
and the Indians; but was itself checked by the 
British light-troops. Ripley's brigade took very 
little part in the battle, three of the regiments not 
being engaged at all, and the fourth so slightly 



Preface to Third Edition xix 

as to lose but five men. The entire brunt of the 
action was borne by Scott's brigade, which was 
fiercely attacked by the bulk of the British regu- 
lars under Riall. The latter advanced with great 
bravery, but were terribly cut up by the fire of 
Scott's regulars ; and when they had come nearly 
up to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and 
drove them clean ofl: the field. The American 
loss was 322, including 23 Indians; the British 
loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. The 
number of Americans actually engaged did not 
exceed that of the British; and Scott's brigade, 
in fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge, defeated 
an equal force of British regulars. 

On July 25th occurred the battle of Niagara, 
or Lundy's Lane, fought between General Brown 
with 3 1 00 ' Americans and General Drummond 
with 3500 ^ British. It was brought on by acci- 
dent in the evening, and was waged with obstinate 
courage and savage slaughter till midnight. On 
both sides the forces straggled into action by de- 
tachments. The Americans formed the attack- 
ing party. As before, Scott's brigade bore the 

^ As near as can be found out; most American authorities 
make it much less; Lossing, for example, says, only 2400. 

2 General Drummond in his official letter makes it but 
2800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3000 rank and 
file; adding 13 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and 
drummers, brings it up to 3400; and we still have to count 
in the artillery drivers, etc. 



XX Preface to Third Edition 

brunt of the fight, and over half of his men were 
killed or wounded; he himself was disabled and 
borne from the field. The struggle was of the 
most desperate character, the combatants show- 
ing a stubborn courage that could not be sur- 
passed/ Charge after charge was made with the 
bayonet, and the artillery was taken and retaken 
once and again. The loss was nearly equal: on 
the side of the Americans, 854 men (including 
Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and two 
guns; on that of the British, 878 men (including 
General Riall, captured) and one gun. Each side 
claimed it as a victory over superior numbers. 
The truth is beyond question that the British had 
the advantage in numbers, and a still greater 
advantage in position ; while it is equally beyond 
question that it was a defeat and not a victory 
for the Americans. They left the field and retired 
in perfect order to Fort Erie, while the British 
held the field and the next day pursued their foes. 
Having received some reinforcements. General 
Drummond, now with about 3600 men, pushed 

^ General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner 
were their attacks directed against our guns that our artillery- 
men were bayoneted while in the act of loading, and the 
muzzle, of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few 
yards of ours." Even James says: "Upon the whole, how- 
ever, the American troops fought bravely; and the conduct 
of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially, 
would have done honor to any service." 



Preface to Third Edition xxi 

forward to besiege Fort Erie, in which was the 
American army, some 2400 strong, under General 
Gaines. Colonel Tucker, with 500 British regulars, 
was sent across the Niagara to destroy the bat- 
teries at Black Rock, but was defeated by 300 
American regulars under Major Morgan, fighting 
from behind a strong breastwork of felled trees, 
with a creek in front. On the night of the 15th 
of August, the British in three columns advanced 
to storm the American works, but after making a 
most determined assault were beaten off. The as- 
sailants lost 900 men, the assailed about 80. After 
this nothing was done till September 17th, when 
General Brown, who had resumed command of the 
American forces, determined upon and executed 
a sortie. Each side had received reinforcements; 
the Americans numbered over 3000, the British 
nearly 4000. The fighting was severe, the Ameri- 
cans losing 500 men; but their opponents lost 600 
men ; and most of their batteries were destroyed. 
Each side, as usual, claimed the victory; but, 
exactly as Lundy's Lane must be accounted an 
American defeat, as our forces retreated from the 
ground, so this must be considered an American 
victory, for after it the British broke up camp 
and drew off to Chippeway. Nothing more was 
done, and on November 5th the American army 
recrossed the Niagara. Though marked by some 
brilliant feats of arms this four months' invasion of 



xxii Preface to Third Edition 

Canada, like those that had preceded it, thus came 
to nothing. But at the same time a British in- 
vasion of the United States was repulsed far more 
disgracefully. Sir George Prevost, with an army 
of 13,000 veteran troops, marched south along 
the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which 
was held by General Macomb with 2000 regulars, 
and perhaps double that number of nearly worth- 
less militia ; — a force that the British could have 
scattered to the winds, though, as they were 
strongly posted, not without severe loss. But the 
British fleet was captured by Commodore Mac- 
Donough in the fight on the lake; and then Sir 
George, after some heavy skirmishing between 
the outposts of the armies, in which the Americans 
had the advantage, fled precipitately back to 
Canada. 

All through the war the sea-coasts of the United 
States had been harried by small predatory ex- 
cursions; a part of what is now the State of 
Maine was conquered with little resistance, and 
kept until the close of hostilities; and some of 
the towns on the shores of Chesapeake Bay had 
been plundered or burnt. In August, 18 14, a 
more serious invasion was planned, and some 
5000 troops — regulars, sailors, and marines — were 
landed, under the command of General Ross. So 
utterly helpless was the Democratic Administra- 
tion at Washington, that during the two years 



Preface to Third Edition xxiii 

of warfare hardly any steps had been taken to 
protect the Capitol, or the country round about; 
what little was done was done entirely too late, 
and bungled badly in addition. History has not 
yet done justice to the ludicrous and painful folly 
and stupidity of which the government founded 
by Jefferson and carried on by Madison, was 
guilty, both in its preparations for, and in its way 
of carrying on, this war; nor is it yet realized 
that the men just mentioned, and their associates, 
are primarily responsible for the loss we suffered 
in it, and the bitter humiliation some of its inci- 
dents caused us. The small British army marched 
at will through Virginia and Maryland, burned 
Washington, and finally retreated from before 
Baltimore and re-embarked to take part in the 
expedition against New Orleans. Twice, at Bla- 
densburg and North Point, it came in contact with 
superior numbers of militia in fairly good position. 
In each case the result was the same. After 
some preliminary skirmishing, manoeuvring, and 
volley firing, the British charged with the bayonet. 
The rawest regiments among the American mi- 
litia then broke at once; the others kept pretty 
steady, pouring in quite a destructive fire, until 
the regulars had come up close to them, when 
they also fled. The British regulars were too 
heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their 
mode of attack, and the rapidity with which their 



xxiv Preface to Third Edition 

opponents ran away, the loss of the latter was in 
each case very slight. At North Point, however, 
the militia, being more experienced, behaved 
better than at Bladensburg. In neither case 
were the British put to any trouble to win their 
victory. 

The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns 
of the war. It is not cheerful reading for an 
American, nor yet of interest to a military student ; 
and its lessons have been taught so often by 
similar occurrences in other lands under like cir- 
cumstances, and, moreover, teach such self-evident 
truths, that they scarcely need to be brought to 
the notice of an historian. But the crowning 
event of the war was the battle of New Orleans ; 
remarkable in its military aspect, and a source 
of pride to every American. It is well worth a 
more careful study, and to it I have devoted the 
last chapter of this work. 



New York City, 1883. 



PREFACE 

THE history of the naval events of the War of 
1812 has been repeatedly presented both 
to the American and the English reader. 
Historical writers have treated it either in con- 
nection with a general account of the contest on 
land and sea, or as forming a part of the complete 
record of the navies of the two nations. A few 
monographs, which confine themselves strictly to 
the naval occurrences, have also appeared. But 
none of these works can be regarded as giving 
a satisfactorily full or impartial account of the 
war, some of them being of the "popular " and 
loosely constructed order, while others treat it 
from a purely partisan standpoint. No single 
book can be quoted which would be accepted by 
the modern reader as doing justice to both sides, 
or, indeed, as telling the whole story. Any one 
specially interested in the subject must read all; 
and then it will seem almost a hopeless task to 
reconcile the many and widely contradictory 
statements he will meet with. 

There appear to be three works which, taken 
in combination, give the best satisfaction on the 

XXV 



xxvi Preface 

subject. First, in James's Naval History of Great 
Britain (which supphes both the material and 
the opinions of almost every subsequent English 
or Canadian historian) can be found the British 
view of the case. It is an invaluable work, written 
with fulness and care ; on the other hand, it is also 
a piece of special pleading by a bitter and not 
over-scrupulous partisan. This, in the second 
place, can be partially supplemented by Fenimore 
Cooper's Naval History of the United States. The 
latter gives the American view of the cruises and 
battles; but it is much less of an authority than 
James's, both because it is written without great 
regard for exactness, and because all figures for 
the American side need to be supplied from Lieu- 
tenant (now Admiral) George E. Emmons's Statis- 
tical History of the United States Navy, which is 
the third of the works in question. 

But even after comparing these three authors, 
many contradictions remain unexplained, and the 
truth can only be reached in such cases by a care- 
ful examination of the navy Records, the London 
Naval Chronicle, Niles's Register, and other similar 
documentary publications. Almost the only good 
criticisms on the actions are those incidentally 
given in standard works on other subjects, such 
as Lord Howard Douglass's Naval Gunnery, and 
Admiral Jurien de la Graviere's Guerres Maritimes. 
Much of the material in our Navy Department 



Preface xxvii 

has never been touched at all. In short, no full, 
accurate, and unprejudiced history of the war has 
ever been written. 

The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has 
received. At present people are beginning to 
realize that it is folly for the great English-speak- 
ing Republic to rely for defence upon a navy com- 
posed partly of antiquated hulks, and partly of 
new vessels rather more worthless than the old. 
It is worth while to study with some care that 
period of our history during which our navy stood 
at the highest pitch of its fame ; and, to learn any- 
thing from the past, it is necessary to know, as 
near as may be, the exact truth. Accordingly, 
the work should be written impartially, if only 
from the narrowest motives. Without abating a 
jot from one's devotion to his country and flag, 
I think a history can be made just enough to 
warrant its being received as an authority equally 
among Americans and Englishmen. I have 
endeavored to supply such a work. It is im- 
possible that errors, both of fact and opinion, 
should not have crept into it; and although I 
have sought to make it in character as non-parti- 
san as possible, these errors will probably be in 
favor of the American side. 

As my only object is to give an accurate narra- 
tive of events, I shall esteem it a particular favor 
if any one will furnish me with the means of 



xxviii Preface 

rectifying such mistakes ; and if I have done in- 
justice to any commander, or officer of any grade, 
whether American or British, I shall consider 
myself under great obligations to those who will 
set me right. 

I have been unable to get access to the original 
reports of the British commanders, the logs of 
the British ships, or their muster-rolls, and so 
have been obliged to take them at second hand 
from the Gazette, or Naval Chronicle, or some 
standard history. The American official letters, 
log-books, original contracts, muster-rolls, etc., 
however, being preserved in the Archives at 
Washington, I have been able, thanks to the 
courtesy of the Hon. Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary 
of the Navy, to look them over. The set of letters 
from the officers is very complete, in three series, 
— Captains' Letters, Masters-Commandant Letters, 
and Officers' Letters, — there being several volumes 
for each year. The books of contracts contain 
valuable information as to the size and build of 
some of the vessels. The log-books are rather 
exasperating, often being very incomplete. Thus, 
when I turned from Decatur's extremely vague 
official letter describing the capture of the Mace- 
donian to the log-book of the Frigate United 
States, not a fact about the fight could be gleaned. 
The last entry in the log on the day of the fight is 
" strange sail discovered to be a frigate under Eng- 



Preface xxix 

lish colors," and the next entry (on the following 
day) relates to the removal of the prisoners. The 
log of the Enterprise is very full indeed, for most 
of the time, but is a perfect blank for the period 
during which she was commanded by Lieutenant 
Burrows, and in which she fought the Boxer. I 
have not been able to find the Peacock's log at all, 
though there is a very full set of letters from her 
commander. Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed 
a great deal of valuable material. Whenever it 
was possible I have referred to printed matter in 
preference to manuscript, and my authorities can 
thus, in most cases, be easily consulted. 

In conclusion, I desire to express my sincerest 
thanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of 
the United States Navy, and Commander Adolf 
Mensing, formerly of the German Navy, without 
whose advice and sympathy this work would 
probably never have been written or even begun. 

New York City, 1882. 



PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES 
REFERRED TO 

(see also in alphabetical place in index) 

American State Papers. 

Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, lySj to 
i8j6. 2 vols., octavo. London, 1837. 

Broke, Adm., Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo. 
London, 1866. 

Captains' Letters, in Archives at Washington. 

Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs. Edited by his daugh- 
ter. 2 vols., octavo. London, 1873. 

Coggesliall, George. History of American Privateers. New- 
York, 1876. 

Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New 
York, 1856. 

Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. Lon- 
don, i860. 

Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London, 
i860. 

Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States 
Navy. 1853. 

Farragut, Adm,. D. G., Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. 
Octavo. New York, 1878. 

Gravierc, Adm., J. de la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols., 
octavo. Paris, 1881. 

James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols., 
octavo. London, 1837. 

James, William. Naval Occurrences with tlie Americans. 
Octavo. London, 1817. 

London Naval Chronicle. 

xxxi 



Principal Authorities Referred To 

Lossing, Benson J . Field-book of the War of 1812. Octavo. 
New York, 1869. 

Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 161 j to i86j. 2 
vols., octavo. London, 1877. 

Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols., octavo. 
London, 1825. 

Masters-Commandant Letters, in Archives at Washington. 

Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880. 

Naval Archives, at Washington. 

Niles. Weekly Register. 

Pielat, B. La Vie et les Actions Memorables du St. Michel 
de Ruyter. Amsterdam, 1677. 

Riviere, Lieut. H. La Marine Frangaise sous le Regime de 
Louis XV. Paris, 1859. 

Tatnall, Corn., Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah, 1878. 

Toussard, L. de. American Artillerists' Companion. 
Phila. 181 1. 

Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, i868. 

Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859. 

Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy. 3 
vols., octavo. London, 1866. 



xxxu 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of America 
and Britain as regards neutral rights — Those of the former 
power right — ImpossibiUty of avoiding hostiUties — Declara- 
tion of war June 18, 18 12 — Slight preparations made — 
General features of the contest — ^The treaty of peace nomin- 
ally leaves the situation unchanged — But practically settles 
the dispute in our favor in respect to maritime rights — The 
British navy and its reputation prior to 18 12 — Comparison 
with other European navies — British and American author- 
ities consulted in the present work 1-26 

CPIAPTER II 

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America 
declared war against her — Race identity of the combatants 
— American navy at the beginning of the war — Officers well 
trained — Causes tending to make our seamen especially 
efficient — Close similarity between British and American 
sailors — Otir ships manned chiefly by native Americans, 
many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British 
navy — Quotas of seamen contributed by the different States 
— Navy yards— Lists of officers and men — Lists of vessels — 
Tonnage — Different ways of estimating it in Britain and 
America — Ratings — American ships properly rated — Ar- 
maments of the frigates and corvettes — Three styles of guns 
used — Difference between long guns and carronades — Short 

xxxiii 



xxxiv Contents 

weight of American shot — Comparison of British frigates 
rating 38 and American frigates rating 44 guns— Compared 
with a 74 27-88 



CHAPTER III 

1812 

ON THE OCEAN 

Commodore Rodgers's cruise and unsuccessful chase of the 
Belvidera — Engagement between Belvidera and President — 
Hornet captures a privateer — Cruise of the Essex — Captain 
Hull's cruise and escape from the squadron of Commodore 
Broke — Constitution captures Guerriere — Marked superiority 
shown by the Americans — Wasp captures Frolic — Dispro- 
portionate loss on the British side — Both afterward captured 
by Poictiers — Second unsuccessful cruise of Commodore 
Rodgers — United States captures Macedonian — Constitution 
captures Java — Cruise of Essex — Summary 89-169 



CHAPTER IV 

1812 

ON THE LAKES 

Preliminary. — The combatants starting nearly on an 
equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force — Difficulty of 
comparing the force of the rival squadrons — Meagreness of 
the pubHshed accounts — Unreliability of authorities, espe- 
cially James. — Ontario — Extraordinary nature of the Ameri- 
can squadron — Canadian squadron a kind of water militia — 
Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle — 
'Commodore Chauncy attacks the Royal George — And bom- 
bards York. — Erie — Lieutenant Elliot captures the Detroit 
and Caledonia — Lieutenant Angus's unsuccessful attack on 
Red House barracks 170-194 



Contents xxxv 

CHAPTER V 

I8I3 

ON THE OCEAN 

Blockade of the American coast — Commodore Porter's 
campaign with the Essex in the South Pacific — Hornet block- 
ades Bonne Citoyenne — Hornet captures Resolution — Hornet 
captures Peacock — Generous treatment shown to the con- 
quered — Viper captured by Narcissus — American privateers 
cut out by British boats — Third cruise of Commodore Rodgers 
— United States, Macedonian, and Wasp blockaded in New 
London — Broke's challenge to Lawrence — The Chesapeake 
captured by the Shannon — Comments and criticisms by 
various authorities — Surveyor captured by boats of Narcissus 
— Futile gunboat actions — British attack on Craney Island 
repulsed — Cutting-out expeditions — The Argus captured by 
the Pelican — The Enterprise captures the Boxer — Ocean war- 
fare of 1813 in favor of British — Summary 195-267 

CHAPTER VI 
1813 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Chauncy's 
superiority in strength — Chauncy takes York and Fort George 
— Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor, but keeps command 
of the lake — The Lady of the Lake captures Lady Murray — 
Hamilton and Scourge founder in a squall — Yeo's partial 
victory off Niagara — Indecisive action off the Genesee — 
Chauncy's partial victory ofE Burlington, which gives him 
the command of the lake — Yeo and Chauncy compared — 
Reasons for American success. — Erie — Perry's success in 
creating a fleet — His victory — " Glory" of it overestimated — 
Cause of his success. — Champlain — The Growler and Eagle 
captured by gunboats — Summary of year's campaign, 

268-344 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



y 



The Hon. Theodore Roosevelt . Frontispiece 
Etched by Albert Rosenthal, Jr. 

Battle between the Constitution and 

GUERRIERE 112 '' 

Walter Russell 

The Chesapeake CAPTURED BY THE Shannon . 222 "^ 
Albert Henke 

Battle of Lake Erie 312 '^ 

R. F. Zogbaum 



NAVAL WAR OF 1812 



CHAPTER I 



INTRODUCTORY 



Causes of the War of 1812 — Conflicting views of America 
and Britain as regards neutral rights— Those of the former 
power right — Impossibility of avoiding hostiUties — Declara- 
tion of war — General features of the contest — The treaty of 
peace nominally leaves the situation unchanged — But practi- 
cally settles the dispute in our favor in respect to maritime 
rights — The British navy and its reputation prior to 1812 — 
Comparison with other European navies — British and Ameri- 
can authorities consulted in the present work. 

THE view professed by Great Britain in 18 12 
respecting the rights of belHgerents and 
neutrals was diametrically opposite to that 
held by the United States. " Between England 
and the United States of America," writes a 
British author, "a spirit of animosity, caused 
chiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or 
of seamen asserted to be such, from on board of 
American merchant vessels, had unhappily sub- 
sisted for a long time" prior to the war. " It is, 
we believe," he continues, "an acknowledged 

VOL. I. — I. 



2 Naval War of 1812 

maxim of public law, as well that no nation but 
the one he belongs to can release a subject from 
his natural allegiance, as that, provided the juris- 
diction of another independent state be not in- 
fringed, every nation has a right to enforce the 
services of her subjects wherever they may be 
found. Nor has any neutral nation such a juris- 
diction over her merchant vessels upon the high 
seas as to exclude a belligerent nation from the 
right of searching them for contraband of war or 
for the property or persons of her enemies. And 
if, in the exercise of that right, the belligerent 
should discover on board of the neutral vessel a 
subject who has withdrawn himself from his law- 
ful allegiance, the neutral can have no fair ground 
for refusing to deliver him up ; more especially if 
that subject is proved to be a deserter from the 
sea or land service of the former." ^ 

Great Britain's doctrine was, "once a subject 
always a subject. ' ' On the other hand, the United 
States maintained that any foreigner, after five 
years' residence within her territory, and after 
having complied with certain forms, became one 
of her citizens as completely as if he was native 
born. Great Britain contended that her war ships 
possessed the right of searching all neutral vessels 

^ The Naval History of Great Britain, by William James, 
vol. iv., p. 324. (New edition by Captain Chamier, R. N., 
London, 1837.) 



Naval War of 1812 



for the property and persons of her foes. The 
United States resisted this claim, asserting that 
"free bottoms made free goods," and that conse- 
quently her ships when on the high seas should 
not be molested on any pretext whatever. Finally, 
Great Britain's system of impressment,^ by which 
men could be forcibly seized and made to serve 
in her navy, no matter at what cost to themselves, 
was repugnant to every American idea. 

Such wide differences in the views of the two 
nations produced endless difficulties. To escape 
the press-gang, or for other reasons, many British 
seamen took service under the American flag; 
and if they were demanded back, it is not likely 
that they or their American shipmates had much 
hesitation in swearing either that they were not 
British at all, or else that they had been natural- 
ized as Americans. Equally probable is it that 
the American blockade-runners were guilty of a 
great deal of fraud and more or less thinly veiled 
perjury. But the wrongs done by the Americans 
were insignificant compared with those they re- 
ceived. Any innocent merchant vessel was liable 
to seizure at any moment ; and when overhauled 
by a British cruiser short of men was sure to be 
stripped of most of her crew. The British officers 
were themselves the judges as to whether a 

^ The best idea of which can be gained by reading Marryat's 
novels. 



4 Naval War of 1 812 

seaman should be pronounced a native of Amer- 
ica or of Britain, and there was no appeal from 
their judgment. If a captain lacked his full com- 
plement there was little doubt as to the view he 
would take of any man's nationality. The 
wrongs inflicted on our seafaring countrymen by 
their impressment into foreign ships formed the 
main cause of the war. 

There were still other grievances which are thus 
presented by the British Admiral Cochrane.^ ' ' Our 
treatment of its (America's) citizens was scarcely 
in accordance with the national privileges to 
which the young Republic had become entitled. 
There were, no doubt, many individuals among 
the American people who, caring little for the Fede- 
ral Government, considered it more profitable to 
break than to keep the laws of nations by aiding 
and supporting our enemy (France), and it was 
against such that the efforts of the squadron had 
chiefly been directed; but the way the object was 
carried out was scarcely less an infraction of those 
national laws which we were professedly enfor- 
cing. The practice of taking English (and Ameri- 
can) seamen out of American ships, without regard 
to the safety of navigating them when thus de- 
prived of their hands, has been already mentioned. 

^Autobiography of a Seaman, by Thomas, tenth Earl of 
Dundonald, Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiral of the Fleet. 
London, i860, vol. i., p. 24. 



Naval War of 1 812 5 

To this may be added the detention of vessels 
against which nothing contrary to international 
neutrality could be established, whereby their 
cargoes became damaged; the compelling them, 
on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other than 
those to which they were destined ; and generally 
treating them as though they were engaged in 
contraband trade. . . . American ships were 
not permitted to quit English ports without giving 
security for the discharge of their cargoes in some 
other British or neutral port." On the same sub- 
ject, James' writes: "When, by the maritime su- 
premacy of England, France could no longer trade 
for herself, America proffered her services, as a 
neutral, to trade for her ; and American merchants 
and their agents, in the gains that flowed in, soon 
found a compensation for all the perjury and 
fraud necessary to cheat the former out of her 
belligerent rights. The high commercial im- 
portance of the United States thus obtained, 
coupled with a similarity of language and, to a 
superficial observer, a resemblance in person be- 
tween the natives of America and Great Britain, 
has caused the former to be the chief, if not the 
only sufferers by the exercise of the right of 
search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and 
prosperity to emigration from Europe, the United 
States hold out every allurement to foreigners, 

^ L. c, iv., 325. 



6 Naval War of 1812 

particularly to British seamen, whom, by a pro- 
cess peculiarly their own, they can naturalize as 
quickly as a dollar can exchange masters and a 
blank form, ready signed and sworn to, can be 
filled up/ It is the knowledge of this fact that 
makes British naval officers, when searching for 
deserters from their service, so harsh in their 
scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and 
asseverations." 

The last sentence of the foregoing from James 
is an euphemistic way of saying that whenever a 
British commander short of men came across an 
American vessel he impressed all of her crew that 
he wanted, whether they were citizens of the 
United States or not. It must be remembered 
however, that the only reason why Great Britain 
did us more injury than any other power was be- 
cause she was better able to do so. None of her 
acts were more offensive than Napoleon's Milan 
decree, by which it was declared that any neutral 
vessel which permitted itself to be searched by a 
British cruiser should be considered as British, 
and as the lawful prize of any French vessel. 
French frigates and privateers were very apt to 
snap up any American vessel they came across, 
and were only withheld at all by the memory of 
the sharp dressing they had received in the West 
Indies during the quasi-war of 1 799-1800. What 

^ This is an exaggeration. 



Naval War of 1 812 7 

we undoubtedly ought to have done was to have 
adopted the measure actually proposed in Con- 
gress, and declared war on both France and Eng- 
land. As it was, we chose as a foe the one that 
had done, and could still do, us the greatest 
injury. 

The principles for which the United States con- 
tended in 181 2 are now universally accepted, and 
those so tenaciously maintained by Great Britain 
find no advocates in the civilized world. That 
England herself was afterwards completely recon- 
ciled to our views, was amply shown by her intense 
mdignation when Commodore Wilkes, in the ex- 
ercise of the right of search for the persons of the 
foes of his country, stopped the neutral British 
ship Trent; while the applause with which the 
act was greeted in America proves pretty clearly 
another fact— that we had warred for the right, 
not because it was the right, but because it agreed 
with our self-interest to do so. We were con- 
tending for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights": 
meaning by the former expression, freedom to 
trade wherever we chose without hindrance save 
from the power with whom we were trading; 
and by the latter, that a man who happened to 
be on the sea should have the same protection ac- 
corded to a man who remained on land. Nom- 
inally, neither of these questions was settled by, or 
even alluded to, in the treaty of peace; but the 



8 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

immense increase in reputation that the navy ac- 
quired during the war practically decided both 
points in our favor. Our sailors had gained too 
great a name for any one to molest them with 
impunity again. 

Holding views on these maritime subjects so 
radically different from each other, the two nations 
could not but be continually dealing with causes 
of quarrel. Not only did British cruisers molest 
our merchantmen, but at length one of them, 
the 50-gun ship Leopard attacked an American 
frigate, the Chesapeake, when the latter was so 
lumbered up that she could not return a shot, 
killed or disabled some twenty of her men, and 
took away four others, one Briton and three 
Americans, who were claimed as deserters. For 
this act an apology was offered, but it failed to 
restore harmony between the two nations. Soon 
afterward another action was fought. The Ameri- 
can frigate President, Commodore Rodgers, at- 
tacked the British sloop Little Belt, Captain 
Bingham, and exchanged one or two broadsides 
with her, the frigate escaping scot-free while the 
sloop was nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual re- 
criminations followed, each side insisting that the 
other was the assailant. 

When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council 
forbidding our trading with France, we retaliated 
by passing an embargo act, which prevented us 



Naval War of 1812 9 

from trading at all. There could be but one re- 
sult to such a succession of incidents, and that 
was war. Accordingly, in June, 181 2, war was 
declared; and as a contest for the rights of sea- 
men, it was largely waged on the ocean. We also 
had not a little fighting to do on land, in which, 
as a rule, we came out second-best. Few or no 
preparations for the war had been made, and the 
result was such as might have been anticipated. 
After dragging on through three dreary and un- 
eventful years it came to an end in 181 5, by a 
peace which left matters in almost precisely the 
state in which the war had found them. On land 
and water the contest took the form of a succes- 
sion of petty actions, in which the glory acquired 
by the victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace incurred 
by the vanquished. Neither side succeeded in 
doing what it intended. Americans declared 
that Canada must and should be conquered, 
but the conquering came quite as near being 
the other way. British writers insisted that the 
American navy should be swept from the seas ; 
and, during the sweeping process, it increased 
fourfold. 

When the United States declared war. Great 
Britain was straining every nerve and muscle in a 
death struggle with the most formidable military 
despotism of modern times, and was obliged to 
entrust the defence of her Canadian colonies to a 



lo Naval War of 1812 

mere handful of regulars, aided by the local fenci- 
bles. But Congress had provided even fewer 
trained soldiers, and relied on the militia. The 
latter chiefly exercised their fighting abilities upon 
one another in duelling, and, as a rule, were 
afflicted with conscientious scruples whenever it 
was necessary to cross the frontier and attack the 
enemy. Accordingly, the campaign opened with 
the bloodless surrender of an American general to 
a much inferior British force, and the war con- 
tinued much as it had begun; we suffered dis- 
grace after disgrace, while the losses we inflicted, 
in turn, on Great Britain were so slight as hardly 
to attract her attention. At last, having crushed 
her greater foe, she turned to crush the lesser and, 
in her turn, suffered ignominious defeat. By this 
time events had gradually developed a small num- 
ber of soldiers on our Northern frontier, who, com- 
manded by Scott and Brown, were able to 
contend on equal terms with the veteran troops 
to whom they were opposed, though these formed 
part of what was then undoubtedly the most for- 
midable fighting infantry any European nation 
possessed. The battles at this period of the 
struggle were remarkable for the skill and stub- 
born courage with which they were waged, as well 
as for the heavy loss involved; but the number 
of combatants was so small that in Europe they 
would have been regarded as mere outpost skir- 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 11 

mishes, and they wholly failed to attract any at- 
tention abroad in that period of colossal armies. 
When Great Britain seriously turned her at- 
tention to her transatlantic foe, and assembled in 
Canada an army of 14,000 men at the head of 
Lake Champlain, Congressional forethought en- 
abled it to be opposed by soldiers who, it is true, 
were as well disciplined, as hardy, and as well 
commanded as any in the world, but who were 
only a few hundred strong, backed by more or less 
incompetent militia. Only McDonough's skill 
and Sir George Prevost's incapacity saved us from 
a serious disaster; the sea-fight reflected high 
honor on our seamen, but the retreat of the 
British land-forces was due to their commander 
and not to their antagonists. Meanwhile, a large 
British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achieved 
much glory by the destruction of local oyster- 
boats and the burning of a few farmers' houses, 
so an army was landed to strike a decisive blow. 
At Bladensburg ' the five thousand British regu- 
lars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by 
their mere appearance frightened into a panic 
double their number of American militia, well 
posted. But the only success attained was burn- 
ing the public buildings of Washington, and 
that result was of dubious value. Baltimore was 

^ See the Capture of Washington, by Edward D. Ingraham 
(Philadelphia, 1849). 



12 Naval War of i8i 2 

attacked next, and the attack repulsed, after the 
forts and ships had shelled one another with the 
slight results that usually attend that spectacular 
and harmless species of warfare. 

The close of the contest was marked by the 
extraordinary battle of New Orleans. It was a 
perfectly useless shedding of blood, since peace 
had already been declared. There is hardly an- 
other contest of modern times where the defeated 
side suffered such frightful carnage, while the 
victors came off almost scathless. It is quite in 
accordance with the rest of the war that the 
militia, hitherto worse than useless, should on 
this occasion win against great odds in point of 
numbers ; and, moreover, that their splendid vic- 
tory should have been of little consequence in its 
effects upon the result. On the whole, the con- 
test by land, where we certainly ought to have 
been successful, reflected greater credit on our 
antagonists than upon us, in spite of the services 
of Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our small force 
of regulars and volunteers did excellently; as for 
the militia, New Orleans proved that they could 
fight superbly; and the other battles, that they 
generally would not fight at all. 

At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were 
widely different. Here we possessed a small but 
highly effective force, the ships well built, manned 
by thoroughly trained men, and commanded by 



Naval War of 1 812 13 

able and experienced officers. The deeds of our 
navy form a part of history over which any Ameri- 
can can be pardoned for Hngering. 

Such was the origin, issue, and general character 
of the war. It may now be well to proceed to a 
comparison of the authorities on the subject. 
Allusion has already been made to them in the 
preface, but a fuller reference seems to be neces- 
sary in this connection. 

At the close of the contest, the large majority 
of historians who wrote of it were so bitterly ran- 
corous that their statements must be received 
with caution. For the main facts, I have relied, 
wherever it was practicable, upon the official 
letters of the commanding officers, taking each as 
authority for his own loss.' For all the British 
victories we have British official letters, which 
tally almost exactly, as regards matters of fact 
and not of opinion, with the corresponding Ameri- 
can accounts. For the first year, the British also 
published official accounts of their defeats, which, 
in the cases of the Guerriere, Macedonian, and 

^ As, where Broke states his own force at 330, his antagonist's 
at 440, and the American court of inquiry makes the num- 
bers 396 and 379, 1 have taken them as being 330 and 379, 
respectively. This is the only just method; I take it for 
granted that each commander meant to tell the truth, and, 
of course, knew his own force, while he might very naturally 
and in perfect good faith exaggerate his antagonist's. 



H Naval War of 1812 

Frolic, I have followed as closely as the accounts 
of the American victors. The last British official 
letter published, announcing a defeat, was that in 
the case of the Java, and it is the only letter that 
I have not strictly accepted. The fact that no 
more were published thereafter is of itself un- 
fortunate; and from the various contradictions 
it contains it would appear to have been tam- 
pered with. The surgeon's report accompanying 
it is certainly false. Subsequent to 181 2, no let- 
ter of a defeated British commander was pub- 
lished,^ and I have to depend upon the various 
British historians, especially James — of whom 
more anon. 

The American and British historians from whom 
we are thus at times forced to draw our material 
regard the war from very different standpoints, 
and their accounts generally differ. Each writer, 
naturally, so colored the affair as to have it ap- 
pear favorable to his own side. Sometimes this 
was done intentionally and sometimes not. Not 
infrequently errors are made against the his- 
torian's own side; as when the British author, 
Brenton, says that the British brig Peacock 
mounted 32's instead of 24's, while Lossing, in 
his Field Book of the War of 18 t 2, makes the same 

^ Except about the battles on the Lakes, where I have ac- 
cordingly given the same credit to the accounts both of the 
British and of the Americans. 



Naval War of 1 812 15 

mistake about the armament of the American 
brig Argus. Errors of this description are, of 
course, as carefully to be guarded against as any 
others. Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has 
been said," "a prisoner on board the opposing 
fleet has observed," "an American (or British) 
newspaper of such and such a date has remarked," 
are of course to be rejected. There is a curious 
parallelism in the errors on both sides. For ex- 
ample, the American Mr. Low, writing in 1813, 
tells how the Constitution, 44, captured the Giier- 
riere of 49 guns, while the British Lieutenant Low, 
writing in 1880, tells how the Pelican, 18, captured 
the Argus of 20 guns. Each records the truth, 
but not the whole truth, for although rating 44 
and 18 the victors carried respectively 54 and 21 
guns, of heavier metal than those of their an- 
tagonists. Such errors are generally intentional. 
Similarly, most American writers mention the 
actions in which the privateers were victorious, 
but do not mention those in which they were de- 
feated; while the British, in turn, record every 
successful " cutting-out " expedition, but ignore en- 
tirely those which terminated unfavorably. Other 
errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, James, 
in speaking of the repulse of the Endymion's 
boats by the Ncufchatel, gives the latter a crew 
of 120 men; she had more than this number 
originally, but only forty were in her at the time 



i6 Naval War of 1812 

of the attack. So also when the captain of the 
Pelican writes that the officers of the Argus report 
her loss at 40, when they really reported it at 24, 
or when Captain Dacres thought the Constitution 
had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The 
American gun-boat captains, in recounting their 
engagements with the British frigates invariably 
greatly overestimated the loss of the latter. So 
that on both sides there were some intentional 
misstatements or garblings, and a much more 
numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely 
from an incapacity for seeing more than one side 
of the question. 

Among the early British writers upon this war, 
the ablest was James. He devoted one work, his 
Naval Occurrences, entirely to it ; and it occupies 
the largest part of the sixth volume of his more 
extensive History of the British Navy."- Two other 
British writers. Lieutenant Marshall ^ and Captain 
Brenton,^ wrote histories of the same events, about 
the same time ; but neither of these naval officers 
produced half as valuable a work as did the 
civilian James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes, 
each filled with several scores of dreary panegyrics 
or memoirs of as many different officers. There 

' A new edition. London, 1826. 

2 Royal Naval Biography, by John Marshall. London, 1823- 

1835- 

3 Naval History of Great Britain, by Edward Pelham Bren- 
ton. New edition, London, 1837. 



Naval War of 1 812 17 

is no attempt at order, hardly anything about the 
ships, guns, or composition of the crews; and not 
even the pretence of giving both sides, the object 
being to make every EngHshman appear in his 
best Hght. The work is analogous to the numer- 
ous lives of Decatur, Bainbridge, Porter, etc., that 
appeared in the United States about the same 
time, and is quite as untrustworthy. Brenton 
made a far better and very interesting book, 
written on a good and well-connected plan, and 
apparently with a sincere desire to tell the truth. 
He accepts the British official accounts as needing 
nothing whatever to supplement them, precisely 
as Cooper accepts the American officials'. A 
more serious fault is his inability to be accurate. 
That this inaccuracy is not intentional, is proved 
by the fact that it tells as often against his own 
side as against his opponents. He says, for ex- 
ample, that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's 
squadrons "were about equal in number and 
weight," that the Peacock (British) was armed 
with 32's instead of 24's, and underestimates the 
force of the second Wasp. But the blunders are 
quite as bad when distributed as when confined 
to one side; in addition, Brenton's disregard of 
all details makes him of but little use. 

James, as already said, is by far the most valu- 
able authority on the war, as regards purely British 
affairs. He enters minutely into details, and has 



VOL. I. — 2 



i8 Naval War of 1812 

evidently laboriously hunted up his authorities. 
He has examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty 
reports, various treaties, all the Gazette reports, 
gives very well-chosen extracts, has arranged his 
work in chronological order, discriminates be- 
tween the officers that deserve praise and those 
that deserve blame, and in fact writes a book 
which ought to be consulted by every student of 
naval affairs. But he is unfortunately afflicted 
with a hatred toward the Americans that amounts 
to a monomania. He wishes to make out as 
strong a case as possible against them. The 
animus of his work may be gathered from the not 
over-complimentary account of the education of 
the youthful seafaring American, which can be 
found in vol. vi., p. 113, of his History. On page 
153 he asserts that he is an " impartial historian" ; 
and about three lines before mentions that "it 
may suit the Americans to invent any falsehood, 
no matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant char- 
acter on themselves." On page 419 he says that 
Captain Porter is to be believed, "so far as is 
borne out by proof (the only safe way where 
an American is concerned)," — which somewhat 
sweeping denunciation of the veracity of all of 
Captain Porter's compatriots would seem to indi- 
cate that James was not, perhaps, in that dis- 
passionate frame of mind best suited for writing 
history. That he should be biassed against in- 



Naval War of 1812 19 

dividual captains can be understood, but when 
he makes rabid onslaughts upon the American 
people as a whole, he renders it difficult for an 
American, at any rate, to put implicit credence 
in him. His statements are all the harder to 
confute when they are erroneous, because they are 
intentionally so. It is not, as with Brenton and 
Marshall, because he really thinks a British cap- 
tain cannot be beaten, except by some kind of 
distorted special providence, for no man says 
worse things than he does about certain officers 
and crews. A writer of James's undoubted ability 
must have known perfectly well that his state- 
ments were untrue in many instances, as where 
he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter's loss, or 
misstates the comparative force of the fleets on 
Lake Champlain. 

When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge 
wished to run away from the Java, and would 
have done so if he had not been withheld by the 
advice of his first lieutenant, who was a renegade 
Englishman,' it is not of much consequence 
whether his making the statement was due to 
excessive credulity or petty meanness, for, in 
either case, whether the defect was in his mind or 
his morals, it is enough to greatly impair the 
value of his other "facts." Again, when James 

' Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born in Virginia, and 
never in England in his life. 



20 Naval War of 1812 

(p. 165) states that Decatur ran away from the 
Macedonian until, by some marvellous optical de- 
lusion, he mistook her for a 3 2 , he merely detracts 
a good deal from the worth of his own account. 
When the Americans adopt boarding helmets, he 
considers it as proving conclusively that they are 
suffering from an acute attack of cowardice. On 
p. 122 he says that "had the President, when she 
fell in with the Belvidera, been cruising alone 
, . . Commodore Rodgers would have magni- 
fied the British frigate into a line-of-battle ship, 
and have done his utmost to avoid her," which 
gives an excellent idea of the weight to be attached 
to the various other anecdotes he relates of the 
much-abused Commodore Rodgers. 

But it must always be remembered that un- 
trustworthy as James is in anything referring 
purely to the Americans, he is no worse than his 
compeers of both nationalities. The misstate- 
ments of Niles in his Weekly Register about the 
British are quite as flagrant, and his information 
about his own side even more valuable.^ Every 

^ In Nilcs, by the way, can be found excellent examples of 
the traditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place 
I remember his describing "The Immortal Rodgers," balked 
of his natural prey, the British, as "soaring about like the 
bold bald eagle of his native land," seeking whom he might 
devour. The accounts he gives of British line-of-battle 
ships fleeing from American 44's qtiite match James's anec- 
dotes of the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36's for 



Naval War of 1 812 21 

little American author crowed over Perry's " Nel- 
sonic victory over a greatly superior force." The 
Constitution was declared to have been at a dis- 
advantage when she fought the Guerrihe, and so 
on, ad infinitum. But these writers have all faded 
into oblivion, and their writings are not even re- 
ferred to, much less believed. James, on the con- 
trary, has passed through edition after edition, is 
considered as unquestionable authority in his own 
country, and largely throughout Europe, and has 
furnished the basis for every subsequent account 
by British authors. From Alison to Lieutenant 
Low, almost every English work, whether of a 
popular character or not, is, in so far as it touches 
on the war, simply a ' ' rehash ' ' of the works writ- 
ten by James. The consequence is that the 
British and American accounts have astonishingly 
little resemblance. One ascribes the capture of 
the British frigates simply to the fact that their 
opponents were "cut down line-of -battle ships"; 
the other gives all the glory to the "undaunted 
heroism," etc., of the Yankee sailors. 

One not very creditable trait of the early Ameri- 
can naval historians gave their rivals a great 
advantage. The object of the former was to 

fear they might mount twent3'-four -pounders. The two 
works taken together give a ver>^ good idea of the war; 
separately, either is utterly unreliable, especially in matters 
of opinion. 



22 Naval War of 1812 

make out that the Constitution, for example, won 
her victories against an equal foe, and an exact 
statement of the forces showed the contrary; so 
they always avoided figures, and thus left the 
ground clear for James's careful misstatements. 
Even when they criticised him they never went 
into details, confining themselves to some remark 
about "hurling" his figures in his face with 
" loathing." Even Cooper, interesting though his 
work is, has gone far less into figures than he 
should, and seems to have paid little, if any, at- 
tention to the British official statements, which 
of course should be received as of equal weight with 
the American. His comments on the actions are 
generally very fair, the book never being dis- 
figured by bitterness toward the British ; but he 
is certainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the 
loss of the Chesapeake solely to accident, that of 
the Argus solely to her inferiority in force, and so 
on. His disposition to praise all the American 
commanders may be generous, but is nevertheless 
unjust. If Decatur's surrender of the President 
is at least impliedly praised, then Porter's defence 
of the Essex can hardly receive its just award. 
There is no weight in the commendation bestowed 
upon Hull, if commendation, the same in kind 
though less in degree, is bestowed upon Rodgers. 
It is a great pity that Cooper did not write a 
criticism on James, for no one could have done it 



Naval War of 1812 23 

more thoroughly. But he never mentions him, 
except once in speaking of Barclay's fleet. In 
all probability this silence arose from sheer con- 
tempt, and the certainty that most of James's re- 
marks were false; but the effect was that very 
many foreigners believe him to have shirked the 
subject. He rarely gives any data by which the 
statements of James can be disproved, and it is 
for this reason that I have been obliged to criticise 
the latter's work very fully. Many of James's re- 
marks, however, defy criticism from their random 
nature, as when he states that American midship- 
men were chiefly masters and mates of merchant- 
men, and does not give a single proof to support 
the assertion. It would be nearly as true to assert 
that the British midshipmen were for the most 
part ex-members of the prize-ring, and as much 
labor would be needed to disprove it. In other 
instances it is quite enough to let his words speak 
for themselves, as where he says (p. 155) that of 
the American sailors one third in number and 
one half in point of effectiveness were in reality 
British. That is, of the 450 men the Constitution 
had when she fought the Java, 150 were British, 
and the remaining 300 could have been as effec- 
tively replaced by 150 more British. So a very 
little logic works out a result that James certainly 
did not intend to arrive at: namely, that 300 
British led by American officers could beat, with 



24 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

ease and comparative impunity, 400 British led 
by their own officers. He also forgets that the 
whole consists of the sum of the parts. He ac- 
counts for the victories of the Americans by 
stating (p. 280) that they were lucky enough to 
meet with frigates and brigs that had unskilful 
gunners or worthless crews; he also carefully 
shows that the Macedonian was incompetently 
handled, the Peacock commanded by a mere 
martinet, the Avon's crew unpractised at the guns, 
the Epervier's mutinous and cowardly, the Pen- 
guin's weak and unskilful, the Java's exceedingly 
poor, and more to the same effect. Now, the 
Americans took in single fight three frigates and 
seven sloops, and when as many as ten vessels 
are met it is exceedingly probable that they rep- 
resent the fair average; so that James's strictures, 
so far as true, simply show that the average 
British ship was very apt to possess, comparatively 
speaking, an incompetent captain or unskilful 
crew. These disadvantages were not felt when 
opposed to navies in which they existed to an 
even greater extent, but became very apparent 
when brought into contact with a power whose 
few officers knew how to play their own parts 
very nearly to perfection, and, something equally 
important, knew how to make first-rate crews out 
of what was already good raw material. Finally, 
a large proportion of James's abuse of the Ameri- 



Naval War of 1 812 25 

cans sufficiently refutes itself, and perhaps Coop- 
er's method of contemptuously disregarding him 
was the best; but no harm can follow from de- 
voting a little space to commenting upon him. 

Much the best American work is Lieutenant 
George E. Emmons's Statistical History of the 
United States Navy. Unfortunately, it is merely 
a mass of excellently arranged and classified sta- 
tistics, and while of invaluable importance to the 
student, it is not interesting to the average reader. 
Almost all the statements I have made of the 
force, tonnage, and armament of the American ves- 
sels, though I have, whenever practicable, taken 
them from the Naval Records, etc., yet could be 
just as well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most 
of the American official letters which I have quoted 
can be found in Niles's Weekly Register, volumes 
i. to X. and all of the British ones in the London 
Naval Chronicle for the same years. It is to 
these two authorities that I am most indebted, 
and nearly as much so to the American State 
Papers, vol. xiv. Next in order come Emmons, 
Cooper, and the invaluable, albeit somewhat scur- 
rilous, James; and a great many others whose 
names I have quoted in their proper places. In 
commenting upon the actions I have, whenever 
possible, drawn from some standard work, such 
as Jurien de la Graviere's Guerres Maritimes, Lord 
Howard Douglass's Naval Gunnery, or, better still, 



26 Naval War of 1 812 

from the lives and memoirs of Admirals Farragut, 
Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles of the 
various works will be found given in full as they 
are referred to.^ In a few cases, where extreme 
accuracy was necessary, or where, as in the case 
of the President's capture, it was desirable that 
there should be no room for dispute as to the 
facts, I have given the authority for each sen- 
tence; but in general this would be too cumber- 
some, and so I have confined myself to referring, 
at or near the beginning of the accoimt of each 
action, to the authorities from whom I have taken 
it. For the less important facts, on which every 
one is agreed, I have often given no references. 

^ To get an idea of the American seaman of that time 
Cooper's novels, Miles Wallingford, Home as Found, and The 
Pilot, are far better than any history; in the Two Admirals 
the description of the fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His 
view of Jack's Hfe is rather rose-colored, however. Tom 
Cringle's Log ought to be read for the information it gives. 
Marryat's novels will show some of the darker aspects of 
sailor life. 



CHAPTER II 

Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America 
declared war against her — Race identity of the combatants 
— The American navy at the beginning of the war — Officers 
well trained — Causes tending to make our seamen especially 
efficient — Close similarity between the British and American 
sailors — Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans, 
many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British 
navy — Quotas of seamen contributed by the different States 
— Navy yards — Lists of officers and men — List of vessels — 
Tonnage — Different ways of estimating it in Britain and 
America — Ratings — American ships properly rated — Arma- 
ments of the frigates and corvettes — -Three styles of guns used 
— Dift'erence between long guns and carronades — Short 
weight of American shot — Comparison of British frigates 
rating 38, and American frigates rating 44 guns — Compared 
with a 74. 

DURING the early years of this century, 
England's naval power stood at a height 
never reached before or since by that of 
any other nation. On every sea her navies rode, 
not only triumphant, but with none to dispute 
their sway. The island folk had long claimed the 
mastery of the ocean, and they had certainly suc- 
ceeded in making their claim completely good 
during the time of bloody warfare that followed 
the breaking out of the French Revolution. Since 
the year 1792, each European nation, in turn, 
had learned to feel bitter dread of the weight of 

27 



28 Naval War of 1812 

England's hand. In the Baltic, Sir Samuel Hood 
had taught the Russians that they must needs 
keep in port when the English cruisers were in the 
offing. The descendants of the Vikings had seen 
their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen. No 
Dutch fleet ever put out after the day when, off 
Camperdown, Lord Dimcan took possession of 
De Winter's shattered ships. But a few years 
before 1812, the greatest sea-fighter of all time 
had died in Trafalgar Bay, and in dying had 
crumbled to pieces the navies of France and of 
Spain. 

From that day England's task was but to keep 
in port such of her foe's vessels- as she had not 
destroyed. France alone still possessed fleets that 
could be rendered formidable, and so, from the 
Scheldt to Toulon, her harbors were watched and 
her coasts harried by the blockading squadrons 
of the English. Elsewhere, the latter had no fear 
of their power being seriously assailed ; but their 
vast commerce and numerous colonies needed 
ceaseless protection. Accordingly, in every sea 
their cruisers could be found, of all sizes, from the 
stately ship-of-the-line, with her tiers of heavy 
cannon and her many hundreds of men, down to 
the little cutter carrying but a score of souls and a 
couple of light guns. All these cruisers, but es- 
pecially those of the lesser rates, were continually 
brought into contact with such of the hostile ves- 



Naval War of 1 812 29 

sels as had run through the blockade, or were too 
small to be affected by it. French and ItaHan 
frigates were often caught and captured when 
they were skirting their own coasts, or had started 
off on a plundering cruise through the Atlantic, 
or to the Indian Ocean ; and though the Danes 
had lost their larger ships, they kept up a spirited 
warfare with brigs and gunboats. So the English 
marine was in constant exercise, attended with 
almost invariable success. 

Such was Great Britain's naval power when the 
Congress of the United States declared war upon 
her. While she could number her thousand sail, 
the American navy included but half-a-dozen 
frigates, and six or eight sloops and brigs ; and it 
is small matter for surprise that the British officers 
should have regarded their new foe with con- 
temptuous indifference. Hitherto, the American 
seamen had never been heard of except in con- 
nection with two or three engagements with 
French frigates, and some obscure skirmishes 
against the Moors of Tripoli ; none of which could 
possibly attract attention in the years that saw 
Aboukir, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. And yet 
these same petty wars were the school w^hich 
raised our marines to the highest standard of 
excellence. A continuous course of victory, won 
mainly by seamanship, had made the English 
sailor ovei'weeningly self-confident, and caused 



30 Naval War of 1812 

him to pay but little regard to manoeuvring or 
even to gunnery. Meanwhile, the American 
learned, by receiving hard knocks, how to give 
them, and belonged to a service too young to 
feel an over-confidence in itself. One side had let 
its training relax, while the other had carried it 
to the highest possible point. Hence our ships 
proved, on the whole, victorious in the apparently 
unequal struggle, and the men who had con- 
quered the best seamen of Europe were now in 
turn obliged to succumb. Compared with the 
great naval battles of the preceding few years, 
our bloodiest conflicts were mere skirmishes, but 
they were skirmishes between the hitherto ac- 
knowledged kings of the ocean, and new men who 
yet proved to be more than their equals. For 
over a hundred years, or since the time when they 
had contended on equal terms with the great 
Dutch admirals, the British had shown a decided 
superiority to their various foes, and during the 
latter quarter of the time this superiority, as 
already said, was very marked indeed; in con- 
sequence, the victories of the new enemy attracted 
an amount of attention altogether dispropor- 
tionate to their material effects. And it is a 
curious fact that our little navy, — in which the 
art of handling and fighting the old broadside 
sailing frigate in single conflict was brought to 
the highest point of perfection ever reached, — that 



Naval War of i8ia 31 

this same navy should have contained the first 
representative of the modern war steamer, and 
also the torpedo — -the two terrible engines which 
were to drive from the ocean the very white- 
winged craft that had first won honor for the 
starry flag. The tactical skill of Hull or Decatur 
is now of merely archaic interest, and has but 
little more bearing on the manoeuvering of a 
modern fleet than have the tactics of the Athenian 
gallies. But the war still conveys some most 
practical lessons as to the value of efBcient ships 
and, above all, of efficient men in them. Had 
we only possessed the miserable gun-boats, our 
men could have done nothing; had we not pos- 
sessed good men, the heavy frigates would have 
availed us little. Poor ships and impotent artil- 
lery had lost the Dutch almost their entire navy; 
fine ships and heavy cannon had not saved the 
French and Spanish from the like fate. We owed 
our success to putting sailors even better than the 
Dutch on ships even finer than those built by the 
two Latin seaboard powers. 

The first point to be remembered in order to 
write a fair account of this war is that the differ- 
ence in fighting skill, which certainly existed be- 
tween the two parties, was due mainly to training, 
and not to the nature of the men. It seems cer- 
tain that the American had in the beginning some- 
what the advantage, because his surroundings, 



32 kNaval War of 1812 

partly physical and partly social and political, 
had forced hirn into habits of greater self-reliance. 
Therefore, on the average, he offered rather the 
best material to start with; but the difference 
was very slight, and totally disappeared under 
good training. The combatants were men of the 
same race, differing but little from one another. 
On the New England coast the English blood was 
as pure as in any part of Britain; in New York 
and New Jersey, it was mixed with that of the 
Dutch settlers— and the Dutch are by race nearer 
to the true old English of Alfred and Harold than 
are, for example, the thoroughly anglicized Welsh 
of Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusion of new 
blood into the English race on this side of the 
Atlantic has been chiefly from three sources — 
German, Irish, and Norse; and these three 
sources represent the elemental parts of the com- 
posite English stock in about the same proportions 
in which they were originally combined, — mainly 
Teutonic, largely Celtic, and with a Scandinavian 
admixture. The descendant of the German be- 
comes as much an Anglo-American as the de- 
scendant of the Strathclyde Celt has already 
become an Anglo-Briton. Looking through 
names of the combatants it would be difficult to 
find any of one navy that could not be matched 
in the other— Hull or Lawrence, Allen, Perry, or 
Stewart. And among all the English names on 



Naval War of 1812 33 

both sides will be found many Scotch, Irish, or 
Welsh — McDonough, O'Brien, or Jones. Still 
stranger ones appear: the Huguenot Tattnall is 
one among the iVmerican defenders of the Con- 
stellation, and another Huguenot Tattnall is 
among the British assailants at Lake Borgne. 
It must always be kept in mind that the Ameri- 
cans and the British are two substantially similar 
branches of the great English race, which, both 
before and after their separation, have assimilated, 
and made Englishmen of, many other peoples.' 
The lessons taught by the war can hardly be 
learned unless this identity is kept in mind.^ 

To understand aright the efficiency of our navy, 
it is necessary to take a brief look at the character 

' The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as 
"British" — English being either too narrow or too broad a 
term, in one case meaning the inhabitants of but a part of 
Britain, and in the other the whole Anglo-Saxon people. 

2 It was practically a civil war and was waged with much 
harshness and bitterness on both sides. I have already 
spoken of the numerous grievances of the Americans; the 
British, in turn, looked upon our blockade-runners which 
entered the French ports exactly as we regarded, at a later 
date, the British steamers that ran into Wilmington and 
Charleston. It is curious to see how illogical writers are. 
The careers of the Argus and Alabama, for example, were 
strikingly similar in many ways, yet the same writer who 
speaks of one as an "heroic little brig," will call the other a 
"black pirate." Of course there can be no possible com- 
parison as to the causes for which the two vessels were 
fighting; but the cruises themselves were very much alike, 
both in character and history. 

VOL. I.— 3 



34 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

and antecedents of the officers and men who served 
in it. 

When war broke out the United States Navy 
was but a few years old, yet it already had a far 
from dishonorable history. The captains and 
lieutenants of 181 2 had been taught their duties 
in a very practical school, and the flag under 
which they fought was endeared to them already 
by not a few glorious traditions — though these, 
perhaps, like others of their kind, had lost none 
of their glory in the telling. A few of the older 
men had served in the war of the Revolution, and 
all still kept fresh in mind the doughty deeds of 
the old-time privateering war-craft. Men still 
talked of Biddle's daring cruises and Barney's 
stubborn fights, or told of Scotch Paul and the 
grim work they had who followed his fortunes. 
Besides these memories of an older generation, 
most of the officers had themselves taken part, 
when younger in years and rank, in deeds not a 
whit less glorious. Almost every man had had a 
share in some gallant feat, to which he, in part at 
least, owed his present position. The captain had 
perhaps been a midshipman under Truxton when 
he took the Vengeance, and had been sent aboard 
the captured French frigate with the prize-master ; 
the lieutenant had borne a part in the various 
attacks on Tripoli, and had led his men in the 
desperate hand-to-hand fights in which the Yan- 



Naval War of 1 812 35 

kee cutlass proved an overmatch for the Turkish 
and Moorish scimitars. Nearly every senior offi- 
cer had extricated himself by his own prowess or 
skill from the dangers of battle or storm; he 
owed his rank to the fact that he had proved 
worthy of it. Thrown upon his own resources, 
he had learned self-reliance; he was a first-rate 
practical seaman, and prided himself on the way 
his vessel was handled. Having reached his rank 
by hard work, and knowing what real fighting 
meant, he was careful to see that his men were 
trained in the essentials of discipline, and that 
they knew how to handle the guns in battle as 
well as polish them in peace. Beyond almost any 
of his countrymen, he worshipped the "Gridiron 
Flag," and, having been brought up in the navy, 
regarded its honor as his own. It was, perhaps, 
the navy alone that thought itself a match, ship 
against ship, for Great Britain. The remainder 
of the nation pinned its faith to the army, or 
rather to that weakest of weak reeds, the militia. 
The officers of the navy, with their strong esprit 
de corps, their jealousy of their own name and 
record, and the knowledge, by actual experience, 
that the British ships sailed no faster and were no 
better handled than their own, had no desire to 
shirk a conflict with any foe, and, having tried 
their bravery in actual service, they made it 
doubly formidable by cool, wary skill. Even the 



36 Naval War of 1812 

younger men, who had never been in action, had 
been so well trained by the tried veterans over 
them that the lack of experience was not sensibly 
felt. 

The sailors comprising the crews of our ships 
were well worthy of their leaders. There was no 
better seaman in the world than American Jack; 
he had been bred to his work from infancy, and 
had been off in a fishing-dory almost as soon as 
he could walk. When he grew older, he shipped 
on a merchantman or whaler, and in those war- 
like times, when our large merchant-marine was 
compelled to rely pretty much on itself for pro- 
tection, each craft had to be well handled; all 
that were not, were soon weeded out by a process 
of natural selection, of which the agents were 
French picaroons, Spanish buccaneers, and Malay 
pirates. It was a rough school, but it taught 
Jack to be both skilful and self-reliant; and he 
was all the better fitted to become a man-of-war's 
man because he knew more about fire-arms than 
most of his kind in foreign lands. At home he 
had used his ponderous ducking-gun with good 
effect on the flocks of canvasbacks in the reedy 
flats of the Chesapeake, or among the sea-coots 
in the rough water off the New England cliffs; 
and when he went on a sailing voyage the 
chances were even that there would be some use 
for the long guns before he returned, for the 



Naval War of 1 812 37 

American merchant - sailor could trust to no 
armed escort. 

The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at 
the date of which I am writing, as well as long 
subsequently to it, was largely due to the curious 
condition of things in Europe. For thirty years 
all the European nations had been in a state of 
continuous and very complicated warfare, during 
the course of which each nation in turn fought 
almost every other, England being usually at 
loggerheads with all. One effect of this was to 
force an enormous proportion of the carrying trade 
of the world into American bottoms. The old 
Massachusetts town of Salem was then one of the 
main depots of the East India trade; the Balti- 
more clippers carried goods into the French and 
German ports with small regard to the blockade; 
New Bedford and Sag Harbor fitted out whalers 
for the Arctic seas, as well as for the South Pacific ; 
the rich merchants of Philadelphia and New York 
sent their ships to all parts of the world; and 
every small port had some craft in the coasting 
trade. On the New England seaboard but few 
of the boys would reach manhood without having 
made at least one voyage to the Newfoundland 
Banks after codfish ; and in the whaling towns of 
Long Island it used to be an old saying that no 
man could marry till he struck his whale. The 
wealthy merchants of the large cities would often 



38 Naval War of 1812 

send their sons on a voyage or two before they let 
them enter their counting-houses. Thus it came 
about that a large portion of our population was 
engaged in seafaring pursuits of a nature strongly 
tending to develop a resolute and hardy character 
in the men that followed them. The British 
merchantmen sailed in huge convoys, guarded 
by men-of-war, while, as said before, our vessels 
went alone, and relied for protection on them- 
selves. If a fishing smack went to the Banks it 
knew that it ran a chance of falling in with some 
not over-scrupulous Nova Scotian privateer. The 
barques that sailed from Salem to the Spice 
Islands kept their men well trained both at great 
guns and musketry, so as to be able to beat off 
either Malay proas or Chinese junks. The New 
York ships, loaded for the West Indies, were pre- 
pared to do battle with the picaroons that 
swarmed in the Spanish main; while the fast 
craft from Baltimore could fight as well as they 
could run. Wherever an American seaman went, 
he not only had to contend with all the legitimate 
perils of the sea, but he had also to regard almost 
every stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called 
himself pirate or privateer mattered but little. 
French, Spaniards, Algerines, Malays, — from all 
alike our commerce suffered, and against all our 
merchants were forced to defend themselves. The 
effect of such a state of things, which made com- 



Naval War of 1 812 39 

merce so remunerative that the bolder spirits 
could hardly keep out of it, and so hazardous 
that only the most skilful and daring could suc- 
ceed in it, was to raise up as fine a set of seamen 
as ever manned a navy. The stem school in 
which the American was brought up, forced him 
into habits of independent thought and action 
which it was impossible that the more protected 
Briton could possess. He worked more intelli- 
gently and less from routine, and while perfectly 
obedient and amenable to discipline, was yet able 
to judge for himself in an emergency. He was 
more easily managed than most of his kind — be- 
ing shrewd, quiet, and, in fact, comparatively 
speaking, rather moral than otherwise; if he was 
a New Englander, when he retired from a sea life 
he was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. 
Altogether, there could not have been better 
material for a fighting crew than cool, gritty 
American Jack. Moreover, there was a good 
nucleus of veterans to begin with, who were well 
fitted to fill the more responsible positions, such 
as captains of guns, etc. These were men who 
had cruised in the little Enterprise after French 
privateers, who had been in the Constellation in 
her two victorious fights, or who, perhaps, had 
followed Decatur when with only eighty men he 
cut out the Philadelphia, manned by fivefold his 
force and surrounded by hostile batteries and war 



40 Naval War of 1812 

vessels, — one of the boldest expeditions of the 
kind on record. 

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connec- 
tion, that by a singular turn of fortune. Great 
Britain, whose system of impressing American 
sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, 
herself became, in consequence of that very sys- 
tem, in some sort a nursery for the seamen of the 
young Republican navy. The American sailor 
feared nothing more than being impressed on a 
British ship — dreading beyond measure the hard 
life and cruel discipline aboard of her; but once 
there, he usually did well enough, and in course of 
time often rose to be of some little consequence. 
For years before 181 2, the number of these im- 
pressed sailors was in reality greater than the 
entire number serving in the American navy, 
from which it will be readily seen that they formed 
a good stock to draw upon. Very much to their 
credit, they never lost their devotion to the home 
of their birth, more than two thousand of them 
being imprisoned at the beginning of the war be- 
cause they refused to serve against their country. 
When Commodore Decatur captured the Mace- 
donian, that officer, as we learn from Marshall's 
Naval Biography (ii., p. 10 19), stated that most of 
the seamen of his own frigate, the United States, 
had served in British war vessels, and that some 
had been with Lord Nelson in the Victory, and 



Naval War of 1812 41 

had even been bargemen to the great Admiral, — 
a pretty sure proof that the American sailors did 
not show to a disadvantage when compared with 
others.' 

Good seaman as the impressed American proved 
to be, yet he seldom missed an opportunity to 
escape from the British service, by desertion or 
otherwise. In the first place, the life was very 
hard, and, in the second, the American seaman 
was very patriotic. He had an honest and deep 
affection for his own flag, while, on the contrary, 
he felt a curiously strong hatred for England, as 
distinguished from Englishmen. This hatred was 
partly an abstract feeling, cherished through a 
vague traditional respect for Bunker Hill, and 

^ With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume De- 
catur's statement to be equivalent to saying that he had 
chiefly British seamen on board; whereas, even as quoted by 
Marshall, Deeatur merely said that "his seamen had served 
on board a British man-of-war," and that some "had served 
under Lord Nelson." Like the Constitution, the United 
States had rid herself of most of the British subjects on 
board, before sailing. Decatur's remark simply referred to 
the number of his American seamen who had been impressed 
on board British ships. Whenever James says that an 
American ship had a large proportion of British sailors 
aboard, the explanation is that a large number of the crew 
were Americans who had been impressed on British ships. 
It would be no more absurd to claim Trafalgar as an American 
victory because there was a certain number of Americans in 
Nelson's fieet, than it is to assert that the Americans were 
victorious in 1S12 becatise there were a few renegade British 
on board their ships. 



42 Naval War of 1812 

partly something very real and vivid, owing to 
the injuries he, and others like him, had received. 
Whether he lived in Maryland or Massachusetts, 
he certainly knew men whose ships had been 
seized by British cruisers, their goods confiscated, 
and the vessels condemned. Some of his friends 
had fallen victims to the odious right of search, 
and had never been heard of afterward. He had 
suffered many an injury to friend, fortune, or 
person, and some day he hoped to repay them all ; 
and when the war did come, he fought all the 
better because he knew it was in his own quarrel. 
But, as I have said, this hatred was against Eng- 
land, not against Englishmen. Then, as now, 
sailors were scattered about over the world with- 
out any great regard for nationality; and the 
resulting intermingling of natives and foreigners 
in every mercantile marine was especially great 
in those of Britain and America, whose people 
spoke the same tongue and wore the same aspect. 
When chance drifted the American into Liver- 
pool or London, he was ready enough to ship in an 
Indiaman or whaler, caring little for the fact that 
he served under the British flag ; and the Briton, 
in turn, who found himself in New York or Phila- 
delphia, willingly sailed in one of the clipper- 
built barques, whether it floated the Stars and 
Stripes or not. When Captain Porter wrought 
such havoc among the British whalers in the South 



Naval War of 1812 43 

Seas, he found that no inconsiderable portion of 
their crews consisted of Americans, some of whom 
enHsted on board his own vessel; and among 
the crews of the American whalers were many 
British. In fact, though the skipper of each ship 
might brag loudly of his nationality, yet in prac- 
tical life he knew well enough that there was very 
little to choose between a Yankee and a Briton.' 
Both were bold and hardy, cool and intelligent, 
quick with their hands, and showing at their best 
in an emergency. They looked alike and spoke 

' What choice there was, was in favor of the American. In 
point of courage, there was no difference whatever. The 
Essex and the Lawrence, as well as the Frolic and the Reindeer, 
were defended with the same stubborn, desperate, cool brav- 
ery that marks the English race on both sides of the Atlantic. 
But the American was a free citizen, any one's equal, a voter 
with a personal interest in his country's welfare, and, above 
all, without having perpetually before his eyes the degrading 
fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was more trac- 
table than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and possessed 
greater judgment. In the fight between the Wasp and the 
Frolic, the latter's crew had apparently been well trained at 
the guns, for they aimed well; but they fired at the wrong 
time, and never corrected the error, while their antagonists, 
delivering their broadsides far more slowly, by intelligently 
waiting until the proper moment, worked frightful havoc. 
But though there was a certain slight difference between the 
seamen of the two nations, it must never be forgotten that 
it was very much less than that between the various indi- 
viduals of the same nation; and when the British had been 
trained for a few years by such commanders as Broke and 
Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed 
our best men to equal them. 



44 Naval War of 1812 

alike ; when they took the trouble to think, they 
thought alike ; and when they got drunk, which was 
not an infrequent occurrence, they quarrelled alike. 

Mingled with them were a few seamen of other 
nationalities. The Irishman, if he came from the 
old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford, Dublin, and 
Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much 
like the two chief combatants ; the Celto-Turanian 
kern of the West did not often appear on ship- 
board. The French, Danes, and Dutch were 
hemmed in at home; they had enough to do on 
their own seaboard, and could not send men into 
foreign fleets. A few Norse, however, did come 
in, and excellent sailors and fighters they made. 
With the Portuguese and Italians, of whom some 
were to be found serving under the Union-Jack, 
and others under the Stars and Stripes, it was 
different; although there were many excellent 
exceptions they did not, as a rule, make the best 
kind of seamen. They were treacherous, fond of 
the knife, less ready with their hands, and likely 
to lose either their wits or their courage when in 
a tight place. 

In the American navy, unlike the British, there 
was no impressment; the sailor was a volunteer, 
and he shipped in whatever craft his fancy 
selected. Throughout the war there were no 
"picked crews" on the American side,^ excepting 

^James's statements to the contrary being in every case 



Naval War of 1 812 45 

on the last two cruises of the Constitution. In 
fact (as seen by the letter of Captain Stewart 
and Bainbridge to Secretary Hamilton) , there was 
often much difficulty in getting enough men/ 
Many sailors preferred to serve in the innumerable 
privateers, and the two above-mentioned officers, 
in urging the necessity of building line-of-battle 
ships, state that it was hard work to recruit men 

utterly without foundation. He is also wrong in his asser- 
tion that the Ameriean ships had no boys; they had nearly 
as many in proportion as the British. The Consiilution had 
31, the Adams 15, etc. So, when he states that our mid- 
shipmen were generally masters and mates of merchantmen; 
they were generally from eleven to seventeen years old at the 
beginning of the war, and, besides, had rarely or never been 
in the merchant-marine. 

' Reading about this war through the volumes of official let- 
ters, which are preserved in the office of the Secretary of the 
Navy, one of the most noticeable things is the continual com- 
plaints about the difficulty of getting men. The Adams at 
one time had a crew of btit nineteen men — -"fourteen of 
whom are marines," adds the aggrieved commander. A 
log-book of one of the gun -boats records the fact that, after 
much difficulty, two men were enlisted — from the jail, with a 
parenthetical memorandum to the effect that they were both 
very drunk. British ships were much more easily manned, 
as they ccnild always have recourse to impressment. 

The Constitution, on starting out on her last cruises, had an 
extraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with 
but 92 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, — making, 
with the officers, a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain 
Bainbridge, October 16, 1814; it is letter No. 51, in the 
fortieth volume of Captains' Letters, in the clerk's office of 
the Secretary of the Navy.) 



46 Naval War of 1812 

for vessels of an inferior grade, so long as the 
emeny had ships-of-the-line. 

One of the standard statements made by the 
British historians about this war is that our ships 
were mainly or largely manned by British sailors. 
This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons 
which it teaches; and, besides that, it is not true. 

In this, as in everything else, all the modern 
writers have merely followed James or Brenton, 
and I shall accordingly confine myself to examin- 
ing their assertions. The former begins (vol. iv., 
p. 470) by diffidently stating that there is a " simi- 
larity" of language between the inhabitants of 
the two countries — an interesting philological dis- 
covery that but few will attempt to controvert. 
In vol. vi., p. 154, he mentions that a number of 
blanks occur in the American Navy List in the 
column "Where Born"; and in proof of the fact 
that these blanks are there because the men were 
not Americans, he says that their names "are all 
English and Irish." ^ They certainly are; and 

^ For example, James writes: "Out of the 32 captains, one 
only, Thomas Tingey, has England marked as his birthplace. 
. . . Three blanks occur, and we consider it rather credit- 
able to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and John 
Ord Creighton, that they were ashamed to tell where they 
were bom." I have not been able to find out the latter's 
birthplace, but Captain Shaw was bom in New York, and I 
have seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as "bom 
and bred in America." Generally, whenever I have been 
able to fill up the vacancies in the column "Where Bom," 



Naval War of 1 812 47 

so are all the other names in the list. It could 
not well be otherwise, as the United States Navy 
was not officered by Indians. In looking over 
this same Navy List (of 18 16) it will be seen that 
but a little over five per cent, of the officers were 
bom abroad— a smaller proportion by far than 
would exist in the population of the country at 
large — and most of these had come to America 
when under ten years of age. On p. 155, James 
adds that the British sailors composed "one third 
in number and one half in point of effectiveness ' ' 
of the American crews. Brenton, in his Naval 
History,^ writes : " It was said, and I have no reason 
to doubt the fact, that there were two hundred 
British seamen aboard the Constitution. These 
statements are mere assertions, unsupported by 
proof and of such a loose character as to be diffi- 
cult to refute. As our navy was small, it may 
be best to take each ship in turn. The only ones 
of which the British could write authoritatively 
were, of course, those which they captured. The 
first one taken was the Wasp. James says many 
British were discovered among her crew, instan- 
cing especially one sailor named Jack Lang ; now. 
Jack Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, 

I have found that it was in America. From these facts it 
would appear that James was somewhat hasty in concluding 
that the omission of the birthplace proved the owner of the 
name to be a native of Great Britain. 

^New edition. London, 1837, vol. ii., p. 456. 



48 Naval War of 1812 

New Jersey, but had been impressed and forced to 
serve in the British navy. The same was doubtless 
true of the rest of the "many British" seamen of 
her crew ; at any rate, as the only instance James 
mentions (Jack Lang) was an American, he can 
hardly be trusted for those whom he does not 
name. 

Of the ninety-five men composing the crew of 
the Nautilus when she was captured, " six were 
detained and sent to England to await examina- 
tion as being suspected of being British subjects." ^ 
Of the other small brigs, the Viper, Vixen, Rattle- 
snake, and Syren, James does not mention the 
composition of the crew, and I do not know that 
any were claimed as British. Of the crew of the 
Arpus, "about ten or twelve were believed to 
be British subjects; the American officers swore 
the crew contained none" (James, Naval Occur- 
rences, p. 278). From o to 10 per cent, can be 
allowed. When the Frolic was captured "her 

^ Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 
12, 1S12 (in Naval Archives, Captains' Letters, vol. xxv., 
No. 43), enclosing a "List of American prisoners of war 
discharged out of custody of Lieutenant William Miller, 
agent at the port of Halifax," in exchange for some of the 
British captured by Porter. This list, by the way, shows the 
crew of the Nautilus (counting the six men detained as 
British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated 
by James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 
twelve men of the Guerricre's crew as an offset to the six men 
belonging to the Nautilus. 



Naval War of 1812 49 

crew consisted of native Americans" {do. p. 340). 
James speaks {History, p. 418) of "a portion of 
the British subjects on board the Essex,'' but 
without giving a word of proof or stating his 
grounds of beHef. One man was claimed as a 
deserter by the British, but he turned out to be 
a New Yorker. There were certainly a certain 
number of British aboard, but the number prob- 
ably did not exceed thirty. Of the Presidents 
crew, he says {Naval Occurrences, p. 448): "In 
the opinion of several British officers there were 
among them many British seamen " ; but Commo- 
dore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, and the other 
officers swore that there were none. Of the crew 
of the Chesapeake, he says, "about thirty-two" 
were British subjects, or about ten per cent. One 
or two of these were afterward shot, and some 
twenty-five, together with a Portuguese boat- 
swain's mate, entered into the British service. 
So that, of the vessels captured by the British, 
the Chesapeake had the largest number of British 
(about ten per cent, of her crew) on board, the 
others ranging from that number down to none 
at all, as in the case of the Wasp. 

As these eleven ships would probably represent 
a fair average, this proportion, of from o to 10 
per cent., should be taken as the proper one. 
James, however, is of the opinion that those ships 
manned by Americans were more apt to be 

VOL. 1.— 4 



50 Naval War of 1812 

captured than those manned by the braver British ; 
which calls for an examination of the crews of the 
remaining vessels. Of the American sloop Pea- 
cock, James says {Naval Occurrences, p. 348) that 
"several of her men were recognized as British 
seamen"; even if this were true, "several" could 
not probably mean more than sixteen, or ten per 
cent. Of the second Wasp, he says: "Captain 
Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, along with 
some English and Scotch, did not, it may be cer- 
tain, neglect to have in his crew a great many 
Irish." Now, Captain Blakely left Ireland when 
he was but sixteen months old, and the rest of 
James's statement is avowedly mere conjecture. 
It was asserted positively in the American 
newspapers that the Wasp, which sailed from 
Portsmouth, was manned exclusively by New 
Englanders, except a small draft of men from 
a Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a 
foreigner in her crew. Of the Hornet, James states 
that " some of her men were natives of the United 
Kingdom ' ' ; but he gives no authority, and the 
men he refers to were in all probability those 
spoken of in the journal of one of the Hornet's 
officers, which says that "many of our men 
(Americans) had been impressed in the British 
service." As regards the gun-boats, James asserts 
that they were commanded by "Commodore 
Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland." This officer, 



Naval War of 1812 51 

however, was born at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. 
As to the Constitution, Brenton, as already men- 
tioned, supposes the number of British sailors in 
her crew to have been two hundred ; James makes 
it less, or about one hundred and fifty. Respect- 
ing this, the only definite statements I can find in 
British works are the following: In the Naval 
Chronicle, vol. xxix., p. 452, an officer of the Java 
states that most of the Constitution's men were 
British, many being from the Guerrihe; which 
should be read in connection with James's state- 
ment (vol. i., p. 156) that but eight of the Guer- 
ri^re's crew deserted, and but two shipped on 
board the Constitution. Moreover, as a matter of 
fact, these eight men were all impressed Ameri- 
cans. In the Naval Chronicle it is also said that 
the Chesapeake' s surgeon was an Irishman, for- 
merly of the British navy; he was bom in Balti- 
more, and was never in the British navy in his 
life. The third lieutenant "was supposed to be 
an Irishman" (Brenton, ii., 456). The first lieu- 
tenant "was a native of Great Britain, we have 
been informed" (James, vi., 194); he was Mr. 
George Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The 
remaining three citations, if true, prove nothing. 
"One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the 
Guerriere (James, vi., p. 153). "One had been in 
the Achille" and "one in the Eurydice" (Brenton, 
ii., 456). These three men were most probably 



52 Naval War of 1812 

American seamen who had been impressed on 
British ships. From Cooper (in Putnam's Maga- 
zine, vol. i., p. 593) as well as from several places 
in the Constitution's log/ we learn that those of 
the crew who were British deserters were dis- 
charged from the Constitution before she left port, 
as they were afraid to serve in a war against Great 
Britain. That this fear was justifiable may be 
seen by reading James, vol. iv., p. 483. Of the 
four men taken by the Leopard from the Chesa- 
peake, as deserters, one was hung and three 
scourged. In reality, the crew of the Constitution 
probably did not contain a dozen British sailors; 
in her last cruises she was manned almost ex- 
clusively by New Englanders. The only remain- 
ing vessel is the United States, respecting whose 
crew some remarkable statements have been made. 
Marshall (vol. ii., p. 1019) writes that Commodore 
Decatur "declared there was not a seaman in his 
ship who had not served from five to twelve years 
in a British man-of-war," from which he concludes 
that they were British themselves. It may be 

^ See her log-book (vol. ii., Feb. i, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813); 
especially on July 12th, when twelve men were discharged. 
In some of Hull's letters he alludes to the desire of the British 
part of the crew to serve on the gun-boats or in the ports; 
and then writes that, "in accordance with the instructions 
sent him by the Secretary of the Navy, " he had allowed the 
British-bom portion to leave the ship. The log-books are 
in the Bureau of Navigation. 



Naval War of 1 812 53 

questioned whether Decatur ever made such an 
assertion; or, if he did, it is safe to assume again 
that his men were long-impressed Americans.' 

Of the Carolina's crew of seventy men, five 
were British. This fact was not found out till 
three deserted, when an investigation was made 
and the two other British discharged. Captain 

^ At the beginning of the war there were on record in the 
American State Department 6257 cases of impressed Ameri- 
can seamen. These could represent but a small part of the 
whole, which must have amounted to 20,000 men, or more 
than sufficient to man our entire navy five times over. 
According to the British Admiralty Report to the House of 
Commons, February i, 1815, 2548 impressed American sea- 
men, who refused to serve against their country, were im- 
prisoned in 181 2. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in 
the House, February 18, 1813, 3300 men claiming to be 
American subjects were serving in the British navy in 
January, 181 1, and he certainly did not give anything like 
the whole number. In the American service, the term of 
enlistment extended for two years, and the frigate United 
States, referred to, had not had her crew for any great length 
of time as yet. If such a crew were selected at random from 
American sailors, among them there would be, owing to the 
small number serving in our own navy and the enormous 
number impressed into the British navy, probably but one of 
the former to two of the latter. As already mentioned, the 
American always left a British man-of-war as soon as he 
could, by desertion or discharge; but he had no unwilling- 
ness to serve in the home na\^, where the pay was larger, 
and the discipline far more humane, not to speak of motives 
of patriotism. Even if the ex-British man-of-war's man 
kept out of service for some time, he would be very apt to 
enlist when a war broke out which his country undertook 
largely to avenge his own wrongs. 



54 Naval War of 1812 

Henly, in reporting these facts, made no conceal- 
ment of his surprise that there should be any- 
British at all in his crew.' 

From these facts and citations we may accord- 
ingly conclude that the proportion of British sea- 
men serving on American ships, after the war broke 
out, varied between none, as on the Wasp and 
Constitution, to ten per cent., as on the Chesa- 
peake and Essex. On the average, nine tenths of 
each of our crews were American seamen, and 
about one twentieth British, the remainder being 
a mixture of various nationalities. 

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British 
frigate Guerriere had ten Americans among her 
crew, who were permitted to go below during 
action, and the Macedonian eight, who were not 
allowed that privilege, three of them being killed. 
Three of the British sloop Peacock's men were 
Americans, who were forced to fight against the 
Hornet; one of them was killed. Two of the 
Epervier's men were Americans, who were also 
forced to fight. When the crew of the Nautilus 
was exchanged, a number of other American pris- 
oners were sent with them; among these were a 
number of American seamen who had been serving 
in the Shannon, Acasta, Africa, and various other 
vessels So there was also a certain proportion 

^ See his letter in Letters of Masters-Commandant, 1814, i., 
No. 116. 



Naval War of 1812 



55 



of Americans among the British crews, although 
forming a smaller percentage of them than the 
British did on board the American ships. In 
neither case was the number sufficient to at all 
affect the result. 

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native 
Americans, it may be interesting to try to find 
out the proportions that were furnished by the 
different sections of the country. There is not 
much difficulty about the officers. The captains, 
masters-commandant, lieutenants, marine offi- 
cers, whose birthplaces are given in the Navy 
List of 1816, — 240 in all, — came from the various 
States as follows : 



New England < 



Middle States 




I Penn., 35 
I Del., 4 



y 78 



District of Columbia ^ D. C, 4 }■ 4 

f Md., 46 ^ 

Va., 42 

N. C, 4 

s. c, 16 y 116 

Ga., 2 

La., 4 
I Ky., 



Southern States < 



Total of given birthplaces. 



240 



56 Naval War of 1812 

Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and 
proportionately, the greatest number of officers — ■ 
Virginia, then the most populous of all the States, 
coming next; four-fifths of the remainder came 
from the Northern States. 

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the 
sailors. Something can be inferred from the num- 
ber of privateers and letters of marque fitted out. 
Here Baltimore again headed the list; following 
closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the 
New England coast towns, with, alone among 
the Southern ports, Charleston, S. C. A more 
accurate idea of the quotas of sailors furnished 
by the different sections can be arrived at by 
comparing the total amount of tonnage the 
country possessed at the outbreak of the war. 
Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged to 
New England, 32 per cent, to the Middle States, 
and II per cent, to Maryland. This makes it 
probable (but of course not certain) that three- 
fourths of the common sailors hailed from the 
Northern States, half the remainder from Mary- 
land, and the rest chiefly from Virginia and South 
Carolina, 

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the 
character of our officers and crews, it will now be 
necessary to present some statistical tables to 
give a more accurate idea of the composition of 



Naval War of 1812 57 

the navy — the tonnage, complements, and arma- 
ments of the ships, etc. 

At the beginning of the war the Government 
possessed six navy yards (all but the last estab- 
lished in 1 801), as follows ' : 



I 


Place 
Portsmouth, 


N. 


H. 


Original cost 
$ 5,500 


Minimum number of 
men employed 

10 


2 


Charlestown, 


Mass. 


39.214 


20 


3 


New York 






40,000 


102 


4 

5 
6 


Philadelphia 

Washington 

Gosport 






37,000 

4,000 

12,000 


13 
36 
16 



In 1812, the following was the number of officers 
in the navy ^ ; 

12 captains 

10 masters-commandant 
73 lieutenants 
53 masters 
310 midshipmen 
42 marine oflficers 



500 



At the opening of the year, the number of sea- 
men, ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 
4010, and enough more were recruited to increase 
it to 5230, of whom only 2346 were destined for 
the cruising war vessels, the remainder being de- 
tailed for forts, gunboats, navy yards, the lakes, 

' Report of Naval Secretary Jones, November 30, 1814. 
""List of Vessels, etc., by Geo. H. Preble, U.S.N. (1874). 



58 Naval War of 1812 

etc.^ The marine corps was already ample, con- 
sisting of 1523 men." 

No regular navy lists were published till 1816, 
and I have been able to get very little informa- 
tion respecting the increase in officers and men 
during 181 3 and 1814; but we have full returns 
for 1 81 5, which may be summarized as follows ^: 

30 captains 

25 masters-commandant 
141 lieutenants 

24 commanders 
510 midshipmen 
230 sailing-masters 
50 surgeons 
12 chaplains 
50 pursers 
10 coast pilots 
45 captain's clerks 
80 surgeon's mates 

530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sail-makers 
268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc. 
1,106 quarter gunners, etc. 
5,000 able seamen 
6,849 ordinary seamen and boys. 

Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines. 4 

Comparing this list with the figures given be- 
fore, it can be seen that during the course of the 
war our navy grew enormously, increasing to be- 
tween three and four times its original size. 

^ Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, February 21, 18 12. 
2 Ibid. 

3Seybert's Statistical Annals, p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818). 
4 Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816. 



Naval War of 1 812 59 

At the beginning of the year 181 2, the navy of 
the United States on the ocean consisted of the 
following vessels, which either were, or could have 
been, made available during the war ': 



Cost 

$299,336 

302,718 

220,910 

314,212 

197,246 

220,677 

139.362 

76,622 

52,603 

40,000 

37.428 

32,521 

18,763 

20,872 

16,240 



There also appeared on the lists the New York, 
36, Boston, 28, and John Adams, 28. The two 
former were condemned hulks; the. latter was 
entirely rebuilt after the war. The Hornet was 
originally a brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having 

^ Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, 
December 24,1798; Letters of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb- 
ruary 21, 1812 ; American State Papers, vol. xix., p. 149. See 
also The History of the Navy of the United States, by Lieut. G. 
E. Emmons, U. S. N. (published in Washington, 1853, under 
the authority of the Navy Department). 



(K) Name 


Where Built 


When 
Built 


Ton- 
nage 


44 


United States 


Philadelphia 


1797 


1576 


44 


Constitiitioii 


Boston 


1797 


1576 


44 


President 


New York 


1800 


1576 


38 


Constellation 


Baltimore 


1797 


1265 


38 


Congress 


Portsmouth 


1799 


1268 


38 


Chesapeake 


Norfolk 


1799 


1244 


32 


Essex 


Salem 


1799 


860 


28 


Adams 


New York 


1799 


560 


18 


Hornet 


Baltimore 


1805 


480 


18 


Wasp 


Washington 


1806 


450 


16 


A rgiis 


Boston 


1803 


298 


16 


Syren 


Philadelphia 


1803 


250 


14 


Nautilus 


Baltimore 


1803 


185 


14 


Vixen 


Baltimore 


1803 


185 


12 


Enterprise 


Baltimore 


1799 


165 


12 


Viper 


Purchased 


1810 


148 



6o Naval War of 1812 

been transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 
20 guns, and in size was of an intermediate grade 
between the Wasp and the heavy sloops, built 
somewhat later, of 509 tons. Her armament con- 
sisted of 3 2 -pound carronades, with the exception 
of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The 
whole broadside was, in nominal weight, just 300 
pounds; in actual weight, about 277 pomids. Her 
complement of men was 140, but during the war 
she generally left port with 150/ The Wasp had 
been a ship from the beginning, mounted the 
number of guns she rated (of the same calibres 
as the Hornet's) and carried some ten men less. 
She was about the same length as the British 18- 
gun brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured 
nearly 30 tons less. The Argus and Syren were 
similar and very fine brigs, the former being the 
longer. Each carried two more guns than she 
rated; and the Argus, in addition, had a couple 
thrust through the bridle-ports. The guns were 
24-pound carronades, with two long 12's for bow- 
chasers. The proper complement of men was 
100, but each sailed usually with about 125. The 
four smaller craft were originally schooners, armed 
with the same number of light long guns as they 

' In the Hornet's log of October 25, 181 2, while in port, it is 
mentioned that she had 158 men; four men who were sick 
were left behind before she started. (See, in the Navy 
Archives, the Log-book, Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, July 20, 
1809, to October, 1813.) 



Naval War of 1812 61 

rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece; but 
they had been very effectually ruined by being 
changed into brigs, with crews increased to a 
hundred men. Each was armed with 18 -pound 
carronades, carrying two more than she rated. 
The Enterprise, in fact, mounted 16 guns, having 
two long 9's thrust through the bridle-ports. 
These little brigs were slow, not very seaworthy, 
and overcrowded with men and guns; they all 
fell into the enemy's hands without doing any 
good whatever, with the single exception of the 
Enterprise, which escaped capture by sheer good 
luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted 
against one of the corresponding and equally bad 
class of British gun-brigs. The Adams, after sev- 
eral changes of form, finally became a flush-decked 
corvette. The Essex had originally mounted 
twenty-six long 12's on her main-deck, and sixteen 
24-pound carronades on her spar-deck; but official 
wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty- 
four 3 2 -pound carronades, and two long 12's on 
the main-deck, and sixteen 3 2 -pound carronades 
with four long 12's on the spar-deck. When Cap- 
tain Porter had command of her he was deeply 
sensible of the disadvantages of an armament 
which put him at the mercy of any ordinary antag- 
onist who could choose his distance ; accordingly, 
he petitioned several times, but always without 
success, to have his long 12's returned to him. 



62 Naval War of 1812 

The American 38's were about the size of the 
British frigates of the same rate, and armed 
almost exactly in the same way, each having 
twenty-eight long i8's on the main-deck and 
twenty 3 2 -pound carronades on the spar-deck. 
The proper complement was 300 men, but each 
carried from 40 to 80 more.^ 

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates 
then afloat (although the British possessed some 
as heavy, such as the Egyptienne, 44) . They were 
beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, 
extremely stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each 
carried on her main-deck thirty long 24's, and 
on her spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and 
twenty or twenty-two carronades — 4 2 -pounders 

^ The Chesapeake, by some curious mistake, was frequently 
rated as a 44, and this drew in its train a number of attendant 
errors. James says that when she was captured, in one of 
her lockers was found a letter, dated in February, 181 1, from 
Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, at 
Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for man- 
ning the Chesapeake, and enumerating her crew at a total of 
443. Naturally, this gave British historians the idea that 
such was the ordinary complement of our 38-gun frigates. 
But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mistake, as 
may be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to the 
Secretary of the Navy, which is given in full in the Captains' 
Letters, vol. xxv.. No. 19 (Navy Archives). In it he mentions 
the extraordinary number of men ordered for the Chesapeake, 
saying: "There is a mistake in the crew ordered for the 
Chesapeake, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun 
frigates, whereas the Chesapeake is of the class of the Congress 
and Constellation." 



Naval War of 1812 63 

on the President and United States, 3 2 -pounders 
on the Constitution. Each sailed with a crew of 
about 450 men — 50 in excess of the regular 
complement.' 

It may be as well to mention here the only 
other class of vessels that we employed during 
the war. This was composed of the ship-sloops 
built in 181 3, which got to sea in 181 4. They 
were very fine vessels, measuring 509 tons apiece,^ 
with very thick scantling and stout masts and 
spars. Each carried twenty 3 2 -pound carronades 
and two long 12's with a crew nominally of 160 
men, but with usually a few supernumeraries.^ 

* The President, when in action with the Endymion, had 450 
men aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the 
Constitution, a few days before her action with the Guerribre, 
contains 464 names (including 51 marines); eight men were 
absent in a prize, so she had aboard, in the action, 456. Her 
muster-roll just before the action with the Cyane and Levant 
shows 461 names. 

2 The dimensions were 117 feet 11 inches upon the gun- 
deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one 
foot before the forward perpendicular and along the base 
line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting three- 
fifths of the moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 
6 inches; making 509!^ tons. (See in Navy Archives, Con- 
tracts, vol. ii., p. 137.) 

3 The Peacock had 166 men, as we learn from Com- 
mander Warrington's letter of June ist (Letter No. 144 in 
Masters-Commandant Letters, 1814, vol. i.). The Frolic took 
aboard "10 or 12 men beyond her regular complement" 
(see letter of Joseph Bainbridge, No. 51, in same vol.). 
Accordingly, when she was captured by the Orplteus, the 



64 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

The British vessels encountered were similar, 
but generally inferior, to our own. The only 24- 
pounder frigate we encountered was the Endymion, 
of about a fifth less force than the President. 
Their 3 8 -gun frigates were almost exactly like 
ours, but with fewer men in crew as a rule. They 
were three times matched against our 44-gun frig- 
ates, to which they were inferior about as three 
is to four. Their 36-gun frigates were larger than 
the Essex, with a more numerous crew, but the 
same number of guns ; carrying on the lower deck, 
however, long i8's instead of 32-pound carro- 
nades, — a much more effective armament. The 
3 2 -gun frigates were smaller, with long 12's on 
the main-deck. The largest sloops were also 
frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 3 2 -pound car- 
ronades on the main-deck, and twelve lighter guns 
on the quarter-deck and forecastle, with a crew 
of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops carried 
21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men. But our 
vessels most often came in contact with the 
British i8-gun brig-sloop. This was a tubby craft, 
heavier than any of our brigs, being about the 
size of the Hornet. The crew consisted of from 
no to 135 men; ordinarily, each was armed with 

commander of the latter, Captain Hugh Pigot, reported the 
number of men aboard to be 171. The Wasp left port with 
173 men, with which she fought her first action; she had a 
much smaller number aboard in her second. 



Naval War of 1 812 65 

sixteen 3 2 -pound carronades, two long 6's, and a 
shifting 1 2 -pound carronade; often with a light 
long gun as a stem-chaser, making 20 in all. The 
Reindeer and Peacock had only 24-pound carro- 
nades; the Epervier had but eighteen guns, all 
carronades.' 

Among the stock accusations against our navy 
of 181 2 were, and are, statements that our vessels 
were rated at less than their real force, and in 
particular that our large frigates were "disguised 
line-of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, 
most vessels of that time carried more guns than 
they rated; the disparity was less in the French 
than in either the British or American navies. 
Our 38-gun frigates carried 48 guns, the exact 
number the British 38's possessed. The worst case 
of underrating in our navy was the Essex, which 
rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real 
was 44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force; 
but this was not as bad as the British sloop Cyane, 
which was rated a 20 or 22, and carried 34 guns, 
so that she had either 55 or 70 per cent, greater 
real than nominal force. At the beginning of the 

' The Epervier was taken into our service under the same 
name and rate. Both Preble and Emmons described her as 
of 477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however, says: "The 
surveyor of the port has just measured the Epervier and 
reports her 467 tons." (In the Navy Archives, Masters' 
Commandant Letters, 1814, i., No. 125.) 

For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix, A. 

VOL. I.— 5 



66 Naval War of 1812 

war we owned two i8-gun ship-sloops, one mount- 
ing 18 and the other 20 guns; the i8-gun brig- 
sloops they captured mounted each 19 guns; so 
the average was the same. Later, we built sloops 
that rated 18 and mounted 22 guns, but when one 
was captured it was also put down in the British 
navy list as an i8-gun ship-sloop. During all 
the combats of the war there were but four 
vessels that carried as few guns as they rated. 
Two were British, the Epervier and Levant, and 
two American, the Wasp and Adams. One navy 
was certainly as deceptive as another, as far as 
underrating went. 

The force of the statement that our large frig- 
ates were disguised line-of-battle ships, of course, 
depends entirely upon what the words "frigate" 
and "line-of-battle ship" mean. When on the 
loth of August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great 
convoy by beating off Sir George Ayscough's fleet 
of 38 sail, the largest of the Dutch admiral's " ^3 
sail of the line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, 
and his own flag-ship but 28 guns and 134 men/ 
The Dutch book from which this statement is 
taken speaks indifferently of frigates of 18, 40, 

^ La Vie et les Actions Meniorahles du Sr. Michel de Ruyter 
a Amsterdam, chez Henry et Theodore Boom, mdclxxvii. 
The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a surgeon in De Ruyter's 
fleet, and personally present during many of his battles. It 
is written in French, but is in tone more strongly anti- 
French than anti-English. 



Naval War of 1812 67 

and 58 guns. Toward the end of the eighteenth 
century the terms had crystallized. Frigate then 
meant a so-called single-decked ship ; it in reality 
possessed two decks, the main- or gun-deck, and 
the upper one, which had no name at all, until 
our sailors christened it spar-deck. The gun-deck 
possessed a complete battery, and the spar-deck 
an interrupted one, mounting guns on the fore- 
castle and quarter-deck. At that time all "two- 
decked" or "three-decked" (in reality three- and 
four-decked) ships were liners. But in 181 2 
this had changed somewhat; as the various 
nations built more and more powerful vessels, 
the lower rates of the different divisions were 
dropped. Thus, the British ship Cyane, captured 
by the Constitution, was in reality a small frigate, 
with a main-deck battery of 22 guns and 12 
guns on the spar-deck; a few years before, she 
would have been called a 24-gun frigate, but she 
then ranked merely as a 2 2 -gun sloop. Similarly 
the 50- and 64-gun ships that had fought in the 
line at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, and even 
at Aboukir, were now no longer deemed fit for that 
purpose, and the 74 was the lowest line-of -battle 
ship. 

The Constitution, President, and United States 
must then be compared with the existing European 
vessels that were classed as frigates. The French 
in 181 2 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very 



68 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

good reason that they had all fallen victims to 
the English i8-pounders; but in July of that 
year a Danish frigate, the Nayaden, which carried 
long 24's, was destroyed by the English ship 
Dictator, 64. 

The British frigates were of several rates. The 
lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns, twenty-six 
long 12's on the main-deck and fourteen 24-pound 
carronades on the spar-deck — a broadside of 324 
pounds.^ The 3 6 -gun frigates, like the Phoehe, car- 
ried 46 guns, twenty-six long iS's on the gun-deck 
and 32-pound carronades above. The 38-gun 
frigates, like the Macedonian, carried 48 or 49 guns, 
long i8's below and 3 2 -pound carronades above. 
The 3 2 -gun frigates, then, presented in broadside 
thirteen long 12's below and seven 24-pound car- 
ronades above; the 38-gun frigates, fourteen long 
i8's below and ten 32-pound carronades above ; so 
thata44-gun frigate would naturally present fifteen 
long 24's below and twelve 42-pound carronades 
above, as the United States did at first. The rate 
was perfectly proper, for French, British, and Danes 
already possessed 24-pounder frigates; and there 
was really less disparity between the force and rate 
of a 44 that carried 54 guns, than there was in a 
38 that carried 49, or, like the Shannon, 52. Nor 
was this all. Two of our three victories were won 

' In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's or 
g's substituted for the bow-chase carronades. 



Naval War of 1812 69 

by the Constitution, which only carried 32-pound 
carronades, and once 54 and once 52 guns; and 
as two thirds of the work was thus done by this 
vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest 
British frigates. Her broadside force consisted 
of fifteen long 24's on the main-deck, and on the 
spar-deck one long 24, and in one case ten, in the 
other eleven, 3 2 -pound carronades— a broadside 
of 704 or 736 pounds/ There was then in the 
British navy the Acasta, 40, carrying in broad-side 
fifteen long i8's and eleven 32-pound carronades; 
when the spar-deck batteries are equal, the addi- 
tion of 90 pounds to the main-deck broadside 
(which is all the superiority of the Constitution 
over the Acasta) is certainly not enough to make 
the distinction between a frigate and a disguised 
74. But not considering the Acasta, there were 
in the British navy three 24-potmder frigates, the 
Cornwallis, Indefatigable, and Endymion. We only 
came in contact with the latter in 181 5, when the 
Constitution had but 5 2 guns. The Endymion then 
had an armament of twenty-eight long 24's, two 
long i8's, and twenty 32-pound carronades, mak- 
ing a broadside of 674 pounds,^ or, including a 
shifting 24-pound carronade, of 698 pounds — 
just six pounds, or one per cent., less than the 

''Nominally; in reality about 7 per cent, less on account 
of the short weight in the metal. 

2 According to James, 664 pounds: he omits the chase 
guns for no reason. 



70 Naval War of 1 812 

force of that "disguised line-of -battle ship" the 
Constitution! As the Endymion only rated as a 
40, and the Constitution as a 44, it was in reality 
the former and not the latter which was under- 
rated. I have taken the Constitution, because 
the British had more to do with her than they 
did with our other two 44 's taken together. The 
latter were both of heavier metal than the Con- 
stitution, carrying 42-pound carronades. In 181 2, 
the United States carried her full 54 guns, throw- 
ing a broadside of 846 pounds; when captured, 
the President carried 53, having substituted a 24- 
pound carronade for two of her 42's, and her 
broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or 16 per 
cent, nominal and, on account of the short weight 
of her shot, nine per cent, real excess over the 
Endymion. If this difference made her a line-of- 
battle ship, then the Endymion was doubly a 
line-of -battle ship, compared to the Congress or 
the Constellation. Moreover, the American com- 
manders found their 42 -pound carronades too 
heavy; as I have said, the Constitution only 
mounted 32's, and the United States landed six of 
her guns. When, in 18 13, she attempted to break 
the blockade, she carried but 48 guns, throwing a 
broadside of 720 pounds — just three per cent, more 
than the Endymion.'^ If our frigates were line-of- 

' It was on account of this difference of three per cent, that 
Captain Hardy refused to allow the Endymion to meet the 



Naval War of 1812 71 

battle ships, the disguise was certainly marvel- 
lously complete, and they had a number of com- 
panions equally disguised in the British ranks. 

The 44's were thus true frigates, with one com- 
plete battery of long guns and one interrupted 
one of carronades. That they were better than 
any other frigates was highly creditable to our 
ingenuity and national skill. We cannot, per- 
haps, lay claim to the invention and first use of 
the heavy frigate, for 24-pounder frigates were 
already in the service of at least three nations, 
and the French 36-pound carronade, in use on 
their spar-decks, threw a heavier ball than our 
42 -pounder. But we had enlarged and perfected 
the heavy frigate, and were the first nation that 
ever used it effectively. The French Forte and 
the Danish Nayaden shared the fate of ships 
carrying guns of lighter calibre; and the British 
24-pounders, like the Endymion, had never ac- 
complished anything. Hitherto, there had been 
a strong feeling, especially in England, that an 
i8-poimd gun was as effective as a 24- in arming 

United States (James, vi. , p. 470) . This was during the course 
of some challenges and counter-challenges which ended in 
nothing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the Mace- 
donian meet the Statira, unless the latter should agree not to 
take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this; but 
he ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two 
ships but an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful 
disadvantage in a fight. 



72 Naval War of 1812 

a frigate; we made a complete revolution in this 
respect. England had been building only 18- 
pounder vessels when she ought to have been 
building 24-pounders. It was greatly to our 
credit that our average frigate was superior to 
the average British frigate; exactly as it was to 
our discredit that the Essex was so ineffectively 
armed. Captain Porter owed his defeat chiefly 
to his ineffective guns, but also to having lost his 
topmast, to the weather being unfavorable, and, 
still more, to the admirable skill with which 
Hilyar used his superior armament. The Java, 
Macedonian, and Guerriere owed their defeat 
partly to their lighter guns, but much more to 
the fact that their captains and seamen did not 
display either as good seamanship or as good 
gunnery as their foes. Inferiority in armament 
was a factor to be taken into account in all the 
four cases, but it was more marked in that of 
the Essex than in the other three ; it would have 
been fairer for Porter to say that he had been 
captured by a line-of-battle ship than for the 
captain of the Java to make that assertion. In 
this last case, the forces of the two ships compared 
almost exactly as their rates. A 44 was matched 
against a 38 ; it was not surprising that she should 
win, but it was surprising that she should win 
with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the 
Constitution' s gun-deck no more made her a line- 



Naval War of 1 812 73 

of-battle ship than the 3 2 -pound carronades 
mounted on an EngHsh frigate's quarter-deck and 
forecastle made her a line-of-battle ship when 
opposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's 
on his spar-deck. When, a few years before, the 
English Phcehe had captured the French Nereide, 
their broadsides were respectively 407 and 258 
pounds, a greater disparity than in any of our 
successful fights ; yet no author thought of claim- 
ing that the Phcehe was anything but a frigate. 
So with the Clyde, throwing 425 pounds, which 
took the Vestale, throwing but 246. The facts 
were that i8-pounder frigates had captured 12- 
pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in turn 
captured the i8-pounders. 

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, 
one of her i8-pounder frigates, the San Florenzo, 
throwing 476 pounds in a broadside, captured the 
i2-pounder French frigate Pysche, whose broad- 
side was only 246 pounds. The force of the 
former was thus almost double that of the latter, 
yet the battle was long and desperate, the English 
losing 48 and the French 124 men. This conflict, 
then, reflected as much credit on the skill and 
seamanship of the defeated as of the victorious 
side ; the difference in loss could be fairly ascribed 
to the difference in weight of metal. But where, 
as in the famous ship-duels of 181 2, the difference 
in force is only a fifth, instead of a half, and 



74 Naval War of 1 812 

yet the slaughter, instead of being as five is to 
two, is as six to one, then the victory is certainly 
to be ascribed as much to superiority in skill as 
to superiority in force. But, on the other hand, 
it should always be remembered that there was a 
very decided superiority in force. It is a very 
discreditable feature of many of our naval his- 
tories that they utterly ignore this superiority, 
seeming ashamed to confess that it existed. In 
reality, it was something to be proud of. It was 
highly to the credit of the United States that her 
frigates were of better make and armament than 
any others; it always speaks well for a nation's 
energy and capacity that any of her implements 
of warfare are of a superior kind. This is a per- 
fectly legitimate reason for pride. 

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that 
they opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders 
of the Austrians; but it would be folly to give 
all the credit of the victory to the breech-loaders 
and none to Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it 
must be remembered that two things contributed 
to our victories. One was the excellent make 
and armament of our ships; the other was the 
skilful seamanship, excellent discipline, and superb 
gunnery of the men who were in them. British 
writers are apt only to speak of the first, and 
Americans only of the last, whereas both should 
be taken into consideration. 



Naval War of 1 812 75 

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was 
a true frigate, in build and armament, properly- 
rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate just about 
in the proportion of 44 to t,S, and not exceeding 
in strength an i8-pounder frigate as much as the 
latter exceeded one carrying 12 -pounders. They 
were, in no way whatever, line-of -battle ships ; but 
they were superior to any other frigates afloat, 
and, what is still more important, they were better 
manned and commanded than the average frigate 
of any other navy. Lord Codrington says {Me- 
moirs, i., p. 310): "But I well know the system 
of favoritism and borough corruption prevails so 
very much that many people are promoted and 
kept in command that should be dismissed the 
service, and while such is the case the few Ameri- 
cans chosen for their merit may be expected to 
follow up their successes except where they meet 
with our best officers on even terms." ' The 
small size of our navy was probably to a certain 

' To show that I am not quoting an authority biassed in 
our favor I will give Sir Edward Codrington 's opinion of our 
rural better class (i. , 3 1 8) . " It is curious to observe the animos- 
ity which prevails here among what is called the better order 
of people, which I think is moi-e a misnomer here than in any 
other country where I have ever been. Their wliig and tory 
are democrat and federalist, and it would seem for the sake 
of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which marks the 
Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term) who 
takes possession of a property adopts the opposite political 
creed to that of his nearest neighbor." 



76 Naval War of 1 812 

extent effective in keeping it up to a high stand- 
ard ; but this is not the only explanation, as can 
be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On 
the other hand, the champions or pick of a large 
navy ought to be better than the champions of a 
small one.^ 

^ In speaking of tonnage, I wish I could have got better 
authority than James for the British side of the question. 
He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one a distrust of 
his judgment. Thus in speaking of the Penguin's capture, 
he, in endeavoring to show that the Hornet's loss was greater 
than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously 
wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was 
afraid to amputate, owing to his want of experience" {Naval 
Occurrences, 492). Now, what could persuade a writer to 
make such a foolish accusation ? No matter how utterly 
depraved and brutal Captain Biddle might be, he would 
certainly not throw his wounded over alive because he feared 
they might die. Again, in vol. vi., p. 546, he says: "Captain 
Stewart had caused the Cyane to be painted to resemble a 
36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his 
exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." No 
matter how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no 
matter how great the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, 
the Cyane (which by the way went to New York and not to 
Boston) could no more be painted to look like a 36-gun 
frigate than a schooner could be painted to look like a brig. 
Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly in his 
work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter of 
fact froin what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the 
British official accounts when they can be reached, except in 
the case of the Java, which seem garbled. That such was 
sometimes the case with British officials is testified to by 
both James (vol. i v., p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii., p. 454, note). 
From the Memoir of Admiral Broke, we learn that his public 



Naval War of 1 812 "j^ 

Again, the armaments of the American as well 
as of the British ships were composed of three 
very different styles of guns. The first, or long 
gun, was enormously long and thick-barrelled in 
comparison to its bore, and in consequence very 
heavy ; it possessed a very long range, and varied 
in calibre from two to forty-two pounds. The 
ordinary calibres in our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 
24. The second style was the carronade— a short, 
light gun of large bore ; compared to a long gun of 
the same weight, it carried a much heavier ball for 
a much shorter distance. The chief calibres were 
9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68 pounders, the first and 
the last being hardly in use in our navy. The 

letter was wrong in a number of particulars. See also any- 
one of the numerous biographies of Lord Dundonald, the 
hero of the little Speedy s fight. It is very unfortunate that 
the British stopped publishing official accounts of their de- 
feats; it could not well help giving rise to unpleasant sus- 
picions. 

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James's 
accusations do not really detract from the interest attaching 
to the war and its value for purposes of study. If, as he says, 
the American commanders were cowards, and their crews 
renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that 
good training will make such men able to beat brave officers 
with loyal crews. And why did the British have such bad 
average crews as he makes out? He says, for instance, that 
the Java's was unusually bad; yet Brenton says (vol. ii., p. 
461) it was hke " the generahty of our crews." It is worth 
while explaining the reason why such a crew was generally 
better than a French and worse than an American one. 



78 Naval War of 1 812 

third style was the columbiad, of an intermediate 
grade between the first two. Thus it is seen that 
a gun of one style by no means corresponds to a 
gun of another style of the same calibre. As a 
rough example, a long 12, a columbiad 18, and 
a 3 2 -pound carronade would be about equivalent 
to one another. These guns were mounted on 
two different types of vessel. The first was flush- 
decked ; that is, it had a single straight open deck 
on which all the guns were mounted. This class 
included one heavy corvette (the Adams), the 
ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through the 
bow-chase port, on each side, each of these 
mounted a long gun ; the rest of their guns were 
carronades, except in the case of the Adams, 
which had all long guns. Above these came the 
frigates, whose gun-deck was covered above by 
another deck ; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle 
and quarterdeck) of this upper, open deck were 
also mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all 
long, except on the Essex, which had carronades; 
on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, 
and on the forecastle also carronades, with two 
long bow-chasers. 

Where two ships of similar armament fought 
one another, it is easy to get the comparative 
force by simply comparing the weight in broad- 
sides, each side presenting very nearly the same 
proportion of long guns to carronades. For such 



Naval War of 1 812 79 

a broadside we take half the guns mounted in the 
ordinary way, and all guns mounted on pivots, or 
shifting. Thus Perry's force in guns was 54 to 
Barclay's 63 ; yet each presented 34 in broadside. 
Again, each of the British brig-sloops mounted 19 
guns, presenting 10 in broadside. Besides these, 
some ships mounted bow-chasers run through the 
bridle-ports, or stern-chasers, neither of which 
could be used in broadsides. Nevertheless, I in- 
clude them, both because it works in about an 
equal number of cases against each navy, and be- 
cause they were sometimes terribly effective. 
James excludes the Giierriere's bow-chaser; in 
reality, he ought to have included both it and its 
fellow, as they worked more damage than all the 
broadside guns put together. Again, he excludes 
the Endymion's bow-chasers, though in her action 
they proved invaluable. Yet he includes those of 
the Enterprise and Argus, though the former's 
were probably not fired. So I shall take the half 
of the fixed, plus all the movable, guns aboard, in 
comparing broadside force. 

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of 
one style are matched against those of another. 
If a ship armed with long 12's meets one armed 
with 3 2 -pound carronades, which is superior in 
force? At long range the first, and at short range 
the second; and of course each captain is pretty 
sure to insist that "circumstances" forced him to 



8o Naval War of 1812 

fight at a disadvantage. The result would depend 
largely on the skill or luck of each commander in 
choosing position. 

One thing is certain: long guns are more for- 
midable than carronades of the same calibre. 
There are exemplifications of this rule on both 
sides ; of course, American writers, as a rule, only 
pay attention to one set of cases and British to 
the others. The Cyane and Levant threw a heav- 
ier broadside than the Constitution, but were 
certainly less formidably armed; and the Essex 
threw a heavier broadside than the Phoebe, yet was 
also less formidable. On Lake Ontario the Ameri- 
can ship. General Pike, threw less metal at a broad- 
side than either of her two chief antagonists, but 
neither could be called her equal; while on Lake 
Champlain a parallel case is afforded by the Brit- 
ish ship Confiance. Supposing that two ships 
throw the same broadside weight of metal, one 
from long guns, the other from carronades, at 
short range they are equal ; at long, one has it all 
her own way. Her captain thus certainly has a 
great superiority of force, and if he does not take 
advantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill 
or his own mismanagement. As a mere approxi- 
mation, it may be assumed, in comparing the 
broadsides of two vessels or squadrons, that long 
guns count for at least twice as much as car- 
ronades of the same calibre. Thus on Lake 



Naval War of 1812 81 

Champlain Captain Downie possessed an immense 
advantage in his long guns, which Commodore 
Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangements nul- 
lified. Sometimes part of the advantage may be 
willingly foregone so as to acquire some other. 
Had the Constitution kept at long bowls with the 
Cyane and Levant she could have probably cap- 
tured one without any loss to herself, while the 
other would have escaped; she preferred to run 
down close so as to insure the capture of both, 
knowing that even at close quarters long guns are 
somewhat better than short ones (not to mention 
her other advantages in thick scantling, speed, 
etc.). The British carronades often upset in ac- 
tion; this was either owing to their having been 
insufficiently secured, and to this remaining un- 
discovered because the men were not exercised at 
the guns, or else it was because the unpractised 
sailors would greatly overcharge them. Our bet- 
ter-trained sailors on the ocean rarely committed 
these blunders, but our less-skilled on the lakes 
did so as often as their antagonists. 

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had 
heavier and better-fitted guns, they labored under 
one or two disadvantages. Our foundries were 
generally not as good as those of the British, and 
our guns, in consequence, more likely to burst ; it 
was an accident of this nature which saved the 
British Belvidcra; and the General Pike, under 

VOL. I. — 6. 



82 Naval War of 1812 

Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frig- 
ate Guerriere suffered in the same way ; while often 
the muzzles of the guns would crack. A more 
universal disadvantage was in the short weight of 
our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the Avon 
he officially reported that her four shot which came 
aboard weighed just 32 pounds apiece, a pound and 
three-quarters more than his heaviest ; this would 
make his average shot about 2^ pounds less, or 
rather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements 
were made by the officers of the Constitution in her 
three engagements. Thus, when she fought the 
Java, she threw at a broadside, as already stated, 
704 pounds ; the Java mounted twenty -eight long 
i8's, eighteen 32-pound carronades, two long 12's, 
and one shifting 24-pound carronade, — a broad- 
side of 576 pounds. Yet, by the actual weighing 
of all the different shot on both sides, it was found 
that the difference in broadside force was only 
about 77 pounds, or the Constitution's shot were 
about 7 per cent, short weight. The long 24's of 
the United States each threw a shot but 4^ pounds 
heavier than the long i8's of the Macedonian; 
here again the difference was about 7 per cent. 
The same difference existed in favor of the Pen- 
guin and Epervier compared with the Wasp and 
Hornet. Mr. Fenimore Cooper ' weighed a great 
number of shot some time after the war. The 

^ See Naval History, i., 380. 



Naval War of 1 812 83 

later castings, even, weighed nearly 5 per cent, less 
than the British shot, and some of the older ones 
about 9 per cent. The average is safe to take at 
7 per cent, less, and I shall throughout make this 
allowance for ocean cruisers. The deficit was 
sometimes owing to windage, but more often the 
shot was of full size, but defective in density. The 
effect of this can be gathered from the following 
quotation from the work of a British artillerist: 
"The greater the density of shot of like calibres, 
projected with equal velocity and elevation, the 
greater the range, accuracy, and penetration." ' 
This defectiveness in density might be a serious 
injury in a contest at a long distance, but would 
make but little difference at close quarters (al- 
though it may have been partly owing to their 
short weight that so many of the Chesapeake' s shot 
failed to penetrate ihe Shannon' s hull). Thus, in 
the actions with the Macedonian and Java, the 
American frigates showed excellent practice when 
the contest was carried on within fair distance, 
while their first broadsides at long range went very 
wild; but in the case of the Guerri^re the Con- 
stitution reserved her fire for close quarters, and 

'^ Heavy Ordnance, Capt. T. F. Simmons, R. A., London, 
1S37. James supposes that the "Yankee captains" have in 
each case hunted round till they could get particularly small 
American shot to weigh; and also denies that short weight is 
a disadvantage. The last proposition, carried out logically, 
would lead to some rather astonishing results. 



84 Naval War of 1 812 

was probably not at all affected by the short 
weight of her shot. 

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, 
the following was the regular complement estab- 
lished by law ' : 

1 captain i coxswain 
4 lieutenants i sailmaker 

2 lieutenants of marines r cooper 

2 sailing-masters i steward 

2 master's mates i armorer 

7 midshipmen i master of arms 

I purser i cook 

1 surgeon i chaplain 

2 surgeon's mates 



I clerk 50 

1 carpenter 120 able seamen 

2 carpenter's mates 150 ordinary seamen 

1 boatswain 30 boys 

2 boatswain's mates 50 marines 
I yeoman of gun-room 

I gunner 400 in all. 
1 1 qvtarter gunners 

An i8-gun ship had 3 2 officers and petty officers, 
30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 
20 marines — 140 in all. Sometimes ships put to 
sea without their full complements (as in the case 
of the first Wasp), but more often with super- 
numeraries aboard. The weapons for close quar- 
ters were pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes; while 
the marines and some of the topmen had rnuskets 
and occasionally rifles. 

^ See State Papers, vol. xvi., p. 159, Washington, 1834. 



Naval War of 1 812 85 

In comparing the forces of the contestants, I 
have always given the number of men in crew; 
but this in most cases was unnecessary. When 
there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim 
the sails, make repairs, act as marines, etc., any 
additional number simply served to increase the 
slaughter on board. The Gnerrihe undoubtedly 
suffered from being short-handed, but neither the 
Macedonian nor Java would have been benefited 
by the presence of a hundred additional men. 
Barclay possessed about as many men as Perry, 
but this did not give him an equality of force. 
The Penguin and Frolic would have been taken 
just as surely had the Hornet and Wasp had a 
dozen men less apiece than they did. The prin- 
cipal case where numbers would help would be in 
a hand-to-hand fight. Thus, the Chesapeake, hav- 
ing fifty more men than the Shannon, ought to 
have been successful ; but she was not, because the 
superiority of her crew in numbers was more than 
counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shan- 
non's crew in other respects. The result of the 
battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought at 
anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry 
to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected 
by the number of men on either side, as both com- 
batants had amply enough to manage the guns 
and perform every other service. 

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties 



86 Naval War of 1 812 

is taken for granted ; it was not so much a factor 
in gaining the victory as one which, if lacking, was 
fatal to all chances of success. In the engage- 
ments between regular cruisers, not a single one 
was gained by superiority in courage. The crews 
of both the Argus and Epervier certainly flinched; 
but had they fought never so bravely they were 
too unskilful to win. The Chesapeake's crew 
could hardly be said to lack courage ; it was more 
that they were inferior to their opponents in dis- 
cipline as well as in skill. 

There was but one conflict during the war 
where the victory could be said to be owing to 
superiority in pluck. This was when the Neuf- 
chdtel privateer beat off the boats of the Endy- 
mion. The privateersmen suffered a heavier 
proportional loss than their assailants, and they 
gained the victory by sheer ability to stand pun- 
ishment. 

For convenience in comparing them, I give in 
tabulated form the force of the three British 38's 
taken by American 44 's (allowing for short weight 
of metal of latter) : 

Constitution Guerriire 

30 long 24's 30 long i8's 

2 long 24's 2 long 12's 
22 short 32's 16 short 32's 
— I short 18 



Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs. 



real, 684 lbs. Broadside, 556 lbs. 



Naval War of 1 812 87 

United Slates Macedonian 

30 long 24's 28 long i8's 

2 long 24's 2 long 12's 

22 short 42's 2 long 9's 



16 short 32's 

Broadside, nominal. 846 lbs. i short 18 

real, 786 lbs. 



Broadside, 547 lbs. 



Constitution Java 

30 long 24's 28 long iS's 

2 long 24's 2 long 12's 

20 short 32's 18 short 32's 

I short 24 



Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs. 



real, 654 lbs. Broadside, 576 lbs. 

The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with 
only long i8's on the second deck, was armed as 
follows : 

28 long 32's 

28 long iS's 

6 long 12's 
14 short 32's 

7 short i8's, 

or a broadside of 1032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 
296 from carronades; while the Constitution 
threw (in reality) 684 lbs., 356 from long guns, 
and 328 from her carronades, and the United 
States 102 lbs. more from her carronades. Re- 
membering the difference between long guns and 
carronades, and considering sixteen of the 74's 
long i8's as being replaced by 4 2 -pound carro- 



88 Naval War of 1 812 

nades ' (so as to get the metal on the ships distrib- 
uted in similar proportions between the two styles 
of cannon), we get as the 74's broadside 592 lbs, 
from long guns and 632 from carronades. The 
United States threw nominally 360 and 486, and 
the Constitution nominally 360 and 352; so the 
74 was superior even to the former nominally 
about as three is to two; while the Constitution, 
if "a line-of -battle ship," was disguised to such a 
degree that she was in reality of but little more 
than one half the force of one of the smallest true 
liners England possessed! 

^ That this change would leave the force about as it was, 
can be gathered from the fact that the Adams and Jolin 
Adams, both of which had been armed with 4 2 -pound carro- 
nades (which were sent to Sackett's Harbor), had them 
replaced by long and medium i8-pounders, these being con- 
sidered to be more formidable; so that the substitution of 
42-pound carronades would, if anything, reduce the force of 
the 74. 



CHAPTER III 
1812 

ON THE OCEAN 

Commodore Rodgers's cruise and unsuccessful chase of the 
Belvidera — Cruise of the Essex — Captain Hull's cruise and 
escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke — Constitu- 
tion captures Guerriere — Wasp captures Frolic — Second un- 
successful cruise of Commodore Rodgers — United States 
captures Macedonian — Constitution captures Java — Essex 
starts on a cruise — Summary. 

AT the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 
181 2, the American navy was but partially 
prepared for effective service. TheWasp, 
18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from 
France; the Constellation, 38, was lying in the 
Chesapeake River, unable to receive a crew for 
several months to come; the Chesapeake, ^S, was 
lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor ; the 
Adams, 28, was at Washington, being cut down 
and lengthened from a frigate into a corvette. 
These three cruisers were none of them fit to go to 
sea till after the end of the year. The Essex, 32, 
was in New York harbor, but, having some repairs 
to make, was not yet ready to put out. The Con- 
stitution, 44, was at Annapolis, without all of her 

89 



90 Naval War of 1812 

stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the 
time of the old one being up. The Nautilus, 14, 
was cruising off New Jersey, and the other small 
brigs were also off the coast. The only vessels 
immediately available were those under the com- 
mand of Commodore Rodgers at New York, con- 
sisting of his own ship, the President, 44, and of 
the United States, 44, Commodore Decatur; 
Congress, 38, Captain Smith; Hornet, 18, Captain 
Lawrence; and A rg«5, 16, Lieutenant Sinclair. It 
seems marvellous that any nation should have 
permitted its ships to be so scattered, and many 
of them in such an unfit condition, at the begin- 
ning of hostilities. The British vessels cruising off 
the coast were not at that time very numerous or 
formidable, consisting of the Africa, 64, Acasta, 
40, Shannon, 38, Guerriere, 38, Belvidera, 36, 
Mollis, 32, Southampton, 32, Sind Minerva, 32, with 
a number of corvettes and sloops ; their force was, 
however, strong enough to render it impossible for 
Commodore Rodgers to make any attempt on the 
coast towns of Canada or the West Indies. But 
the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from 
Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by 
the Thalia, 36, Captain Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, 
Captain Manners. Its capture or destruction 
would have been a serious blow, and one which 
there seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet 
would have to pass along the American coast, run- 



Naval War of 1 812 91 

ning with the Gulf Stream. Commodore Rodgers 
had made every preparation in expectation of war 
being declared, and an hour after official intelli- 
gence of it, together with his instructions, had 
been received, his squadron put to sea on June 
2ist, and ran off toward the southeast ' to get at 
the Jamaica ships. Having learned from an 
American brig that she had passed the plate fleet 
four days before in lat. 36° N., long. 67° W., the 
Commodore made all sail in that direction. At 6 
A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E., 
which proved to be the British frigate Belvidera, 36, 
Captain Richard Byron. ^ The latter had sighted 
some of Commodore Rodgers's squadron some 
time before and stood toward them, till at 6.30 
she made out the three largest ships to be frigates. 
Having been informed of the likelihood of war by 
a New York pilot boat, the Belvidera now stood 
away, going N. E. by E., the wind being fresh from 
the west. The i\mericans made all sail in chase, 
the President, a very fast ship off the wind, lead- 
ing, and the Congress coming next. At noon the 
President bore S.W., distant 2| miles from the 
Belvidera, Nantucket shoals bearing 100 miles N. 
and 48 miles E,^ The wind grew lighter, shifting 

^ Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of 
the Navy, September i, 1812. 

2 Brenton, v., 46. 

3 Log of Belvidera, June 23, 1812. 



92 Naval War of 1 812 

more toward the southwest, while the ships con- 
tinued steadily in their course, going N. E. by E. 
As the President kept gaining, Captain Byron 
cleared his ship for action, and shifted to the stern 
ports two long i8-pounders on the main-deck and 
two 3 2 -pound carronades on the quarter-deck. 

At 4.30 ' the President's starboard forecastle 
bow-gun was fired by Commodore Rodgers him- 
self; the corresponding main-deck gun was next 
discharged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired 
again. These three shots all struck the stern of 
the Belvidera, killing and wounding nine men, — 
one of them went through the rudder coat into the 
after gun-room, the other two into the captain's 
cabin. A few more shots would have rendered 
the Belviderd's capture certain, but when the 
President's main-deck gun was discharged for the 
second time it burst, blowing up the forecastle 
deck and killing and wounding sixteen men, among 
them the Commodore himself, whose leg was 
broken. This saved the British frigate. Such an 
explosion always causes a half panic, every gun 
being at once suspected. In the midst of the con- 
fusion. Captain Byron's stem-chasers opened with 
spirit and effect, killing or wounding six men more. 
Had the President still pushed steadily on, only 

' Cooper, ii., 151. According to James, vi., 117, the Presi- 
dent was then 600 yards distant from the Belvidera half a 
point on her weather or port quarter 



Naval War of 1 812 93 

using her bow-chasers until she closed abreast, 
which she could probably have done, the Belvidera 
could still have been taken; but, instead, the 
former now bore up and fired her port broadside, 
cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly, but doing 
no other damage, while the Belvidera kept up a 
brisk and galling fire, although the long bolts, 
breeching-hooks, and breechings of the guns now 
broke continually, wounding several of the men, 
including Captain Byron. The President had lost 
ground by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, 
coming up closer than before, again opened from 
her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which se- 
verely wounded her opponent's main -topmast, 
cross jack yard, and one or two other spars ' ; but 
shortly afterward she repeated her former tactics 
and again lost ground by yawing to discharge 
another broadside, even more ineffectual than the 
first. Once more she came up closer than ever, 
and once more yawed; the single shots from her 
bow-chasers doing considerable damage, but her 
raking broadsides none.^ Meanwhile, the active 
crew of the Belvidera repaired everything as fast 
as it was damaged, while, under the superintend- 
ence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, and Campbell, 

^James, vi., 119. He says the President was within 400 
yards. 

^ Lord Howard Douglass, Naval Gunnery, p. 419 (third 
edition) . 



94 Naval War of 1812 

no less than three hundred shot were fired from 
her stern guns.' Finding that if the Presi- 
dent ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, 
Captain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, 
and two sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and 
jolly-boat, and started fourteen tons of water. 
The effect of this was at once apparent, and she 
began to gain ; meanwhile, the damage the sails of 
the combatants had received had enabled the Con- 
gress to close, and when abreast of his consort Cap- 
tain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the 
shot fell short. The Belvidera soon altered her 
course to east by south, set her starboard stud- 
ding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; 
three days afterward she reached Halifax harbor. 
Lord Howard Douglass's criticisms on this en- 
counter seem very just. He says that the Presi- 
dent opened very well with her bow-chasers (in 
fact, the Americans seemed to have aimed better 
and to have done more execution with these guns 
than the British with their stern-chasers), but 
that she lost so much ground by yawing and de- 
livering harmless broadsides as to enable her an- 
tagonist to escape. Certainly, if it had not been 
for the time thus lost, to no purpose, the Commo- 
dore would have run alongside his opponent and 
the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed. 
On the other hand, it must be remembered that it 

^ James, vi., ii8. 



Naval War of 1 812 95 

was only the bursting of the gun on board the 
President, causing such direful confusion and loss, 
and especially harmful in disabling her com- 
mander, that gave the Belvidera any chance of 
escape at all. At any rate, whether the American 
frigate does, or does not, deserve blame. Captain 
Byron and his crew do most emphatically deserve 
praise for the skill with which their guns were 
served and repairs made, the coolness with which 
measures to escape were adopted, and the courage 
with which they resisted so superior a force. On 
this occasion Captain Byron showed himself as 
good a seaman and as brave a man as he sub- 
sequently proved a humane and generous enemy 
when engaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake. 
This was not a very auspicious opening of hos- 
tilities for America. The loss of the Belvidera was 
not the only thing to be regretted, for the dis- 
tance the chase took the pursuers out of their 
course probably saved the plate fleet. When the 
Belvidera was first made out, Commodore Rodgers 
was in latitude 39° 26' N., and longitude 71° 10' 
W., at noon the same day the Thalia and her 
convoy were in latitude 39° N., longitude 
62° W, Had they not chased the Belvidera, the 

^ Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the 
British, does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and 
Hardy, which certainly shone in comparison to some of the 
rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followers in Chesa- 
peake Bay. 



gS Naval War of 1812 

Americans would probably have run across the 
plate fleet. 

The American squadron reached the western 
edge of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th,' 
and on July ist, a little to the east of the Banks, 
fell in with large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, 
orange peels, etc., which filled every one with 
great hopes of overtaking the quarry. On July 
9th, the Hornet captured a British privateer in lati- 
tude 45° 30' N., and longitude 23° W., and her 
master reported that he had seen the Jamaica- 
men the previous evening; but nothing further 
was heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being 
within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, 
Commodore Rodgers reluctantly turned south- 
ward, reaching Madeira July 21st. Thence he 
cruised toward the Azores and by the Grand Banks 
home, there being considerable sickness on the 
ships. On August 31st he reached Boston after a 
very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made but 
seven prizes, all merchantmen, and had recap- 
tured one American vessel. 

On July 3d, the Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, 
put out of New York. As has been already ex- 
plained, she was most inefficiently armed, almost 
entirely with carronades. This placed her at the 
mercy of any frigate with long guns which could 
keep at a distance of a few hundred yards; but, 
^Letter of Commodore Rodgers, September i. 



Naval War of 1 812 97 

in spite of Captain Porter's petitions and remon- 
strances, he was not allowed to change his arma- 
ment. On the nth of July, at 2 a.m., latitude t,t,° 
N., longitude 66° W., the Essex fell in with the 
Minerva, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins, convoy- 
ing seven transports, each containing about 200 
troops, bound from Barbadoes to Quebec. The 
convoy was sailing in open order, and, there being 
a dull moon, the Essex ran in and cut out trans- 
port No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. Having 
taken out the soldiers. Captain Porter stood back 
to the convoy, expecting Captain Hawkins to 
come out and fight him ; but this the latter would 
not do, keeping the convoy in close order around 
him. The transports were all armed and still con- 
tained in the aggregate 1200 soldiers. As the 
Essex could only fight at close quarters these 
heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to 
cut out the Minerva. Her carronades would have 
to be used at short range to be effective, and it 
would of course have been folly to run in right 
among the convoy and expose herself to the cer- 
tainty of being boarded by five times as many men 
as she possessed. The Minerva had three less 
guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried 24-pound 
carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had 
fifty men less than the Essex, which had about 270 
men this cruise ; on the other hand, her main-deck 
was armed with long 12's, so that it is hard to say 

VOL. I. — 7 



98 Naval War of 1 812 

whether she did right or not in refusing to fight. 
She was of the same force as the Southampton, 
whose captain, Sir James Lucas Yeo, subsequently 
challenged Porter, but never appointed a meeting- 
place. In the event of a meeting, the advantage, 
in ships of such radically different armaments, 
would have been with that captain who succeeded 
in outmanoeuvring the other and in making the 
fight come off at the distance best suited to him- 
self. At long range either the Minerva or South- 
ampton would possess an immense superiority ; but 
if Porter could have contrived to run up within a 
couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, 
his superiority in weight of metal and number of 
men would have enabled him to carry either of 
them. Porter's crew was better trained for board- 
ing than almost any other American commander's ; 
and probably none of the British frigates on 
the American station, except the Shannon and 
the Tenedos, would have stood a chance with the 
Essex in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among her 
youngest midshipmen was one, by name David 
Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, 
who afterward became the first and greatest ad- 
miral of the United States. His own words on 
this point will be read with interest.: "Every 
day," he says,' "the crew were exercised at the 

^Life of Farragut (embodying his journal and letters), p. 
31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York, 1879. 



Naval War of 1812 99 

great guns, small arms, and single stick. And I 
may here mention the fact that I have never been 
on a ship where the crew of the old Essex was rep- 
resented but that I found them to be the best 
swordsmen on board. They had been so thor- 
oughly trained as boarders that every man was 
prepared for such an emergency, with his cutlass 
as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the ship's 
armorer out of a file, and a pistol." ' 

On August 13th, a sail was made out to wind- 
ward, which proved to be the British ship-sloop 
Alert, 16, Capt. T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 
twenty 18-pound carronades and 100 men.^ As 

I James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to 
bring the Minerva to action, we do not see what could have 
prevented the Essex, with her superiority of sailing, from 
coming alongside of her. But no such thought, we are sure, 
entered into Captain Porter's head." What "prevented the 
Essex" was the Minerva's not venturing out of the convoy. 
Farragut, in his journal, writes: "The captured British offi- 
cers were very anxious for us to have a fight with the Minerva, 
as they considered her a good match for the Essex, and Cap- 
tain Porter replied that he should gratify them with pleasure 
if his majesty's commander was of their taste. So we stood 
toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and 
awaited the Minerva, but she tacked and stood in among the 
convoy, to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who de- 
nounced the commander as a base coward, and expressed 
their determination to report him to the Admiralty." An 
incident of reported "flinching" like this is not worth men- 
tioning; I allude to it only to show the value of James's sneers. 

^ James {History, vi., p. 128) says " 86 men." In the Naval 
Archives at Washington, in the Captains' Letters for 181 2 (vol. 

L.of C. 



loo Naval War of 1812 

soon as the Essex discovered the Alert, she put out 
drags astern, and led the enemy to beheve she was 
trying to escape by sending a few men aloft to 
shake out the reefs and make sail. Concluding 
the frigate to be a merchantman, the Alert bore 
down on her ; while the Americans went to quar- 
ters and cleared for action, although the tompions 
were left in the guns and the ports kept closed.' 
The Alert fired a gun and the Essex hove to, when 
the former passed under her stem, and when on 
her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grape and 
canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frig- 
ate's beam that her shot did not enter the ports 
and caused no damage. Thereupon Porter put up 
his helm and opened as soon as his guns would 
bear, tompions and all. The Alert now discov- 
ered her error and made off, but too late, for in 
eight minutes the Essex was alongside, and the 
Alert fired a musket and struck, three men being 
wounded and several feet of water in the hold. 
She was disarmed and sent as a cartel into St. 
John's. It has been the fashion among American 
writers to speak of her as if she were "unworthily " 
given up, but such an accusation is entirely 

ii., No. 182), can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the 
parole of the officers and crew of the Alert, signed by Captain 
Laughame; it contains either loo or loi names of the crew 
of the Alert, besides those of a number of other prisoners sent 
back in the same cartel. 
^ Life of Farragut, p. i6. 



Naval War of 1812 loi 

groundless. The Essex was four times her force, 
and all that could possibly be expected of her 
was to do as she did — exchange broadsides and 
strike, having suffered some loss and damage. 
The Essex returned to New York on September 
7th, having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men.' 
The Belvidera, as has been stated, carried the 
news of the war to Halifax. On July 5th, Vice- 
Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise 
against the United States, commanded by Philip 
Vere Broke, of the Shannon, 38, having under him 
the Belvidera, 36, Captain Richard Byron; Africa, 
64, Captain John Bastard; and Molus, 32, Captain 
Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off 
Nantucket, they were joined by the Guerrikre, 38, 
Captain James Richard Dacres. On the i6th, the 
squadron fell in with and captured the United 
States brig Nautilus, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, 
like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns 
and men. She threw her lee guns overboard and 

^ Before entering New York, the Essex fell in with a British 
force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's v/orks, is said to 
have been composed of the Acasta and Shannon, each of fifty 
guns, and Ringdove, of twenty. James says it was the Shan- 
non, accompanied by a merchant vessel. It is not a point of 
much importance, as nothing came of the meeting, and the 
Shannon alone, with her immensely superior armament, 
ought to have been a match twice over for the Essex; al- 
though, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather a 
comical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary 
escape." 



I02 Naval War of 1812 

made use of every expedient to escape, but to no 
purpose. At 3 p.m. of the following day, when 
the British ships were abreast of Barnegat, about 
four leagues off shore, a strange sail was seen 
and immediately chased, in the south-by-east, or 
windward quarter, standing to the northeast. 
This was the United States frigate Constitution, 44, 
Captain Isaac Hull.' When the war broke out he 
was in the Chesapeake River getting a new crew 
aboard. Having shipped over 450 men (counting 
officers) , he put out of harbor on the 1 2th of July. 
His crew was entirely new, drafts of men coming 
on board up to the last moment.^ On the 17th, 
at 2 P.M., Hull discovered four sail, in the northern 
board, heading to the westward. At 3, the wind 
being very light, the Constitution made sail and 
tacked, in 18^ fathoms. At 4, in the N.E., a 
fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be 
the Guerriere. The first four ships bore N. N. W., 
and were all on the starboard tack; while by 6 

^ For the ensuing chase I have reUed mainly on Cooper; see 
also Memoir of Admiral Broke, p. 240; James, vi., 133; and 
Marshall's Naval Biography, ii., 625 (London, 1825). 

- In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy {Captains' Letters, 
1812, ii., No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men 
were arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with 
a ship of war, as many have but lately joined and have never 
been on an armed ship before. . . . We are doing all 
that we can to make them acquainted with their duty, and 
in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single- 
decked ship." 



Naval War of 1 812 103 

o'clock the fifth bore E.N.E. At 6.15, the wind 
shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing 
the American ship to windward. She then wore 
round with her head to the eastward, set her light 
studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30 beat to 
action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the 
Guerriere. The two frigates neared one another 
gradually, and at 10 the Constitution began mak- 
ing signals, which she continued for over an hour. 
At 3.30 A.M. on the i8th, the Guerriere, going 
gradually toward the Constitution on the port tack, 
and but one half-mile distant, discovered on her 
lee beam the Belvidera and the other British ves- 
sels, and signalled to them. They did not answer 
the signals, thinking she must know who they 
were, — a circumstance which afterward gave rise 
to sharp recriminations among the captains,— and 
Dacres, concluding them to be Commodore Rod- 
gers's squadron, tacked, and then wore round and 
stood away from the Constitution for some time 
before discovering his mistake. 

At 5 A.M., Hull had just enough steerage way on 
to keep his head to the east, on the starboard 
tack; on his lee quarter, bearing N.E. by N., 
were the Belvidera and Guerriere, and astern the 
Shannon, Molus, and Africa. At 5.30, it fell en- 
tirely calm, and Hull put out his boats to tow the 
ship, always going southward. At the same time 
he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and got 



I04 Naval War of 1812 

the forecastle-chaser aft, cutting away the taffrail 
to give the two guns more freedom to work in, and 
also running out, through the cabin windows, two 
of the long main-deck 24's. The British boats 
were towing also. At 6 a.m., a light breeze sprang 
up, and the Constitution set studding-sails and 
stay-sails; the Shannon opened at her with her 
bow-guns, but ceased when she found she could 
not reach her. At 6.30, the wind having died 
away, the Shannon began to gain, almost all the 
boats of the squadron towing her. Having 
sounded in 26 fathoms. Lieutenant Charles Morris 
suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare 
rope was bent on to the cables, payed out into the 
cutters, and a kedge run out half a mile ahead and 
let go ; then the crew clapped on and walked away 
with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge 
as she came up with the end of the line. Mean- 
while, fresh lines and another kedge were carried 
ahead, and the frigate glided away from her pur- 
suers. At 7.30 A.M., a little breeze sprang up, 
when the Constitution set her ensign and fired a 
shot at the Shannon. It soon fell calm again and 
the Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from the 
southward struck the ship, bringing her to wind- 
ward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails 
were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her 
helm she was brought close up on the port tack. 
The boats dropped in alongside; those that be- 



Naval War of 1 812 105 

longed to the davits were run up, while the others 
were just lifted clear of the water, by purchases on 
the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they 
could be used again at a minute's notice. Mean- 
while, on her lee beam the Guerrzbre opened fire; 
but her shot fell short, and the Americans paid 
not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell calm 
when Hull had 2000 gallons of water started, and 
again put out his boats to tow. The Shannon, 
with some of the other boats of the squadron help- 
ing her, gained on the Constitution, but by severe 
exertion was again left behind. Shortly after- 
ward, a slight wind springing up, the Belvidera 
gained on the other British ships, and when it fell 
calm she was nearer to the Constitution than any 
of her consorts, their boats being put on to her.' 
At 10.30, observing the benefit that the Constitu- 
tion had derived from warping, Captain Byron did 
the same, bending all his hawsers to one another, 
and working two kedge anchors at the same time 
by paying the warp out through one hawse-hole 
as it was run in through the other opposite. Hav- 
ing men from the other frigates aboard, and a 
lighter ship to work. Captain Byron, at 2 p.m. was 

' Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon; but from Mar- 
shall's Naval Biography we learn that it was the Belvidera. 
At other times, he confuses the Belvidera with the Guerriere. 
Captain Hull, of course, could not accurately distinguish the 
names of his pursuers. My account is drawn from a careful 
comparison of Marshall, Cooper, and James. 



io6 Naval War of 1812 

near enough to exchange bow- and stern-chasers 
with the Constitution — out of range, however. Hull 
expected to be overtaken, and made every arrange- 
ment to try in such case to disable the first frigate 
before her consorts could close. But neither the 
Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow very near 
for fear of having their boats sunk by the Amer- 
ican's stern-chasers. 

The Constitution's crew showed the most ex- 
cellent spirit. Officers and men relieved each 
other regularly, the former snatching their rest 
anywhere on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. 
Gradually, the Constitution drew ahead, but the 
situation continued most critical. All through 
the afternoon the British frigates kept towing and 
kedging, being barely out of gunshot. At 3 p.m., a 
light breeze sprung up, and blew fitfully at inter- 
vals; every puff was watched closely and taken 
advantage of to the utmost. At 7 in the evening 
the wind almost died out, and for four more weary 
hours the worn-out sailors towed and kedged. At 
10.45, a li'ttle breeze struck the frigate, when the 
boats dropped alongside and were hoisted up, ex- 
cepting the first cutter. Throughout the night 
the wind continued very light, the Belvidera forg- 
ing ahead tih she was oft" the Constitution's lee 
beam; and at 4 a.m. on the morning of the 19th, 
she tacked to the eastward, the breeze being light 
from the south by east. At 4.20 the Constitution 



Naval War of 1 812 107 

tacked also; and at 5,15 the /Eolits, which had 
drawn ahead, passed on the contrary tack. Soon 
afterward the wind freshened so that Captain Hull 
took in his cutter. The Africa was now so far to 
leeward as to be almost out of the race, while the 
five frigates were all running on the starboard 
tack with every stitch of canvas set. At 9 a.m., an 
American merchantman hove in sight and bore 
down toward the squadron. The Belvidera, by 
way of decoy, hoisted American colors, when the- 
Constitution hoisted the British flag, and the mer- 
chant vessel hauled off. The breeze continued 
light till noon, when Hull found he had dropped 
the British frigates well behind; the nearest was 
the Belvidera, exactly in his wake, bearing W.N. 
W. 2^ miles distant. The Shannon was on his lee, 
bearing N. by W. I W. distant 3|- miles. The 
other two frigates were five miles off on the lee 
quarter. Soon aftenvard the breeze freshened, 
and "Old Ironsides" drew slowly ahead from her 
foes, her sails being watched and tended with the 
most consummate skill. At 4 p.m., the breeze 
again lightened, but even the Belvidera was now 
four miles astern and to leeward. At 6.45, there 
were indications of a heavy rain squall, which 
once more permitted Hull to show that in sea- 
manship he excelled even the able captains against 
whom he was pitted. The crew were stationed 
and everything kept fast till the last minute, when 



io8 Naval War of 1812 

all was clewed up just before the squall struck the 
ship. The light canvas was furled, a second reef 
taken in the mizzen-topsail, and the ship almost 
instantly brought under short sail. The British 
vessels, seeing this, began to let go and haul down 
without waiting for the wind, and were steering on 
different tacks when the first gust struck them. 
But Hull, as soon as he got the weight of the wind 
sheeted home, hoisted his fore- and main-top- 
gallantsails, and went off on an easy bowline at the 
rate cf 11 knots. At 7.40, sight was again obtained 
of the enemy, the squall having passed to leeward ; 
the Belvidera, the nearest vessel, had altered her 
bearings two points to leeward, and was a long 
way astern. Next came the Shannon ; the Guer- 
riere and Molus were hull down, and the Africa 
barely visible. The wind now kept light, shifting 
occasionally in a very baffling manner, but the 
Constitution gained steadily, wetting her sails 
from the sky-sails to the courses. At 6 a.m. on 
the morning of the 20th, the pursuers were almost 
out of sight; and at 8.15 a.m. they abandoned the 
chase, Hull at once stopped to investigate the 
character of two strange vessels, but found them 
to be only Americans ; then, at midday, he stood 
toward the east, and went into Boston on July 
26th. 

In this chase. Captain Isaac Hull was matched 
against five British captains, two of whom. Broke 



Naval War of 1 812 109 

and Byron, were fully equal to any in their navy; 
and while the latter showed great perseverance, 
good seamanship, and ready imitation, there can 
be no doubt that the palm in every way belongs 
to the cool old Yankee. Every daring expedient 
known to the most perfect seamanship was tried, 
and tried with success; and no victorious fight 
could reflect more credit on the conqueror than 
this three-days' chase did on Hull. Later, on 
two occasions, the Constitution proved herself 
far superior in gunnery to the average British 
frigate; this time, her officers and men showed 
that they could handle the sails as well as they 
could the guns. Hull out-manoeuvred Broke 
and Byron as cleverly as a month later he out- 
fought Dacres. His successful escape and victori- 
ous fight were both performed in a way that place 
him above any single ship-captain of the war. 

On August 2d, the Constitution made sail from 
Boston ' and stood to the eastward, in hopes of 
falling in with some of the British cruisers. She 
was unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. 
Then she ran down to the Bay of Fundy, steered 
along the coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward 
Newfoundland, and finally took her station off 
Cape Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she 
took and burned two brigs of little value. On 
the 15th she recaptured an American brig from 

^Letter of Captain Isaac Hull, August 28, 1812. 



no Naval War of 1812 

the British ship-sloop Avenger, though the latter 
escaped ; Captain Hull manned his prize and sent 
her in. He then sailed southward, and on the 
night of the i8th spoke a Salem privateer which 
gave him news of a British frigate to the south; 
thither he stood, and at 2 p.m. on the 19th, in lat. 
41° 30 ' N. and 55° W., made out a large sail bear- 
ing E.S.E. and to leeward, ^ which proved to be 
his old acquaintance, the frigate Giierriere, Captain 
Dacres. It was a cloudy day, and the wind was 
blowing fresh from the northwest. The Giier- 
riere was standing by the wind on the starboard 
tack, under easy canvas^ ; she hauled up her 
courses, took in her topgallantsails, and at 4.30 
backed her main-topsail. Hull then very delib- 
erately began to shorten sail, taking in topgallant- 
sails, stay-sails, and flying-jib, sending down the 
royal yards and putting another reef in the top- 
sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted three en- 
signs, when the American also set his colors, one 
at each mast-head, and one at the mizzen-peak. 

The Constitution now ran down with the wind 
nearly aft. The Guerrihe was on the starboard 
tack, and at five o 'clock opened with her weather- 
guns,^ the shot falling short, then wore round and 
fired her port broadside, of which two shots struck 

^Do., August 30th. 

2 Letter of Captain James R. Dacres, September 7, 18 12. 

3 Log of Guerri^re. 



Naval War of 1 812 m 

her opponent, the rest passing over and through 
her rigging.' As the British frigate again wore, to 
open with her starboard battery, the Constitution 
yawed a Httle and fired two or three of her port 
bow-guns. Three or four times the Guerriere 
repeated this manoeuvre, wearing and firing alter- 
nate broadsides, but with Httle or no effect, while 
the Constitution yawed as often to avoid being 
raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow-guns. 
This continued nearly an hour, as the vessels were 
very far apart when the action began, hardly any 
loss or damage being inflicted by either party. At 
6.00 the Guerriere bore up and ran off under her 
topsails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a 
little on her port quarter, when the Constitution 
set her main-topgallantsail and foresail, and at 
6.05 closed within half pistol-shot distance on her 
adversary's port beam.^ Immediately a furious 
cannonade opened, each ship firing as the guns 
bore. By the time the ships were fairly abreast, 

' See in the Naval Archives (Bureau of Navigation) the 
Constitution's Log-Book (vol. ii., from February i, 1812, to 
December 13, 18 13). The point is of some little importance, 
because Hull in his letter speaks as if both the first broad- 
sides fell short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second 
went over the ship, except two shot, which came home. 
The hypothesis of the Guerriere having damaged powder was 
founded purely on this supposed falling short of the first two 
broadsides. 

^Autobiography of Commodore Morris, p. 164. Annapolis, 
1880. 



1 1 2 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

at 6.20, the Constitution shot away the Guerrieres 
mizzen-mast, which fell over the starboard quarter, 
knocking a large hole in the counter, and bringing 
the ship round against her helm. Hitherto, she had 
suffered very greatly, and the Constitution hardly 
at all. The latter, finding that she was ranging 
ahead, put her helm aport and then luffed short 
round her enemy's bows,' delivering a heavy rak- 
ing fire with the starboard guns and shooting away 
the Guerriere's main-yard. Then she wore and 
again passed her adversary's bows, raking with 
her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the Giterriere, 
dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her 
bow round till the wind came on her starboard 
quarter; and so near were the two ships that the 
Englishman's bowsprit passed diagonally over the 
Constitution's quarter-deck, and as the latter ship 
fell off it got foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the 
vessels then lay with the Guerriere's starboard 
bow against the Constitution's port, or lee quarter- 
gallery. ^ The Englishman's bow-guns played 
havoc with Captain Hull's cabin, setting fire to it; 
but the flames were soon extinguished by Lieuten- 
ant Hoffman. On both sides the boarders were 
called away ; the British ran forward, but Captain 
Dacres relinquished the idea of attacking ^ when 

' Log of Constitution. 

^Cooper, in Putnam's Magazine, i., 475. 

3 Address of Captain Dacres to the court-martial at Halifax. 



Naval War of 1 812 113 

he saw the crowds of men on the American's decks. 
Meanwhile, on the Constitution, the boarders and 
marines gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was 
running that they could not get on the Guerriere. 
Both sides suffered heavily from the closeness of 
the musketry fire; indeed, almost the entire loss 
on the Constitution occurred at this juncture. As 
Lieutenant Bush, of the marines, sprang upon the 
taffrail to leap on the enemy's decks, a British 
marine shot him dead; Mr. JNIorris, the first 
lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also 
both leaped on the taffrail, and both were at the 
same moment wounded by the musketry fire. On 
the Guerriere the loss was far heavier, almost all 
the men on the forecastle being picked off. Cap- 
tain Dacres himself was shot in the back and 
severely wounded by one of the American mizzen- 
topmen, while he was standing on the starboard 
forecastle hammocks, cheering on his crew ' ; two 
of the lieutenants and the master were also shot 
down. The ships gradually worked round till the 
wind was again on the port quarter, when they 
separated, and the Guerriere' s foremast and main- 
mast at once went by the board, and fell over on 
the starboard side, leaving her a defenceless hulk, 
rolling her main-deck guns into the water." At 
6.30, the Constitution hauled aboard her tacks, ran 
off a little distance to the eastward, and lay to. 

^ James, vi., 144. 2 Brenton, v., 51. 

VOL. I.— 8 



114 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

Her braces and standing and running rigging were 
much cut up and some of the spars wounded, but 
a few minutes sufficed to repair damages, when 
Captain Hull stood under his adversary's lee, and 
the latter at once struck, at 7.00 p.m.,' just two 
hours after she had fired the first shot. On the 
part of the Constitution, however, the actual 
fighting, exclusive of six or eight guns fired during 
the first hour, while closing, occupied less than 
30 minutes. 

The tonnage and metal of the combatants have 
already been referred to. The Constitution had, 
as already said, about 456 men aboard, while of 
the Guerriere's crew, 267 prisoners were received 
aboard the Constitution; deducting 10 who were 
Americans and would not fight, and adding the 15 
killed outright, we get 272 ; 28 men were absent in 
prizes. 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

C9mpara- 
Broad- Compaxa- tive loss 

Tons Guns side Men Loss tive Force inflicted 

Constitution. . I ST 6 27 684 456 14 i-oo ^■°° 

Guerricre 1338 25 §56 272 79 .70 .18 

The loss of the Constitution included Lieutenant 
WiUiam S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen 
killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, mas- 
ter, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, 
wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. 
Almost all this loss occurred when the ships came 

* Log of the Constitution. 



CONSTITUTION 



SOD 



\ 



This diagram is taken from Commo- 
dore Morris's autobiography and the log 
of the Gxtcrrit-re : the official accounts 
apparently consider "larboard" and 
"starboard " as interchangeable terms. 



SJS 



\,.,.4tP-\ 



V 



/ 



\ 
I 



/ 



s.ca I 



CUERRtERE 
s/s 



>v 



'••*«»«0»a»** 






V^ 

"'%^\ 



s.eD -^c. \ 




^.::# 



115 



f.JO 



1 1 6 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

foul, and was due to the Guerriere's musketry and 
the two guns in her bridle-ports. 

The Gnerriere lost 23 killed and mortally 
wounded, including her second lieutenant, Henry 
Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, 
including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieu- 
tenant, Bartholomew Kent, master, Robert Scott, 
two master's mates, and one midshipman. 

The third lieutenant of the Constitution, Mr. 
George Campbell Read, was sent on board the 
prize, and the Constitution remained by her during 
the night; but at daylight it was found that she 
was in danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once 
began removing the prisoners, and at three o'clock 
in the afternoon set the Guerrihe on fire, and in a 
quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sail 
for Boston,where he arrived on August 30th. "Cap- 
tain Hull and his officers," writes Captain Dacres in 
his official letter, " have treated us like brave and 
generous enemies ; the greatest care has been 
taken that we should not lose the smallest trifle." 

The British laid very great stress on the rotten 
and decayed condition of the Guerriere; mention- 
ing in particular that the mainmast fell solely be- 
cause of the weight of the faffing foremast. But 
it must be remembered that until the action 
occurred she was considered a very fine ship. 
Thus, in Brighton's Memoir of Admiral Broke, it is 
declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinion 



Naval War of 1812 117 

that she could take a ship in half the time the 
Shannon could. The fall of the mainmast oc- 
curred when the fight was practically over ; it had 
no influence whatever on the conflict. It was 
also asserted that her powder was bad, but on no 
authority; her first broadside fell short, but so, 
under similar circumstances, did the first broadside 
of the United States. None of these causes ac- 
count for the fact that her shot did not hit. Her 
opponent was of such superior force — nearly in 
the proportion of 3 to 2 — that success would have 
been very difficult in any event, and no one can 
doubt the gallantry and pluck with which the 
British ship was fought; but the execution was 
very greatly disproportioned to the force. The 
gunnery of the Guerribre was very poor, and that 
of the Constitution excellent ; during the few min- 
utes the ships were yard-arm and yard-arm, the 
latter was not hulled once, while no less than 30 
shot took efl:ect on the former's engaged side,' 
five sheets of copper beneath the bends. The 
Guerriere, moreover, was out-manoeuvred; "in 
w^earing several times and exchanging broadsides 
in such rapid and continual changes of position, 
her fire was much more harmless than it would 
have been if she had kept more steady." ' The 

^ Captain Dacres's address to the court-martial. 
2 Lord Howard Douglass's treatise on Naval Gunnery, p. 
454. London, 185 1. 



ii8 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

Constitution was handled faultlessly ; Captain Hull 
displayed the coolness and skill of a veteran in the 
way in which he managed, first, to avoid being 
raked, and then to improve the advantage 
which the precision and rapidity of his fire had 
gained. "After making every allowance claimed 
by the enemy, the character of this victory is not 
essentially altered. Its peculiarities were a fine 
display of seamanship in the approach, extraor- 
dinary efficiency in the attack, and great readi- 
ness in repairing damages; all of which denote 
cool and capable officers, with an expert and 
trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of- 
war." ^ The disparity of force, lo to 7, is not 
enough to account for the disparity of execution, 
10 to 2. Of course, something must be allowed 
for the decayed state of the Englishman's masts, 
although I really do not think it had any influence 
on the battle, for he was beaten when the main- 
mast fell; and it must be remembered, on the 
other hand, that the American crew was absolutely 
new, while the Guerriere was manned by old hands. 
So that, while admitting and admiring the gal- 
lantry, and, on the whole, the seamanship, of Cap- 
tain Dacres and his crew, and acknowledging that 
he fought at a great disadvantage, especially in 
being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge 
that the combat showed a marked superiority, 

^ Cooper, ii., 173. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 119 

particularly in gunnery, on the part of the Amer- 
icans. Had the ships not come foul, Captain 
Hull would probably not have lost more than 
three or four men; as it was, he suffered but 
slightly. That the Guerriere was not so weak as 
she was represented to be, can be gathered from 
the fact that she mounted two more main-deck 
guns than the rest of her class ; thus carrying on 
her main-deck thirty long i8-pounders in battery 
to oppose to the thirty long 24's or rather (allow- 
ing for the short weight of shot) long 22's of the 
Constitution. Characteristically enough, James, 
though he carefully reckons in the long bow- 
chasers in the bridle-ports of the Argus and Enter- 
prise, yet refuses to count the two long i8's 
mounted through the bridle-ports on the Guer- 
rihe's main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these 
two bow-guns were used very effectively, when the 
ships got foul, and caused more damage and loss 
than all of the other main-deck guns put together. 
Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed 
the ten Americans on board to go below, so as not 
to fight against their flag ; and, in his address to the 
court-martial, mentions, among the reasons for 
his defeat, "that he was very much w^eakened by 
permitting the Americans on board to quit their 
quarters." Coupling this with the assertion 
made by James and most other British writers 
that the Constitution was largely manned by Eng- 



I20 Naval War of 1812 

lishmen, we reach the somewhat remarkable con- 
clusion that the British ship was defeated because 
the Americans on board would not fight against 
their country, and that the American was vic- 
torious because the British on board would. How- 
ever, as I have shown, in reality there were 
probably not a score of British on board the 
Constitution. 

In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate 
actions, every one must admit that there was a 
great superiority in force on the side of the vic- 
tors, and British historians have insisted that this 
superiority was so great as to preclude any hopes 
of a successful resistance. That this was not 
true, and that the disparity between the com- 
batants was not as great as had been the case in a 
number of encounters in which English frigates 
had taken French ones, can be best shown by a 
few accounts taken from the French historian 
Troude, who would certainly not exaggerate the 
difference. Thus, on March i, 1799, the English 
38-gun i8-pounder frigate Sybil captured the 
French 44-gun 24-pounder frigate Forte, after an 
action of two hours and ten minutes.' In actual 
weight the shot thrown by one of the main-deck 
guns of the defeated Forte was over six pounds 
heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main- 

^ Bataillcs Navales de la France. O. Troude, iv., 171. 
Paris, 1868. 



Naval War of 1 812 121 

deck guns of the victorious Constitution or United 
States.^ 

There are later examples than this. But a very- 
few years before the declaration of war by the 
United States, and in the same struggle that was 
then still raging, there had been at least two vic- 
tories gained by English frigates over French foes 
as superior to themselves as the American 44's 
were to the British ships they captured. On 
August 10, 1805, the PhcBnix, 36, captured the 
Didon, 40, after 3^ hours' fighting, the compara- 
tive broadside force being ^ : 



PhcBnix 


Didon 


13 X 18 


14 X 18 


2X9 


2X8 


6 X 32 


7 X 36 


21 guns, 444 lbs. 


23 guns, 522 lbs. 




(nominal; about 




600, real). 



On March 8, 1808, the San Florenzo, 36, cap- 
tured the Piedmontaise, 40, the force being 
exactly what it was in the case of the Phoenix and 
Didon.^ Comparing the real, not the nominal, 
weight of metal, we find that the Didon and Pied- 
montaise were proportionately of greater force, 
compared to the PhcBnix and San Florenzo, than 

^ See Appendix B for actual weight of French shot. 
2 Batailles Navales de la France, iii., 425. 
3 Ibid., iii., 499. 



122 Naval War of 1 812 

the Constitution was, compared to the Guerriere or 
Java. The French i8's threw each a shot weigh- 
ing but about two pounds less than that thrown 
by an American 24 of 181 2, while their 36-pound 
carronades each threw a shot over 10 pounds 
heavier than that thrown by one of the Constitu- 
tion's spar-deck 32's. 

That a 24-pounder cannot always whip an 18- 
pounder frigate is shown by the action of the 
British frigate Eurotas with the French frigate 
Chlorinde, on February 25, 1814.^ The first, with 
a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds of shot at a 
broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throw- 
ing 463 pounds; yet the result was indecisive. 
The French lost 90, and the British 60 men. The 
action showed that heavy metal was not of much 
use unless used well. 

To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's vic- 
tory caused in the United States, and the intense 
annoyance it created in England, it must be re- 
membered that during the past twenty years the 
Island Power had been at war with almost every 
state in Europe, at one time or another, and in the 
course of about two hundred single conflicts be- 
tween ships of approximately equal force (that 
is, where the difference was less than one half), 
waged against French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, 
Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagon- 

ijames, vi., 391. 



Naval War of 1 812 123 

ists, her ships had been beaten and captured in 
but five instances. Then war broke out with 
America, and in eight months five single-ship 
actions occurred, in every one of which the British 
vessel was captured. 

Even had the victories been due solely to supe- 
rior force, this would have been no mean triumph 
for the United States. 

On October 13, 181 2, the American i8-gun ship- 
sloop Wasp, Captain Jacob Jones, with 137 men 
aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ran off 
southeast to get into the track of the West India 
vessels; on the i6th, a heavy gale began to blow, 
causing the loss of the jib-boom and two men who 
were on it. The next day, the weather moderated 
somewhat, and at 11.30 p.m., in latitude 37° N., 
longitude 65° W., several sail were descried.' 
These were part of a convoy of 14 merchantmen 
which had quitted the bay of Honduras on Sep- 
tember 12th, bound for England,^ under the con- 
voy of the British i8-gun brig-sloop Frolic, of 19 
guns and no men. Captain Thomas Whinyates. 
They had been dispersed by the gale of the i6th, 
during which the Frolic's main-yard was carried 
away and both her topsails torn to pieces ^ ; next 
day she spent in repairing damages, and by dark 

'Captain Jones's official letter, November 24, 1812. 

2 James's History, vi., 158. 

3 Captain Whinyates's official letter, October 18, 1812. 



124 Naval War of 1812 

six of the missing ships had joined her. The day 
broke almost cloudless on the i8th (Sunday), 
showing the convoy, ahead and to leeward of the 
American ship, still some distance off, as Captain 
Jones had not thought it prudent to close during 
the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his 
antagonists. The Wasp now sent down her top- 
gallant yards, close reefed her topsails, and 
bore down under short fighting canvas ; while the 
Frolic removed her main-yard from the casks, 
lashed it on deck, and then hauled to the wind 
under her boom mainsail and close-reefed fore- 
topsail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the 
stranger under her guns, and permit the convoy 
to escape. At 11.32 the action began — the two 
ships running parallel on the starboard tack, not 
sixty yards apart, the Wasp firing her port, and 
the Frolic her starboard guns. The latter fired 
very rapidly, delivering three broadsides to the 
Wasp's two,' both crews cheering loudly as the 
ships wallowed through the water. There was a 
very heavy sea running, which caused the vessels 
to pitch and roll heavily. The Americans fired as 
the engaged side of their ship was going down, 
aiming at their opponent's hull ' ; while the British 
delivered their broadsides while on the crests of 
the seas, the shot going high. The water dashed 

* Cooper, 182. 

* Niles's Register, iii., p. 324. 



Naval War of 1 812 125 

in clouds of spray over both crews, and the vessels 
rolled so that the muzzles of the guns went under.' 
But in spite of the rough weather, the firing was 
not only spirited but well directed. At 11.36, the 
Wasp's main-topmast was shot away and fell, 
with its yard, across the port fore and fore-topsail 
braces, rendering the head yards unmanageable; 
at 1 1.46, the gaff and mizzen-topgallantmast came 
down, and by 11.52 every brace and most of the 
rigging was shot away.^ It would now have been 
very difficult to brace any of the yards. But 
meanwhile the Frolic suffered dreadfully in her 
hull and lower masts, and had her gaff and head 
braces shot away.^ The slaughter among her 
crew was very great, but the survivors kept at 
their work with the dogged courage of their race. 
At first the two vessels ran side by side, but the 
American gradually forged ahead, throwing in her 
fire from a position in which she herself received 
little injury; by degrees, the vessels got so close 
that the American struck the Frolic's side with 
her rammers in loading,'* and the British brig was 
raked with dreadful effect. The Frolic then fell 
aboard her antagonist, her jib-boom coming in 
between the main- and mizzen-rigging of the 
Wasp and passing over the heads of Captain Jones 
and Lieutenant Biddle, who were standing near 

' Niles's Register, iii., p. 324. 3 Captain Whinyates's letter. 
' Captain Jones's letter. 4 Captain Jones's letter. 



126 Naval War of 1812 

the capstan. This forced the Wasp up in the 
wind, and she again raked her antagonist, Captain 
Jones trying to restrain his men from boarding till 
he could put in another broadside. But they 
could no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a 
New Jersey seaman, leaped on the Frolic's bow- 
sprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mounted on the 
hammock-cloth to board, but his feet got entangled 
in the rigging, and one of the midshipmen seizing 
his coat-tails to help himself up, the lieutenant 
tumbled back on the deck. At the next swell he 
succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on which 
there were already two seamen whom he passed 
on the forecastle. But there was no one to oppose 
him; not twenty Englishmen were left unhurt. 
The man at the wheel was still at his post, grim 
and undaunted, and two or three more were on 
deck, including Captain Whinyates and Lieuten- 
ant Wintle, both so severely wounded that they 
could not stand without support.' There could 
be no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddle 
lowered the flag at 12.15 — just 43 minutes after 
the beginning of the fight.3 A minute or two 
afterward both the Frolic's masts went by the 
board — the foremast about fifteen feet above the 
deck, the other short off. Of her crew, as already 
said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. Every 

^ Captain Whinyates's letter. 

' James, vi., i6i. ^ Captain Jones's letter. 



Naval War of 1812 127 

officer was wounded ; two of them, the first lieu- 
tenant, Charles McKay, and master, John Ste- 
phens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over 
90 ' ; about 30 of whom were killed outright or 
died later. The Wasp suffered very severely in 
her rigging and aloft generally, but only two or 
three shots struck her hull; five of her men were 
killed — two in her mizzen-top and one in her 
main-topmast rigging — and five wounded,^ chiefly 
while aloft. 

The two vessels were practically of equal force. 
The loss of the Frolic's main-yard had merely 
converted her into a brigantine, and, as the 
roughness of the sea made it necessary to fight 
under very short canvas, her inferiority in men 
was fully compensated for by her superiority in 
metal. She had been desperately defended; no 
men could have fought more bravely than Captain 
Whinyates and his crew. On the other hand, the 
Americans had done their work with a coolness 
and skill that could not be surpassed ; the contest 
had been mainly one of gunnery, and had been 
decided by the greatly superior judgment and 
accuracy with which they fired. Both officers 
and crew had behaved well; Captain Jones 

* Captain Whinyates's official letter thus states it, and is, 
of course, to be taken as authority; the Bermuda account 
makes it 69, and James only 62. 

' Captain Jones's letter. 



v.. 



r 



128 Naval War of 1812 

particularly mentions Lieutenant Claxton, who, 
though too ill to be of any service, persisted 
in remaining on deck throughout the engage- 
ment. 

The Wasp was armed with two long 12's and 
sixteen 3 2 -pound carronades; the Frolic with two 
long 6's, sixteen 3 2 -pound carronades, and one 
shifting 1 2 -pound carronade. 

DIAGRAM.^ 



t 



W/JSP 



IJ.32 



J 



^• 



0= 



e- 






II. f2 ^«)i(s 







\ 

I 
I 

FBOUC 






^ It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of the manoeuvres 
in this action. James says "larboard" where Cooper says 
" starboard"; one says the Wasp wore, the other says that 
she could not do so, etc. 



Naval War of 1 812 129 



COMPARATIVE FORCE 






Tons No. Guns Weight Metal 


Crews 


Loss 


450 9 250 


135 


10 


467 10 274 


IIO 


90 



Wasp 

Frolic 467 

Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Graviere comments 
on this action as follows ' : 

" The American fire showed itself to be as accu- 
rate as it was rapid. On occasions when the 
roughness of the sea would render all aim exces- 
sively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were 
not less murderous than under more advantageous 
conditions. The corvette Wasp fought the brig 
Frolic in an enormous sea, under very short canvas, 
and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of the 
action, when the two vessels came together, the 
Americans who leaped aboard the brig found on 
the deck, covered with dead and dying, but one 
brave man, who had not left the wheel, and three 
officers, all wounded, who threw down their 
swords at the feet of the victors." Admiral de la 
Graviere' s criticisms are especially valuable, be- 
cause they are those of an expert, who only refers 
to the War of 18 12 in order to apply to the French 
navy the lessons which it teaches, and who is per- 
fectly unprejudiced. He cares for the lesson 
taught, not the teacher, and is quite as willing to 

^Guerres Maritintes, ii., 287. Septieme Edition, Paris, 
1881. 

VOL. I.— 9 



I30 Naval War of 1812 

learn from the defeat of the Chesapeake as from 
the victories of the Constitution — ^while most Amer- 
ican critics only pay heed to the latter. 

The characteristics of the action are the 
practical equality of the contestants in point of 
force and the enormous disparity in the damage 
each suffered; numerically, the Wasp was su- 
perior by 5 per cent., and inflicted a ninefold 
greater loss. 

Captain Jones was not destined to bring his 
prize into port, for a few hours afterward the 
Poictiers, a British 74, Captain John Poer Beres- 
ford, hove in sight. Now appeared the value of 
the Frolic's desperate defence; if she could not 
prevent herself from being captured, she had at 
least ensured her own recapture, and also the cap- 
ture of the foe. When the Wasp shook out her 
sails they were found to be cut into ribbons aloft, 
and she could not make off with sufficient speed. 
As the Poictiers passed the Frolic, rolling like a 
log in the water, she threw a shot over her, and 
soon overtook the Wasp. Both vessels were car- 
ried into Bermuda. Captain Whinyates was again 
put in command of the Frolic. Captain Jones 
and his men were soon exchanged; 25,000 dol- 
lars prize-money was voted them by Congress, 
and the Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were both 
promoted, the former receiving the captured ship 
Macedonian. Unluckily, the blockade was too 



Naval War of 1 812 131 

close for him to succeed in getting out during the 
remainder of the war. 

On October 8th, Commodore Rodgers left Boston 
on his second cruise, with the President, United 
States, Congress, and Argus,^ leaving the Hornet 
in port. Four days out, the United States and 
Argus separated, while the remaining two frigates 
continued their cruise together. The Argus," 
Captain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making 
prizes of six valuable merchantmen, and returned 
to port on January 3d. During the cruise she was 
chased for three days and three nights (the latter 
being moonlight) by a British squadron, and was 
obliged to cut away her boats and anchors and 
start some of her water. But she saved her guns, 
and was so cleverly handled that during the chase 
she actually succeeded in taking and manning a 
prize, though the enemy got near enough to open 
fire as the vessels separated. Before relating 
what befell the United States, we shall bring Com- 
modore Rodgers's cruise to an end. 

On October loth, the Commodore chased, but 
failed to overtake, the British frigate Nymphe, 38, 
Captain Epworth. On the i8th, off the great 
Bank of Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica 
packet Swallow, homeward bound, with 200,000 
dollars in specie aboard. On the 31st, at 9 a.m., 

I Letter of Commodore Rodgers, January i, 1813. 
* Letter of Captain Arthur Sinclair, January 4, 1813. 



132 Naval War of 1812 

lat. 33° N., long. 32° W., his two frigates fell in 
with the British frigate Galatea, 36, Captain 
Woodley Losack, convoying two South Sea ships, 
to windward. The Galatea ran down to recon- 
noitre, and at 10 a.m., recognizing her foes, hauled 
up on the starboard tack to escape. The Amer- 
ican frigates made all sail in chase, and continued 
beating to windward, tacking several times, for 
about three hours. Seeing that she was being 
overhauled, the Galatea now edged away to get on 
her best point of sailing ; at the same moment one 
of her convoy, the Argo, bore up to cross the hawse 
of her foes, but was intercepted by the Congress, 
who lay to to secure her. Meanwhile, the Presi- 
dent kept after the Galatea ; she set her topmast, 
topgallantmast and lower studding-sails, and 
when it was dusk had gained greatly upon her. 
But the night was very dark, the President lost 
sight of the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled 
to the wind to rejoin her consort. The two 
frigates cruised to the east as far as 22° W., and 
then ran down to 17° N.; but during the month 
of November they did not see a sail. They had 
but slightly better luck on their return toward 
home. Passing 120 miles north of Bermuda, 
and cruising a little while toward the Virginia 
capes, they re-entered Boston on December 31st, 
having made nine prizes, most of them of little 
value. 



Naval War of 1 812 133 

When four days out, on October 12th, Com- 
modore Decatur had separated from the rest of 
Rodgers's squadron and cruised east ; on the 25th, 
in lat. 29° N., and long. 29° 30', W., while going 
close-hauled on the port tack, with the wind fresh 
from the S.S.E., a sail was descried on the 
weather beam, about twelve miles distant.' This 
was the British 38-gun frigate Macedonian, Cap- 
tain John Surnam Carden. She was not, like the 
Guerriere, an old ship captured from the French, 
but newly built of oak, and larger than any 
American i8-pounder frigate; she was reputed 
(very wrongfully) to be a "crack ship," According 
to Lieutenant David Hope, " the state of discipline 
on board was excellent; in no British ship was 
more attention paid to gunnery. Before this 
cruise, the ship had been engaged almost every day 
with the enemy; and in time of peace the crew 
were constantly exercised at the great guns." ^ 
How they could have practised so much and 
learned so little, is certainly marvellous. 

The Macedonian set her fore-topmast and top- 
gallant studding-sails and bore away in chase, ^ edg- 
ing down with the wind a little aft the starboard 
beam. Her first lieutenant wished to continue on 
this course and pass down ahead of the United 

'Official letter of Commodore Decatur, October 30, 1812. 

2 Marshall's Naval Biography, iv., p. 1018. 

3 Captain Carden to Mr. Croker, October 28, 1812. 



134 Naval War of 1812 

States,^ but Captain Garden's over-anxiety to keep 
the weather-gage lost him this opportunity of 
closing.^ Accordingly he hauled by the wind and 
passed way to windward of the American. As 
Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased 
off and fired a broadside, most of which fell short ^ ; 
he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, 
his long 24's told heavily, while he received very 
little injury himself.'^ The fire from his main- 
deck (for he did not use his carronades at all for 
the first half-hour) s was so very rapid that it 
seemed as if the ship was on fire; his broadsides 
were delivered with almost twice the rapidity of 
those of the Englishman.^ The latter soon found 
he could not play at long bowls with any chance of 
success; and, having already erred either from 
timidity or bad judgment. Captain Carden de- 
cided to add rashness to the catalogue of his vir- 
tues. Accordingly, he bore up, and came down 
end on toward his adversary, with the wind on his 
port quarter. The States now (10.15) ^^i^ ^^^ 
main-topsail aback and made heavy play with 
her long guns, and, as her adversary came nearer, 
with her carronades also. The British ship would 

^ James, vi., i66. 

^ Sentence of court-martial held on the San Domingo, 74, 
at the Bermudas, May 27, 18 12. 

3 Marshall, iv., 1080. s Letter of Commodore Decatur. 
^Cooper, ii., 178. 6james, vi., 169. 



Naval War of 1 812 135 

reply with her starboard guns, hauling up to do 
so; as she came down, the American would ease 
off, run a little way and again come to, keeping up 
a terrific fire. As the Macedonian bore down to 
close, the chocks of all her forecastle guns (which 
were mounted on the outside) were cut away ' ; 
her fire caused some damage to the American's 
rigging, but hardly touched her hull, while she 
herself suffered so heavily both alow and aloft that 
she gradually dropped to leeward, while the Amer- 
ican forereached on her. Finding herself ahead 
and to windward, the States tacked and ranged up 
imder her adversary's lee, when the latter struck 
her colors at 11. 15, just an hour and a half after 
the beginning of the action.^ 

The United States had suffered surprisingly little ; 
what damage had been done was aloft. Her miz- 
zen-topgallantmast was cut away, some of the 
spars were wounded, and the rigging a good deal 
cut ; the hull was only struck two or three times. 
The ships were never close enough to be within 
fair range of grape and musketry,^ and the wounds 
were mostly inflicted by round shot and were thus 
apt to be fatal. Hence the loss of the Americans 
amounted to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th 
of the ship) and six seamen killed or mortally 

^ Letter of Captain Garden. 

' Letter of Commodore Decatur. 



136 Naval War of 181 2 

wounded, and only five severely and slightly 
wounded. 

The Macedonian, on the other hand, had re- 
ceived over a hundred shot in her hull, several be- 
tween wind and water; her mizzen-mast had 
gone by the board ; her fore- and main-topmasts 
had been shot away by the caps, and her main- 
yard in the slings ; almost all her rigging was cut 
away (only the foresail being left) ; on the engaged 
side all of her carronades but two, and two of her 
main-deck guns, were dismounted. Of her crew 
43 were killed and mortally wounded, and 61 (in- 
cluding her first and third lieutenants) severely 
and slightly wounded.' Among her crew were 
eight Americans (as shown by her muster-roll) ; 
these asked permission to go below before the 
battle, but it was refused by Captain Garden, and 
three were killed during the action. James says 
that they were allowed to go below, but this is un- 
true; for if they had the three would not have 
been slain. The others testified that they had 
been forced to fight, and they afterward entered 
the American service — the only ones of the Mace- 
donian's crew who did, or who were asked to. 

The Macedonian had her full complement of 
301 men; the States had, by her muster-roll of 
October 20th, 428 officers, petty officers, seamen, 
and boys, and 50 officers and privates of marines, 

^ Letter of Captain Garden. 



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137 



138 Naval War of 181 2 

a total of 478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his 
Naval Biography makes it). 

COMPARATIVE FORCE 

Broadside Weight 
Size Guns Metal Men Loss 

United States 1576 27 786 478 12 

Macedonian 1325 25 547 301 104 

Comparative Comparative Loss 

Force Inflicted 

United States 100 100 

Macedonian 66 11 

That is, the relative force being about as three 
is to two/ the damage done was as nine to one! 

Of course, it would have been almost impossible 
for the Macedonian to conquer with one third less 
force; but the disparity was by no means suffi- 
cient to account for the ninefold greater loss suf- 
fered, and the ease and impunity with which the 

I I have considered the United States as mounting her full 
allowance of 54 guns; but it is possible that she had no more 
than 49. In Decatur's letter of challenge of January 17, 
1814 (which challenge, by the way, was a most blustering 
affair, reflecting credit neither on Decatur nor his opponent, 
Captain Hope, nor on any one else, excepting Captain Stack- 
pole of H. M. S. Siatira) , she is said to have had that number; 
her broadside would then be 15 long 24's below, i long 24, one 
12-pound, and eight 42-pound carronades above. Her real 
broadside weight of metal would thus be about 680 lbs., and 
she would be superior to the Macedonian in the proportion of 
5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landed some of 
his guns in 18 13, as James asserts; and though I am not at all 
sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side in 
describing his force. 



Naval War of 1 812 139 

victory was won. The British sailors fought with 
their accustomed courage, but their gunnery was 
exceedingly poor; and it must be remembered 
that though the ship was bravely fought, still the 
defence was by no means so desperate as that 
made by the Essex or even the Chesapeake, as wit- 
nessed by their respective losses. The Mace- 
donian, moreover, was surrendered when she had 
suffered less damage than either the Giierrihe or 
Java. The chief cause of her loss lay in the fact 
that Captain Garden was a poor commander. The 
gunnery of the Java, Guerriere, and Macedonian 
was equally bad; but while Captain Lambert 
proved himself to be as able as he was gallant, and 
Captain Dacres did nearly as well, Captain Carden, 
on the other hand, was first too timid, and then 
too rash, and showed bad judgment at all times. 
By continuing his original course he could have 
closed at once; but he lost his chance by over- 
anxiety to keep the weather-gage, and was cen- 
sured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he 
tried to remedy one error by another, and made a 
foolishly rash approach. A very able and fair- 
minded English writer says of this action: "As a 
display of courage the character of the service was 
nobly upheld, but we would be deceiving our- 
selves were we to admit that the comparative 
expertness of the crews in gunnery was equally sat- 
isfactory. Now, taking the dift'erence of effect as 



HO Naval War of 1812 

given by Captain Garden, we must draw this con- 
clusion — that the comparative loss in killed and 
wounded (104 to 12), together with the dreadful 
account he gives of the condition of his own ship, 
while he admits that the enemy's vessel was in 
comparatively good order, must have arisen from 
inferiority in gunnery as well as in force." ' 

On the other hand, the American crew, even 
according to James, were as fine a set of men as 
ever were seen on shipboard. Though not one 
fourth were British by birth, yet many of them 
had served on board British ships of war, in some 
cases voluntarily, but much more often because 
they had been impressed. They had been trained 
at the guns with the greatest care by Lieutenant 
Allen. And, finally. Commodore Decatur handled 
his ship with absolute faultlessness. To sum up: 
a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was 
matched against an equally brave but unskilful 
one, with an incompetent leader; and this accounts 
for the disparity of loss being so much greater than 
the disparity in force. 

At the outset of this battle, the position of the 
parties was just the reverse of that in the case of 
the Constitution and Guerrihe; the Englishman 
had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in a 
very different manner from that in which Captain 
Hull had done. The latter at once ran down to 
* Lord Howard Douglass, Naval Gunnery, p. 525. 



Naval War of 1 812 141 

close, but manoeuvred so cautiously that no dam- 
age could be done him till he was within pistol- 
shot. Captain Garden did not try to close till 
after fatal indecision, and then made the attempt 
so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before he 
got to close quarters. Commodore Decatur, also, 
manoeuvred more skilfully than Captain Dacres, 
although the difference was less marked between 
these two. The combat was a plain cannonade; 
the States derived no advantage from the superior 
number of her men, for they were not needed. 
The marines in particular had nothing whatever 
to do, while they had been of the greatest service 
against the Guerrihe. The advantage was simply 
in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard Douglass's 
criticisms on these actions seem to me only ap- 
plicable in part. He says (p. 524): "The Amer- 
icans would neither approach nor permit us to 
join in close battle until they had gained some ex- 
traordinary advantage from the superior faculties 
of their long guns in distant cannonade, and from 
the intrepid, imcircumspect, and often very ex- 
posed approach of assailants who had long been 
accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. Our 
vessels were crippled in distant cannonade from 
encountering rashly the serious disadvantage of 
making direct attacks; the uncircumspect gal- 
lantry of our commanders led our ships unguarded- 
ly into the snares which wary caution had spread." 



142 Naval War of 1812 

These criticisms are very just as regards the 
Macedonian, and I fully agree with them (pos- 
sibly reserving the right to doubt Captain Car- 
den's gallantry, though readily admitting his 
uncircumspection) . But the case of the Guerriere 
differed widely. There the American ship made 
the attack, while the British at first avoided close 
combat; and, so far from trying to cripple her 
adversary by a distant cannonade, the Constitution 
hardly fired a dozen times until within pistol-shot. 
This last point is worth mentioning, because in a 
work on Heavy Ordnance, by Capt. T. F. Sim- 
mons, R.A. (London, 1837), it is stated that the 
Guerriere received her injuries before the closing, 
mentioning especially the "thirty shot below the 
water-line"; whereas, by the official accounts of 
both commanders, the reverse was the case. Cap- 
tain Hull, in his letter, and Lieutenant Morris, in 
his autobiography, say they only fired a few guns 
before closing; and Captain Dacres, in his letter, 
and Captain Brenton, in his History, say that not 
much injury was received by the Guerrihe until 
about the time the mizzen-mast fell, which was 
three or four minutes after close action began. 

Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the Mace- 
donian as prize-master; he secured the fore- and 
main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast, con- 
verting the vessel into a bark. Commodore De- 
catur discontinued his cruise to convoy his prize 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 143 

back to America; they reached New London 
December 4th. Had it not been for the necessity 
of convoying the Macedonian, the States would 
have continued her cruise, for the damage she 
suffered was of the most trifling character. 

Captain Garden stated (in Marshall's Naval 
Biography) that the States measured 1670 tons, 
was manned by 509 men, suffered so from shot 
under water that she had to be pumped out every 
watch, and that two 18-pound shot passed in a 
horizontal line through her mainmasts; all of 
which statements were highly creditable to the 
vividness of his imagination . The States measured 
but 1576 tons (and by English measurement very 
much less), had 478 men aboard, had not been 
touched by a shot under water-line and her lower 
masts were unwounded. James states that most 
of her crew were British, which assertion I have 
already discussed ; and that she had but one boy 
aboard, and that he was seventeen years old, — in 
which case 29 others, some of whom (as we learn 
from the Life of Decatur) were only twelve, must 
have grown with truly startling rapidity during 
the hour and a half that the combat lasted. 

During the twenty years preceding 181 2, there 
had been almost incessant warfare on the ocean, 
and although there had been innumerable single 
conflicts between French and English frigates, 
there had been but one case in which the French 



144 Naval War of 1 812 

frigate, single-handed, was victorious. This was 
in the year 1805, when the Milan captured 
the Cleopatra. According to Troude, the former 
threw at a broadside 574 pounds (actual), the lat- 
ter but 334; and the former lost 35 men out of her 
crew of 350; the latter 58 out of 200. Or, the 
forces being as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted was as 
100 to 60 ; while the States' force, compared to the 
Macedonian's, being as 100 to 66, the loss she in- 
flicted was as 100 to 11. 

British ships, moreover, had often conquered 
against odds as great; as, for instance, when the 
Sea Horse captured the great Turkish frigate 
Badere-Zaffer; when the Astrea captured the 
French frigate Gloire, which threw at a broadside 
286 pounds of shot, while she threw but 174; and 
when, most glorious of all. Lord Dundonald, in the 
gallant little Speedy, actually captured the Spanish 
xebec Gamo, of over five times her own force! 
Similarly, the corvette Comus captured the Danish 
frigate Fredrickscoarn, the brig Onyx captured the 
Dutch sloop Manly, the little cutter Thorn cap- 
tured the French Courier-National, and the Pasley 
the Spanish Virgin; while there had been many 
instances of drawn battles between English 12- 
pound frigates and French or Spanish i8-pounders. 

Captain Hull having resigned the command of 
the Constitution, she was given to Captain Bain- 
bridge, of the Constellation, who was also entrusted 



Naval War of 1 812 145 

with the command of the Essex and Hornet. The 
latter ship was in the port of Boston with the Con- 
stitution, under the command of Captain Lawrence. 
The Essex was in the Delaware, and accordingly 
orders were sent to Captain Porter to rendezvous 
at the Island of San Jago; if that failed, several 
other places were appointed, and if, after a certain 
time, he did not fall in with his commodore, he was 
to act at his own discretion. 

On October 26th, the Constitution and Hornet 
sailed, touched at the different rendezvous, and, 
on December 13th, arrived off San Salvador, where 
Captain Lawrence found the Bonne Cttoyenne, 18, 
Captain Pitt Bamaby Greene. The Bonne Cito- 
yenne was armed with eighteen 3 2 -pound carron- 
ades and two long 9's, and her crew of 1 50 men was 
exactly equal in number to that of the Hornet ; the 
latter' s short weight in metal made her antagonist 
superior to her in about the same proportion that 
she herself was subsequently superior to the Pen- 
guin, or, in other words, the ships were practically 
equal. Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain 
Greene to single fight, giving the usual pledges that 
the Constitution should not interfere. The chal- 
lenge was not accepted for a variety of reasons: 
among others, the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying 
home half a million pounds in specie.' Leaving 

^ Brenton and James both deny that Captain Greene was 
blockaded by the Hornet, and claim that he feared the Con- 

VOL. I. — 10. 



146 Naval War of 181 2 

the Hornet to blockade her, Commodore Bainbridge 
ran off to the southward, keeping the land in view. 
At 9 A.M., December 29, 181 2, while the Con- 
stitution was running along the coast of Brazil, 
about thirty miles off shore in latitude 13° 6' S., 
and longitude 31° W., two strange sail were made,' 
inshore and to windward . These were H . B . M . frig- 
ate Java, Captain Lambert, forty-eight days out of 
Spithead, England, with the captured ship William 

stitution. James says (p. 275) that the occurrence was one 
which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned 
greatly to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only 
sent the challenge because "it could not be accepted," and so 
he would "suffer no personal risk." He states that the 
reason it was sent, as well as the reason that it was refused, 
was because the Constitution was going to remain in the offing 
and capture the British ship if she proved conqueror. It is 
somewhat surprising that even James should have had the 
temerity to advance such arguments. According to his own 
account (p. 277), the Constitution left for Boston on January 
6th, and the Hornet remained blockading the Bonne Citoyenne 
till the 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived. During these 
eighteen days there could have been no possible chance of the 
Constitution or any other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous 
to suppose that any such fear kept Captain Greene from sail- 
ing out to attack his foe. No doubt Captain Greene's course 
was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that with all the 
assertions made by James as to the cowardice of the Ameri- 
cans, this is the only instance throughout the war in which a 
ship of either party declined a contest with an antagonist of 
equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir George 
Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of the 
opposing ships). 

' Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, January 3, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 147 

in company. Directing the latter to make for 
San Salvador, the Java bore down in chase of the 
Constitution.'- The wind was blowing light from 
the N.N.E., and there was very little sea on. At 
10 the Java made the private signals, English, 
Spanish, and Portuguese in succession, none being 
answered ; meanwhile, the Constitution was stand- 
ing up toward the Java on the starboard tack; a 
little after 11 she hoisted her private signal, and 
then, being satisfied that the strange sail was an 
enemy, she wore and stood off toward the S.E., 
to draw her antagonist away from the land,^ 
which was plainly visible. The Java hauled up, 
and made sail in a parallel course, the Constitution 
bearing about three points on her lee bow. The 
Java gained rapidly, being much the swifter. 

At 1.30 the Constitution luffed up, shortened 
her canvas to topsails, topgallantsails, jib, and 
spanker, and ran easily oft' on the port tack, head- 
ing toward the southeast; she carried her com- 
modore's pennant at the main, national ensigns at 
the mizzen-peak and main-topgallant mast-head, 
and a jack at the fore. The Java also had taken 
in the mainsail and royals, and came down in a 
lasking course on her adversary's weather-quarter,^ 

^Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, December 31, 1812. 
^ Log of the Constitution. 

3 Lieutenant Chads's address to the court-martial, April 27,, 
1813. 



148 Naval War of 181 2 

hoisting her ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union- 
jack at the mizzen- topgallant mast-head, and 
another lashed to the main-rigging. At 2 p.m., 
the Constitution fired a shot ahead of her, following 
it quickly by a broadside,^ and the two ships began 
at long bowls, the English firing the lee or star- 
board battery while the Americans replied with 
their port guns. The cannonade was very spirited 
on both sides, the ships suffering about equally. 
The first broadside of the Java was very destruc- 
tive, killing and wounding several of the Constitu- 
tion's crew. The Java kept edging down, and the 
action continued, with grape and musketry in 
addition; the swifter British ship soon fore- 
reached and kept away, intending to wear across 
her slower antagonist's bow and rake her; but the 
latter wore in the smoke, and the two combatants 
ran off to the westward, the Englishman still 
a-weather and steering freer than the Constitution, 
which had luffed to close. ^ The action went on 
at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, how- 
ever, the Java again forged ahead, out of the 
weight of her adversary's fire, and then kept off, 
as before, to cross her bows; and, as before, the 
Constitution avoided this by wearing, both ships 
again coming round with their heads to the east, 
the American still to leeward. The Java kept the 
weather-gage tenaciously, forereaching a little, 

^ Commodore Bainbridge's letter ^ Log of the Constitution. 



Naval War of 1 812 149 

and whenever the Constitution luffed up to close/ 
the former tried to rake her. But her gunnery- 
was now poor, little damage being done by it; 
most of the loss the Americans suffered was early 
in the action. By setting her foresail and main- 
sail, the Constitution got up close on the enemy's 
lee beam, her fire being very heavy and carrying 
away the end of the Java's bowsprit and her jib- 
boom.^ The Constitution forged ahead and re- 
peated her former manoeuvre, wearing in the 
smoke. The Java at once hove in stays, but 
owing to the loss of headsail fell off very slowly, 
and the American frigate poured a heavy raking 
broadside into her stern, at about two cables' 
length distance. The Java replied with her port 
guns as she fell off. 3 Both vessels then bore up 
and ran off free, with the wind on the port quarter ; 
the Java being abreast and to windward of her an- 
tagonist, both with their heads a little east of 
south. The ships were less than a cable's length 
apart, and the Constitution inflicted great damage, 
while suffering very little herself. The British 
lost many men by the musketry of the American 
topmen, and suffered still more from the round 
and grape, especially on the forecastle,'* many 

' Log of the Constitution. ^ Lieutenant Chads's letter. 

3 Ihid. 

4 Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of the 
court-martial on board H.M.S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, 
April 23, 1 8 13. 



I50 Naval War of 1812 

marked instances of valor being shown on both 
sides. The Java's masts were wounded and her 
rigging cut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then 
ordered her to be laid aboard the enemy, who was 
on her lee beam. The helm was put a-weather, 
and the Java came down for the Constitution's 
main-chains. The boarders and marines gathered 
in the gangways and on the forecastle, the boat- 
swain having been ordered to cheer them up with 
his pipe that they might make a clean spring.' 
The Americans, however, raked the British with 
terrible effect, cutting off their main- topmast 
above the cap, and their foremast near the cat 
harpings.2 The stump of the Java's bowsprit 
got caught in the Constitution's mizzen-rigging, 
and before it got clear the British suffered still 
more. 

Finally, the ships separated, the Java's bowsprit 
passing over the taffrail of the Constitution; the 
latter at once kept away to avoid being raked. 
The ships again got nearly abreast, but the Coyi- 
stitution, in her turn, forereached; whereupon 
Commodore Bainbridge wore, passed his antag- 
onist, luffed up under his quarter, raked him with 
the starboard guns, then wore, and recommenced 

^ Testimony of James Humble, in minutes of the court- 
martial on board H.M.S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, April 23, 
1813. 

^ Log of Constitution 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 151 

the action with his port broadside at about 3.10. 
Again the vessels were abreast, and the action went 
on as furiously as ever. The wreck of the top ham- 
per on the Java lay over her starboard side, so 
that every discharge of her guns set her on fire,' and 
in a few minutes her able and gallant commander 
was mortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the 
American main-topmen.^ The command then de- 
volved on the first lieutenant, Chads, himself pain- 
fully wounded. The slaughter had been terrible, 
yet the British fought on with stubborn resolu- 
tion, cheering lustily. But success was now hope- 
less, for nothing could stand against the cool 
precision of the Yankee fire. The stump of the 
Java's foremast was carried away by a double- 
headed shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff and 
spanker boom were shot away, also the main-yard, 
and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot, and 
all her guns absolutely silenced; when at 4.05 the 
Constitution, thinking her adversary had struck,^ 
ceased firing, hauled aboard her tacks, and passed 
across her adversary's bows to windward, with her 
topsails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes 
afterward the Java's mainmast fell, leaving her a 
sheer hulk. The Constitution assumed a weatherly 
position, and spent an hour in repairing damages 

^ Lieutenant Chads's address. 
^ Surgeon J. C. Jones's report. 
3 Log of the Constitution (as given in Bainbridge's letter). 



152 Naval War of 1812 

and securing her masts ; then she wore and stood 
toward her enemy, whose flag was again flying, 
but only for bravado, for as soon as the Constitu- 
tion stood across her forefoot she struck. At 5.25 
she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 
ist of the Constitution, in one of the latter's only 
two remaining boats. 

The American ship had suffered comparatively 
little. But a few round shot had struck her hull, 
one of which carried away the wheel; one 18- 
pounder went through the mizzen-mast ; the fore- 
mast, main-topmast, and a few other spars were 
slightly wounded, and the running rigging and 
shrouds were a good deal cut; but in an hour 
she was again in good fighting trim. Her loss 
amounted to 8 seamen and i marine killed; the 
5th lieutenant, John C. Alwyn, and 2 seamen, 
mortally, Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, 
severely, and 7 seamen and 2 marines, slightly 
wounded ; in all 1 2 killed and mortally wounded, 
and 22 wounded severely and slightly.' 

" The Java sustained unequalled injuries beyond 
the Constitution," says the British account.^ 
These have already been given in detail ; she was 
a riddled and entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss 
(for discussion of which see farther on) was 48 
killed (including Captain Henry Lambert, who 

^ Report of Surgeon Amos A. Evans. 
^ Naval Chronicle, xxix., 452. 




153 



154 Naval War of 1812 

died soon after the close of the action, and five 
midshipmen), and 102 wounded, among them 
Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenant of 
Marines David Davies, Commander John Mar- 
shall, Lieutenant James Saunders, the boatswain, 
James Humble, master, Batty Robinson, and four 
midshipmen. 

In this action both ships displayed equal gal- 
lantry and seamanship. "The Java,'' says Com- 
modore Bainb ridge, " was exceedingly well handled 
and bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was 
a distinguished and gallant officer, and a most 
worthy man, whose death I sincerely regret." 
The manoeuvring on both sides was excellent; 
Captain Lambert used the advantage which his 
ship possessed in her superior speed most skilfully, 
always endeavoring to run across his adversary's 
bows and rake him when he had forereached, and 
it was only owing to the equal skill which his an- 
tagonist displayed that he was foiled, the length 
of the combat being due to the number of evolu- 
tions. The great superiority of the Americans 
was in their gunnery. The fire of the Java was 
both, less rapid and less well-directed than that of 
her antagonist ; the difference of force against her 
was not heavy, being about as ten is to nine, and 
was by no means enough to account for the almost 
fivefold greater loss she suffered. 

On page 153 is a diagram of the battle. It 



Naval War of 1812 155 

differs from both of the official accounts, as these 
conflict greatly, both as to time and as regards 
some of the evolutions. I generally take the 
mean in cases of difference; for example, Com- 
modore Bainbridge's report makes the fight en- 
dure but I hour and 55 minutes, Lieutenant 
Chads 's 2 hours and 25 minutes; I have made it 
2 hours and 10 minutes, etc. 

The tonnage and weight of metal of the com- 
batants have already been stated ; I will give the 
complements shortly. The following is the 

COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS 

Tons Weight Metal No. Men Loss 

Constitution 1576 654 475 34 

Ja'va 1340 576 426 150 

Relative Force Relative Loss Inflicted 

Constitution 100 100 

Java 89 23 

In hardly another action of the war do the ac- 
counts of the respective forces differ so widely; 
the official British letter makes their total of men 
at the beginning of the action 377, of whom Com- 
modore Bainbridge officially reports that he 
paroled 378 ! The British state their loss in killed 
and mortally wounded at 24; Commodore Bain- 
bridge reports that the dead alone amounted to 
nearly 60! Usually I have taken each com- 
mander's account of his own force and loss, and I 
should do so now if it were not that the British 
accounts differ among themselves, and whenever 



156 Naval War of 181 2 

they relate to the Americans are flatly con- 
tradicted by the affidavits of the latter' s officers. 
The British first handicap themselves by the 
statement that the surgeon of the Constitution was 
an Irishman and lately an assistant surgeon in the 
British navy (Naval Chronicle, xxix., 452) ; which 
draws from Surgeon Amos A. Evans a solemn 
statement in the Boston Gazette that he was bom 
in Maryland and was never in the British navy in 
his life. Then Surgeon Jones of the Java, in his 
official report, after giving his own killed and 
mortally wounded at 24, says that the Americans 
lost in all about 60, and that 4 of their amputa- 
tions perished under his own eyes; whereupon 
Surgeon Evans makes the statement (Niles's Reg- 
ister, vi., p. 35), backed up by affidavits of his 
brother officers, that in all he had but five ampu- 
tations, of whom only one died, and that one, a 
month after Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To 
meet the assertions of Lieutenant Chads that he 
began action with but 377 men, the Constitution s 
officers produced the Javas muster-roll, dated 
November 17th, or five days after she had sailed, 
which showed 446 persons, of whom 20 had been 
put on board a prize. The presence of this large 
number of supernumeraries on board is explained 
by the fact that the Java was carrying out Lieu- 
tenant-General Hislop, the newly-appointed Gov- 
ernor of Bombay, and his suite, together with part 



Naval War of 1 812 157 

of the crews for the Cornwallis, 74, and gun-sloops 
Chameleon and Icarus; she also contained stores 
for those two ships. 

Besides conflicting with the American reports, 
the British statements contradict one another. 
The official published report gives but two mid- 
shipmen as killed ; while one of the volumes of the 
Naval Chronicle (vol. xxix., p. 452) contains a let- 
ter from one of the Java's lieutenants, in which 
he states that there were five. Finally, Commo- 
dore Bainbridge found on board the Constitution, 
after the prisoners had left, a letter from Lieu- 
tenant H. D. Comick, dated January i, 181 3, and 
addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood, 2 2d 
Regiment, foot, in which he states that 65 of their 
men were killed. James (Naval Occurrences) gets 
around this by stating that it was probably a 
forgery ; but, aside from the improbability of Com- 
modore Bainbridge being a forger, this could not 
be so, for nothing would have been easier than for 
the British lieutenant to have denied having 
written it, which he never did. On the other hand, 
it would be very likely that in the heat of the ac- 
tion, Commodore Bainbridge and the Java's own 
officers should overestimate the latter' s loss.^ 

^ For an account of the shameless corruption then existing 
in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord Dun- 
donald's Autobiography of a Seaman. The letters of the com- 
manders were often garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton. 



158 Naval War of 181 2 

Taking all these facts into consideration, we 
find 446 men on board the Java by her own muster- 
list; 378 of these were paroled by Commodore 
Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24 men were ac- 
knowledged by the enemy to be killed or mortally 
wounded; 20 were absent in a prize, leaving 24 
unaccounted for, who were undoubtedly slain. 

The British loss was thus 48 men killed and 
mortally wounded, and 102 wounded severely and 
slightly. The Java was better handled and more 
desperately defended than the Macedonian or even 
the Guerriere, and the odds against her were much 
smaller; so she caused her opponent greater loss, 
though her gunnery was no better than theirs. 

Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the Java, 
removed all the prisoners and baggage to the Con- 
stitution, and reported the prize to be in a very 
disabled state; owing partly to this, but more to 
the long distance from home and the great danger 
there was of recapture. Commodore Bainbridge 
destroyed her on the 31st, and then made sail for 
San Salvador. "Our gallant enemy," reports 
Lieutenant Chads, "has treated us most gener- 
ously"; and Lieutenant-General Hislop pre- 
sented the Commodore with a very handsome 

Among numerous cases that he gives may be mentioned the 
cutting out of the Chevrette, where he distinctly says, "our 
loss was much greater than was ever acknowledged " (vol. i., 
p. 505, edition of 1837). 



Naval War of 1 812 159 

sword as a token of gratitude for the kindness 
with which he had treated the prisoners. 

Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, 
but especially because of her decayed condition, 
Commodore Bainbridge sailed from San Salvador 
on January 6, 181 3, reaching Boston February 
27th, after his four months' cruise. At San Sal- 
vador he left the Hornet still blockading the 
Bonne Citoyenne. 

In order "to see ourselves as others see us," I 
shall again quote from Admiral Jurien de la Gra- 
viere, ^ as his opinions are certainly well worthy 
of attention, both as to these first three battles 
and as to the lessons they teach. *'When the 
American Congress declared war on England in 
181 2," he says, "it seemed as if this unequal con- 
flict would crush her navy in the act of being bom ; 
instead, it but fertilized the germ. It is only since 
that epoch that the United States has taken rank 
among maritime powers. Some combats of frig- 
ates, corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without 
doubt as regards material results, sufficed to break 
the charm which protected the standard of St. 
George, and taught Europe what she could have 
already learned from some of our combats, if the 
louder noise of our defeats had not drowned the 
glory, that the only invincibles on the sea are good 
seamen and good artillerists. 

^Guerres Maritimes, ii., 284 (Paris, 1881), 



i6o Naval War of 1812 

"The English covered the ocean with their 
cruisers when this unknown navy, composed of 
six frigates and a few small craft hitherto hardly- 
numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at the 
mouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the 
British power. But already the Constitution had 
captured the Guerriere and Java, the United States 
had made a prize of the Macedonian, the Wasp of 
the Frolic, and the Hornet of the Peacock. The 
honor of the new flag was established. England, 
humihated, tried to attribute her multiplied re- 
verses to the unusual size of the vessels which 
Congress had had constructed in 1799, and which 
did the fighting in 1 8 1 2 . She wished to refuse them 
the name of frigates, and called them, not without 
some appearance of reason, disguised line-of- 
battle ships. Since then all maritime powers have 
copied these gigantic models, as the result of the 
War of 181 2 obliged England herself to change 
her naval material ; but if they had employed, in- 
stead of frigates, cut-down 74's {vaisseaux rases), 
it would still be difficult to explain the prodigious 
success of the Americans. , , 

"In an engagement which terminated in less 
than half an hour, the English frigate Guerriere, 
completely dismasted, had fifteen men killed, 
sixty-three wounded, and more than thirty shot 
below the water-line. She sank twelve hours 
after the combat. The Constitution, on the con- 



Naval War of 1812 161 

trary, had but seven men killed and seven 
wounded, and did not lose a mast. As soon as 
she had replaced a few cut ropes and changed a 
few sails, she was in condition, even by the testi- 
mony of the British historian, to take another 
Guerriere. The United States took an hour and a 
half to capture the Macedonian, and the same 
difference made itself felt in the damage suffered 
by the two ships. The Macedonian had her masts 
shattered, two of her main-deck and all her spar- 
deck guns disabled; more than a hundred shot 
had penetrated the hull, and over a third of the 
crew had suffered by the hostile fire. The Amer- 
ican frigate, on the contrary, had to regret but 
five men killed and seven wounded ; her guns had 
been fired each sixty-six times to the Macedonian's 
thirty-six. The combat of the Constitution and 
the Java lasted two hours, and was the most 
bloody of these three engagements. The Java 
only struck when she had been razed like a sheer 
hulk; she had twenty-two men killed and one 
hundred and two wounded. 

"This war should be studied with unceasing 
diligence ; the pride of two peoples to whom naval 
affairs are so generally familiar has cleared all the 
details and laid bare all the episodes, and through 
the sneers which the victors should have spared, 
merely out of care for their own glory, at every 



VOL. I. — II. 



1 62 Naval War of 1812 

step can be seen that great truth, that there is only- 
success for those who know how to prepare for it. 

"It belongs to us to judge impartially these 
marine events, too much exalted perhaps by a na- 
tional vanity one is tempted to excuse. The 
Americans showed, in the War of 181 2, a great 
deal of skill and resolution. But if, as they have 
asserted, the chances had always been perfectly 
equal between them and their adversaries, if they 
had only owed their triumphs to the intrepidity of 
Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge, there would be for 
us but little interest in recalling the struggles. We 
need not seek lessons in courage outside of our own 
history. On the contrary, what is to be well con- 
sidered is that the ships of the United States con- 
stantly fought with the chances in their favor, and 
it is on this that the American government should 
found its true title to glory. . . . The Ameri- 
cans in 181 2 had secured to themselves the advan- 
tage of a better organization [than the English]." 

The fight between the Constitution and the Java 
illustrates best the proposition, "that there is only 
success for those who know how to prepare for it.'' 
Here the odds in men and metal were only about 
as 10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to 
say that they might have been reversed without 
vitally affecting the result. In the fight Lambert 
handled his ship as skilfully as Bainbridge did his; 



Naval War of 1 812 163 

and the Java's men proved by their indomitable 
courage that they were excellent material. The 
Java's crew was new shipped for the voyage, and 
had been at sea but six weeks; in the Constitu- 
tion's first fight her crew had been aboard of her 
but -[ive weeks. So the chances should have been 
nearly equal, and the difference in fighting capa- 
city that was shown by the enormous disparity in 
the loss, and still more in the damage inflicted, 
was due to the fact that the officers of one ship 
had, and the officers of the other had not, trained 
their raw crews. The Constitution's men were not 
" picked," but simply average American sailors, 
as the Java's were average British sailors. The 
essential difference was in the training. 

During the six weeks the Java was at sea, her 
men had fired but six broadsides, of blank cart- 
ridges; during the first five weeks the Constitution 
cruised, her crew were incessantly practised at 
firing with blank cartridge, and also at a target.^ 
The Java's crew had only been exercised occasion- 
ally, even in pointing the guns, and when the 
captain of a gun was killed the effectiveness of 
the piece was temporarily ruined, and, moreover, 
the men did not work together. The Constitution's 

^ In looking through the logs of the Constitution, Hornet, 
etc., we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters, 
exercised the men at the great guns," "exercised with 
musketry," "exercised the boarders," "exercised the great 
guns, blank cartridges, and afterward firing at mark." 



i64 Naval War of 1 812 

crew were exercised till they worked like machines, 
and yet with enough individuality to render it im- 
possible to cripple a gun by killing one man. The 
unpractised British sailors fired at random; the 
trained Americans took aim. The British mar- 
ines had not been taught anything approxi- 
mating to skirmishing or sharpshooting ; the 
Americans had. The British sailors had not 
even been trained enough in the ordinary duties 
of seamen ; while the Americans in five weeks had 
been rendered almost perfect. The former were 
at a loss what to do in an emergency at all out of 
their own line of work; they were helpless when 
the wreck fell over their guns, when the Americans 
would have cut it away in a jiffy. As we learn 
from Commodore Morris's Autobiography, each 
Yankee sailor could, at need, do a little carpenter- 
ing or sail-mending, and so was more self-reliant. 
The crew had been trained to act as if guided by 
one mind, yet each man retained his own indi- 
viduality. The petty officers were better paid 
than in Great Britain, and so were of a better class 
of men, thoroughly self-respecting ; the Americans 
soon got their subordinates in order, while the 
British did not. To sum up : one ship's crew had 
been trained practically and thoroughly, while 
the other crew was not much better off than the 
day it sailed ; and, as far as it goes, this is a good 
test of the efficiency of the two navies. 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 165 

The U. S. brig Vixen, 12, Lieutenant George U. 
Read, had been cruising off the southern coast ; on 
November 2 2d she fell in with the Southampton, 
32, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was cap- 
tured after a short but severe trial of speed. Both 
vessels were wrecked soon afterward. 

The Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, left the 
Delaware on October 28th, two days after Com- 
modore Bainbridge had left Boston. She ex- 
pected to make a very long cruise and so carried 
with her an unusual quantity of stores and sixty 
more men than ordinarily, so that her muster-roll 
contained 319 names. Being deep in the water, 
she reached San lago after Bainbridge had left. 
Nothing was met with until after the Essex had 
crossed the equator in latitude 30° W. on Decem- 
ber nth. On the afternoon of the next day a 
sail was made out to windward, and chased. At 
nine in the evening it was overtaken, and struck 
after receiving a volley of musketry which killed 
one man. The prize proved to be the British 
packet Nocton, of 10 guns and 31 men, with $55,- 
000 in specie aboard. The latter was taken out, 
and the Nocton sent home with Lieutenant Finch 
and a prize crew of 1 7 men, but was recaptured by 
a British frigate. 

The next appointed rendezvous was the Island 
of Fernando de Noronha, where Captain Porter 
found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge, 



1 66 Naval War of 1812 

informing him that the other vessels were off 
Cape Frio. Thither cruised Porter, but his com- 
patriots had left. On the 29th, he captured an 
English merchant vessel ; and he was still cruising 
when the year closed. 

The year 181 2, on the ocean, ended as gloriously 
as it had begun. In four victorious fights the dis- 
parity in loss had been so great as to sink the dis- 
parity of force into insignificance. Our successes 
had been unaccompanied by any important re- 
verse. Nor was it alone by the victories, but by 
the cruises, that the year was noteworthy. The 
Yankee men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the 
British coast and right in the track of the mer- 
chant fleets and their armed protectors. Our ves- 
sels had shown themselves immensely superior to 
those of their foes. 

The reason of these striking and unexpected 
successes was that our navy in 181 2 was the exact 
reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882. I am 
not alluding to the personnel, which still remains 
excellent ; but, whereas we now have a large num- 
ber of worthless vessels, standing very low down 
in their respective classes, we then possessed a few 
vessels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship of 
her class. To bring up our navy to the condition 
in which it stood in 18 12 it would not be neces- 
sary (although in reality both very wise and in the 



Naval War of 1 812 167 

end very economical) to spend any more money 
than at present ; only instead of using it to patch 
up a hundred antiquated hulks, it should be em- 
ployed in building half a dozen ships on the most 
effective model. If in 181 2 our ships had borne' 
the same relation to the British ships that they do 
now, not all the courage and skill of our sailors 
would have won us a single success. As it was, we 
could only cope with the lower rates, and had no 
vessels to oppose to the great "liners"; but to- 
day there is hardly any foreign ship, no matter 
how low its rate, that is not superior to the corre-, 
sponding American ones. It is too much to hope 
that our political shortsightedness will ever enable 
us to have a navy that is first-class in point of size ; 
but there certainly sq^ms no reason why what 
ships we have should not be of the very best 
quality. The effect of a victory is twofold, moral 
and material. Had we been as roughly handled 
on water as we were on land during the first year 
of the war, such a succession of disasters would 
have had a most demoralizing effect on the nation 
at large. As it was, our victorious sea-fights, 
while they did not inflict any material damage 
upon the colossal sea-might of England, had the 
most important results in the feelings they pro- 
duced at home and even abroad. Of course, they 
were magnified absurdly by most of our writers at 
the time; but they do not need to be magnified, 



1 68 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 



for, as they are, any American can look back upon 
them with the keenest national pride. For a hun- 
dred and thirty years England had had no equal on 
the sea; and now she suddenly found one in the 
untried navy of an almost unknown power. 



BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN l8l2 

Name Guns Tonnage Remarks 

Guerribre 49 1340 

Macedonian 49 1325 

Java 49 1340 

Frolic 19 477 Recaptured. 

Alert 20 325 

1S6 4807 

19 477 Deducting Frolic. 

167 4330 



AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED 
Name Guns Tonnage 

Wasp 18 450 

Nautilus 14 185 

Vixen 14 185 

46 820 



Name 



VESSELS BUILT IN l8l2 
Rig Guns Tonnage Where Built 

148 



Nonsuch Schooner 14 

Carolina. . . Schooner 14 230 
Louisiana.. Ship 16 341 



Charleston 



Cost 



MS.ooo 

8,743 
New Orleans 15,500 



Naval War of 1812 169 

PRIZES MADE ' 

Ship No. of Prizes 

President 7 

United States 2 

Constitution 9 

Congress 2 

Chesapeake i 

Essex II 

Wasp 2 

Hornet i 

Argus 6 

Small craft 5 

46 

^ These can only be approximately given; the records are 
often incomplete or contradictory, especially as regards the 
small craft. Most accounts do not give by any means the 
full number. 



CHAPTER IV 

1812 

ON THE LAKES 

Preliminary — The combatants starting nearly on an 
equality — Difficulties of creating a naval force — Difficulty of 
comparing the force of the rival squadrons — Meagreness of 
the pubHshed accounts — UnreHability of James. — Ontario — 
Extraordinary nature of the American squadron — Canadian 
squadron forming only a kind of water militia — Sackett's 
Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle— Commodore 
Chauncy bombards York.— Erie — Lieutenant Elliott captures 
the Detroit and Caledom'a — Unsuccessful expedition of Lieu- 
tenant Angus. 

AT the time we are treating of, the State of 
Maine was so sparsely settled, and covered 
with such a dense growth of forest, that it 
was practically impossible for either of the con- 
tending parties to advance an army through its 
territory. A continuation of the same wooded 
and mountainous district protected the northern 
parts of Vermont and New Hampshire, while in 
New York the Adirondack region was an im- 
penetrable wilderness. It thus came about that 
the northern boundary was formed, for military 
purposes, by Lake Huron, Lake Erie, the Niagara, 
Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence, and, after an in- 

170 



Naval War of 1812 171 

terval, by Lake Champlain. The road into the 
States by the latter ran close along shore, and 
without a naval force the invader would be wholly 
unable to protect his flanks, and would probably 
have his communications cut. This lake, how- 
ever, was almost wholly within the United States, 
and did not become of importance till toward the 
end of the war. Upon it were two American gun- 
boats, regularly officered and manned, and for 
such smooth water sufficiently effective vessels. 

What was at that time the western part of the 
northern frontier became the main theatre of miH- 
tary operations, and as it presented largely a 
water front, a naval force was an indispensable 
adjunct, the command of the lakes being of the 
utmost importance. As these lakes were fitted 
for the manoeuvring of ships of the largest size, 
the operations upon them were of the same nature 
as those on the ocean, and properly belong to 
naval and not to military history. But while on 
the ocean America started with too few ships to 
enable her really to do any serious harm to her 
antagonist, on the inland waters the two sides 
began very nearly on an equality. The chief 
regular forces either belligerent possessed were on 
Lake Ontario. Here the United States had a 
man-of-war brig, the Oneida, of 240 tons, carrying 
sixteen 24-pound carronades, manned by experi- 
enced seamen, and commanded by Lieut. M. T. 



172 Naval War of 1812 

Woolsey. Great Britain possessed the Royal 
George, 22, Prince Regent, 16, Earl of Moira, 14, 
Gloucester, 10, Seneca, 8, and Simco, 8, all under 
the command of a Commodore Earle ; but though 
this force was so much the more powerful it was 
very inefficient, not being considered as belonging 
to the regular navy, the sailors being undis- 
ciplined, and the officers totally without experi- 
ence, never having been really trained in the 
British service. From these causes, it resulted 
that the struggle on the lakes was to be a work as 
much of creating as of using a navy. On the sea- 
board, success came to those who made best use of 
the ships that had already been built; on the 
lakes, the real contest lay in the building. And 
building an inland navy was no easy task. The 
country around the lakes, especially on the south 
side, was still very sparsely settled, and all the 
American naval supplies had to be brought from 
the seaboard cities through the valley of the 
Mohawk. There was no canal or other means of 
communication, except very poor roads inter- 
mittently relieved by transportation on the Mo- 
hawk and on Oneida Lake, when they were 
navigable. Supplies were thus brought up at an 
enormous cost, with tedious delays, and great 
difficulty; and bad weather put a stop to all 
travel. Very little, indeed, beyond timber, could 
be procured at the stations on the lakes. Still, a 



Naval War of 1 812 173 

few scattered villages and small towns had grown 
up on the shores, whose inhabitants were largely- 
engaged in the carrying trade. The vessels used 
for the purpose were generally small sloops or 
schooners, swift and fairly good sailors, but very- 
shallow and not fitted for rough weather. The 
frontiersmen themselves, whether Canadian or 
American, were bold, hardy seamen, and when 
properly trained and led made excellent man-of- 
war's men; but on the American side they were 
too few in number, and too untrained to be made 
use of, and the seamen had to come from the 
coast. But the Canadian shores had been settled 
longer, the inhabitants were more numerous, and 
by means of the St. Lawrence the country was 
easy of access to Great Britain ; so that the seat of 
war, as regards getting naval supplies, and even 
men, was nearer to Great Britain than to us. Our 
enemies also possessed, in addition to the squadron 
on Lake Ontario, another on Lake Erie, consisting 
of the Queen Charlotte, 17, Lady Prevost, 13, Hun- 
ter, 10, Caledonia, 2, Little Belt, 2, and Chippeway, 
2 . These two squadrons furnished training schools 
for some five hundred Canadian seamen, whom a 
short course of discipline under experienced officers 
sufficed to render as good men as their British 
friends or American foes. Very few British sea- 
men ever reached Lake Erie (according to James, 
not over fifty) ; but on Lake Ontario, and after- 



1 74 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 

ward on Lake Champlain, they formed the bulk of 
the crews, " picked seamen, sent out by govern- 
ment expressly for service on the Canada lakes." ' 
As the contrary has sometimes been asserted, it 
may be as well to mention that Admiral Codring- 
ton states that no want of seamen contributed to 
the British disasters on the lakes, as their sea- 
ships at Quebec had men drafted from them for 
that service till their crews were utterly depleted. ^ 
I am bound to state that, while I think that on the 
ocean our sailors showed themselves superior to 
their opponents, especially in gun practice, on the 
lakes the men of the rival fleets were as evenly 
matched, in skill and courage, as could well be. 
The difference, when there was any, appeared in 
the officers, and, above all, in the builders ; which 
was the more creditable to us, as in the beginning 
we were handicapped by the fact that the British 
already had a considerable number of war vessels, 
while we had but one. 

The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation 
between Erie and Ontario; so there were three 
independent centres of naval operations on the 
northern frontier. The first was on Lake Cham- 
plain, where only the Americans possessed any 
force, and, singularly enough, this was the only 

I James, vi., 353. 

'^Memoirs, i., 322, referring especially to battle of Lake 
Champlain. 



Naval War of 1 812 175 

place where the British showed more enterprise in 
ship-building than we did. Next came Lake On- 
tario, where both sides made their greatest efforts, 
but where the result was indecisive, though the 
balance of success was slightly inclined toward us. 
Our naval station was at Sackett's Harbor ; that of 
our foes at Kingston . The third field of operations 
was Lake Erie and the waters above it. Here 
both sides showed equal daring and skill in the 
fighting, and our advantage must be ascribed to 
the energy and success with which we built and 
equipped vessels. Originally, we had no force at 
all on these waters, while several vessels were 
opposed to us. It is a matter of wonder that the 
British and Canadian governments should have 
been so supine as to permit their existing force to 
go badly armed, and so unenterprising as to build 
but one additional ship, when they could easily 
have preserved their superiority. 

It is very difficult to give a full and fair account 
of the lake campaigns. The inland navies were 
created especially for the war, and, after it, were 
allowed to decay, so that the records of the ton- 
nage, armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of 
course, where everything had to be created, the 
services could not have the regular character of 
those on the ocean. The vessels employed were 
of widely different kinds, and this often renders it 
almost impossible to correctly estimate the relative 



176 Naval War of 181 2 

force of two opposing squadrons. While the 
Americans were building their lake navy, they, as 
make-shifts, made use of some ordinary merchant 
schooners, which were purchased and fitted up 
with one or two long, heavy guns each. These 
gun vessels had no quarters, and suffered under all 
the other disadvantages which make a merchant 
vessel inferior to a regularly constructed man-of- 
war. The chief trouble was that in a heavy sea 
they had a strong tendency to capsize, and were 
so unsteady that the guns could not be aimed 
when any wind was blowing. Now, if a few of 
these schooners, mounting long 32's, encoimtered 
a couple of man-of-war brigs, armed with carro- 
nades, which side was strongest ? In smooth water 
the schooners had the advantage, and in rough 
weather they were completely at the mercy of the 
brigs ; so that it would be very hard to get at the 
true worth of such a contest, as each side would be 
tolerably sure to insist that the weather was such 
as to give a great advantage to the other. In all 
the battles and skirmishes on Champlain, Erie, 
and Huron, at least there was no room left for 
doubt as to who were the victors. But on Lake 
Ontario there was never any decisive struggle, 
and whenever an encounter occurred, each com- 
modore always claimed that his adversary had 
" declined the combat" though " much superior in 
strength." It is, of course, almost impossible to 



Naval War of 1 812 177 

find out which really did decline the combat, for 
the official letters flatly contradict each other; 
and it is often almost as difficult to discover where 
the superiority in force lay, when the fleets differed 
so widely in character as was the case in 1813. 
Then Commodore Chauncy's squadron consisted 
largely of schooners ; their long, heavy guns made 
his total foot up in a very imposing manner, and 
similar gun vessels did very good work on Lake 
Erie; so Commodore Yeo, and more especially 
Commodore Yeo's admirers, exalted these schoon- 
ers to the skies, and conveyed the impression that 
they were most formidable craft, by means of 
which Chauncy ought to have won great victories. 
Yet when Yeo captured two of them he refused to 
let them even cruise with his fleet, and they were 
sent back to act as coast gunboats and transports, 
which certainly would not have been done had 
they been fitted to render any effectual assistance. 
Again, one night a squall came on and the two 
largest schooners went to the bottom, which did 
not tend to increase the confidence felt in the 
others. So there can be no doubt that in all but 
very smooth water the schooners could almost be 
counted out of the fight. Then the question 
arises in any given case. Was the water smooth ? 
And the testimony is as conflicting as ever. 

It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters of 
the commanders, and it is still harder to get at the 

VOL. I.— 12. 



178 Naval War of 1 812 

truth from either the American or British his- 
tories. Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, 
paints everything couleur de rose, paying no atten- 
tion to the British side of the question, and dis- 
tributing so much praise to everybody that one is 
at a loss to know where it really belongs. Still, 
he is very useful, for he lived at the time of the 
events he narrates, and could get much informa- 
tion about them at first hand, from the actors them- 
selves. James is almost the only British authority 
on the subject; but he is not nearly as reliable 
as when dealing with the ocean contests, most of 
this part of his work being taken up with a succes- 
sion of acrid soliloquies on the moral defects of the 
American character. The British records for this 
extraordinary service on the lakes were not at all 
carefully kept, and so James is not hampered by 
the necessity of adhering more or less closely to 
official documents, but lets his imagination run 
loose. On the ocean and seaboard his account of 
the British force can generally be reUed upon ; but 
on the lakes his authority is questionable in every- 
thing relating either to friends or foes. This is 
the more exasperating because it is done wilfully, 
when, if he had chosen, he could have written an 
invaluable history; he must often have known 
the truth when, as a matter of preference, he chose 
either to suppress or alter it. Thus he ignores 
all the small "cutting-out" expeditions in which 



Naval War of 1 8i 2 179 

the Americans were successful, and where one 
would like to hear the British side. For example, 
Captain Yeo captured two schooners, the Jiilia 
and Growler, but Chauncy recaptured both. We 
have the American account of this recapture in 
full, but James does not even hint at it, and 
blandly puts down both vessels in the total 
"American loss" at the end of his smaller work. 
Worse still, when the, Growler again changed hands, 
he counts it in again, in the total, as if it were an 
entirely different boat, although he invariably 
rules out of the American list all recaptured ves- 
sels. A more serious perversion of facts are his 
statements about comparative tonnage. This was 
at that time measured arbitrarily, the depth of 
hold being estimated at half the breadth of beam ; 
and the tonnage of our lake vessels was put down 
exactly as if they were regular ocean cruisers of 
the same dimensions in length and breadth. But 
on these inland seas the vessels really did not 
draw more than half as much water as those on the 
ocean, and the depth would of course be much less. 
James, in comparing the tonnage, gives that of the 
Americans as if they were regular ocean ships, 
but in the case of the British vessels carefully 
allows for their shallowness, although professing 
to treat the two classes in the same way ; and thus 
he makes out a most striking and purely imaginary 
difference. The best example is furnished by his 



i8o Naval War of 1 812 

accounts of the fleets on Lake Erie. The captured 
vessels were appraised by two captains and the 
ship-builder, Mr. Henry Eckford; their tonnage 
being computed precisely as the tonnage of the 
American vessels. The appraisement was re- 
corded in the Navy Department, and was first 
made public by Cooper, so that it could not have 
been done for effect. Thus measured, it was found 
that the tonnage was in round numbers as follows : 
Detroit, 490 tons; Queen Charlotte, 400; Lady 
Prevost, 230; Hunter, 180; Little Belt, 90; Chippe- 
way, 70. James makes them measure respectively 
305, 280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, but carefuhy 
gives the American ships the regular sea tonnage. 
So, also, he habitually deducts about 25 per cent, 
from the real number of men on board the British 
ships ; as regards Lake Erie, he contradicts himself 
so much that he does not need to be exposed from 
outside sources. But the most glaring and least 
excusable misstatements are made as to the battle 
of Lake Champlain, where he gives the American 
as greatly exceeding the British force. He 
reaches this conclusion by the most marvellous 
series of garblings and misstatements. First, he 
says that the Confiance and the Saratoga were of 
nearly equal tonnage. The Confiance, being cap- 
tured, was placed on our naval lists, where for 
years she ranked as a 3 6 -gun frigate, while the 
Saratoga ranked among the 24-gun corvettes; and 



Naval War of 1812 181 

by actual measurement the former was half as large 
again as the latter. He gives the Confiance but 
270 men; one of her officers, in a letter published 
in the London Naval Chronicle,'- gives her over 
300 ; more than that number of dead and prisoners 
were taken out of her. He misstates the calibre 
of her guns, and counts out two of them because 
they were used through the bow-ports; whereas, 
from the method in which she made her attack, 
these would have been peculiarly effective. The 
guns are given accurately by Cooper, on the au- 
thority of an officer ^ who was on board the Con- 
fiance within fifteen minutes after the Linnet 
struck, and who was in charge of her for two 
months. 

Then James states that there were but 10 Brit- 
ish gallies, while Sir George Prevost's official ac- 
count, as well as all the American authorities, state 
the number to be 12. He says that the Finch 
grounded opposite an American battery before the 
engagement began, while in reality it was an hour 
afterward, and because she had been disabled by 
the shot of the American fleet. The gallies were 
largely manned by Canadians, and James, anxious 
to put the blame on these rather than the British, 
says that they acted in the most cowardly way, 

^Vol. xxxii., p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five 
of her men remained unhurt. 
2 Lieut. E. A. F. Lavallette. 



1 82 Naval War of 1 812 

whereas in reality they caused the Americans 
more trouble than Downie's smaller sailing vessels 
did. His account of the armament of these ves- 
sels differs widely from the official reports. He 
gives the Linnet and Chuhb a smaller number of 
men than the number of prisoners that were actu- 
ally taken out of them, not including the dead. 
Even misstating Downie's force in guns, under- 
estimating the number of his men, and leaving 
out two of his gunboats, did not content James; 
and to make the figures show a proper dispropor- 
tion, he says (vol. vi., p. 504) that he shall exclude 
the Finch from the estimate, because she grounded, 
and half of the gunboats, because he does not 
think they acted bravely. Even were these as- 
sertions true, it would be quite as logical for an 
American writer to put the Chesapeake's crew down 
as only 200, and say he should exclude the other 
men from the estimate because they flinched ; and 
to exclude all the guns that were disabled by shot 
would be no worse than to exclude the Finch. 
James's manipulation of the figures is a really 
curious piece of audacity. Naturally, subsequent 
British historians have followed him without in- 
quiry. James's account of this battle, alone, 
amply justifies our rejecting his narrative en- 
tirely, as far as affairs on the lakes go, whenever 
it conflicts with any other statement, British or 
American. Even when it does not conflict, it 



Naval War of 1 812 183 

must be followed with extreme caution, for when- 
ever he goes into figures the only thing certain 
about them is that they are wrong. He gives no 
details at all of most of the general actions. Of 
these, however, we already possess excellent ac- 
counts, the best being those in the Manual of 
Naval Tactics, by Commander J. H. Ward, U.S.N, 
(1859), and in Lossing's Field-Book of the War of 
1812, and Cooper's Naval History. The chief 
difficulty occurs in connection with matters on 
Lake Ontario,' where I have been obliged to have 
recourse to a perfect patchwork of authors and 
even newspapers, for the details, using Niles's 
Register and James as mutual correctives. The 
armaments and equipments being so irregular, I 
have not, as in other cases, made any allowance 
for the short weight of the American shot, as here 
the British may have suffered under a similar dis- 
advantage ; and it may be as well to keep in mind 
that on these inland waters the seamen of the two 

^ The accounts of the two commanders on Lake Ontario are 
as difficult to reconcile as are those of the contending admirals 
in the battles which the Dutch waged against the English and 
French during the years 167 2-1 67 5. In every one of De 
Ruyter's last six battles each side regularly claimed the vic- 
tory, although there can be but little doubt that on the whole 
the strategical, and probably the tactical, advantage remained 
with De Ruyter. Every historian ought to feel a sense of the 
most lively gratitude toward Nelson ; in his various encounters 
he never left any possible room for dispute as to which side 
had come out first best. 



1 84 Naval War of 1 812 

navies seem to have been as evenly matched in 
courage and skill as was possible. They were of 
exactly the same stock, with the sole exception 
that among and under, but entirely distinct 
from, the Canadian- English, fought the descen- 
dants of the conquered Canadian-French; and 
even these had been trained by Englishmen, 
were led by English captains, fought on ships 
built by English gold, and with English weapons 
and discipline. 

ON LAKE ONTARIO 

There being, as already explained, three inde- 
pendent centres of inland naval operations, the 
events at each will be considered separately. 

At the opening of the war. Lieutenant Woolsey, 
with the Oneida, was stationed at Sackett's Har- 
bor, which was protected at the entrance by a 
small fort with a battery composed of one long 32. 
The Canadian squadron of six ships, mounting 
nearly 80 guns, was of course too strong to be 
meddled with. Indeed, had the Royal George, 22, 
the largest vessel, been commanded by a regular 
British sea-officer, she would have been perfectly 
competent to take both the Oneida and Sackett's 
Harbor; but before the Canadian commodore, 
Earle, made up his mind to attack, Lieutenant 
Woolsey had time to make one or two short 



Naval War of 1 812 185 

cruises, doing some damage among the merchant 
vessels of the enemy. 

On the 19th of July, Earle's ships appeared off 
the harbor ; the Oneida was such a dull sailer that 
it was useless for her to try to escape, so she was 
hauled up under a bank where she raked the en- 
trance, and her off guns landed and mounted on 
the shore, while Lieutenant Woolsey took charge 
of the "battery," or long 32, in the fort. The 
latter was the only gun that was of much use, for 
after a desultory cannonade of about an hour, 
Earle withdrew, having suffered very little dam- 
age, inflicted none at all, and proved himself and 
his subordinates to be grossly incompetent. 

Acting under orders. Lieutenant Woolsey now 
set about procuring merchant schooners, to be 
fitted and used as gun vessels until more regular 
cruisers could be built. A captured British schooner 
was christened the Julia, armed with a long 32, 
and two 6's, manned with 30 men, under Lieu- 
tenant Henry Wells, and sent down to Ogdensburg. 
" On her way thither she encountered and actually 
beat off, without losing a man, the Moira of 14, 
and Gloucester, of 10 guns." ' Five other schoon- 
ers were also purchased; the Hamilton, of 10 guns, 
being the largest, while the other four, the Gover- 
nor Tompkins, Growler, Conquest, and Pert had 
but II pieces between them. Nothing is more 

I James, vi., 350. 



1 86 Naval War of 1 812 

difficult than to exactly describe the armaments 
of the smaller lake vessels. The American 
schooners were mere make-shifts, and their guns 
were frequently changed ^ ; as soon as they could 
be dispensed with they were laid up, or sold, and 
forgotten. 

It was even worse with the British, who mani- 
fested the most indefatigable industry in inter- 
mittently changing the armament, rig, and name 
of almost every vessel, and, the records being very 
loosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force 
at any one time. A vessel which in one conflict 
was armed with long i8's, in the next would have 
replaced some of them with 6 8 -pound carronades; 
or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of 
her work as a schooner, and be captured as a brig, 
changing her name even oftener than anything 
else. 

On the first of September, Commodore Isaac 
Chauncy was appointed commander of the forces 
on the lakes (except of those on Lake Champlain), 
and he at once bent his energies to preparing an 
effective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters 

^ They were always having accidents happen to them that 
necessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a 
long 32, she rolled too much, and they substituted a 24; if she 
also had an 18-pound carronade, it upset down the hatchway 
in the middle of a fight, and made way for a long 12, which 
burst as soon as it was used, and was replaced by two medium 
6's. So a regular gamut of changes would be rung. 



Naval War of 1 812 187 

were immediately despatched to the Harbor ; and 
they were soon followed by about a hundred officers 
and seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel of a 
ship to mount twenty-four 3 2 -pound carronades, 
and to be called the Madison, was laid down, and 
she was launched on the 26th of November, just 
when navigation had closed on account of the ice. 
Late in the autumn, four more schooners were 
purchased, and named the Ontario, Scourge, Fair 
American, and Asp, but these were hardly used 
until the following spring. The cruising force of 
the Americans was composed solely of the Oneida 
and the six schooners first mentioned. The Brit- 
ish squadron was of nearly double this strength, 
and had it been officered and trained as it was 
during the ensuing summer, the Americans could 
not have stirred out of port. But as it was, it 
merely served as a kind of water militia, the very 
sailors, who subsequently did well, being then 
almost useless, and unable to oppose their well- 
disciplined foes, though the latter were so inferior 
in number and force. For the reason that it was 
thus practically a contest of regulars against 
militia, I shall not give numerical comparisons of 
the skirmishes in the autumn of 181 2, and shall 
touch on them but slightly. They teach the old 
lesson that, whether by sea or land, a small, well- 
officered, and well-trained force, cannot, except 
very rarely, be resisted by a greater number of 



1 88 Naval War of 1812 

mere militia; and that in the end it is true econ- 
omy to have the regular force prepared before- 
hand, without waiting until we have been forced 
to prepare it by the disasters happening to the ir- 
regulars. The Canadian seamen behaved badly, 
but no worse than the American land-forces did at 
the same time ; later, under regular training, both 
nations retrieved their reputations. 

Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Har- 
bor in October, and appeared on the lake on Nov- 
ember 8th, in the Oneida, Lieutenant Woolsey, 
with the six schooners Conquest, Lieutenant El- 
liott; Hamilton, Lieutenant McPherson; Tomp- 
kins, Lieutenant Brown; Pert, Sailing-master 
Arundel; Julia, Sailing-master Trant; Growler, 
Sailing-master Mix. The Canadian vessels were 
engaged in conveying supplies from the westward. 
Commodore Chauncy discovered the Royal George 
off the False Duck Islands, and chased her under 
the batteries of Kingston, on the 9th. Kingston 
was too well defended to be taken by such a force 
as Chauncy's; but the latter decided to make a 
reconnaissance, to discover the enemy's means of 
defence, and see if it was possible to lay the Royal 
George aboard. At 3 p.m. the attack was made. 
The Hamilton and Tompkins were absent chasing 
and did not arrive until the fighting had begun. 
The other four gunboats, Conquest, Julia, Pert, 
and Growler, led, in the order named, to open the 



Naval War of 1812 189 

attack with their heavy guns, and prepare the way 
for the Oneida, which followed. At the third dis- 
charge the Peri's gun burst, putting her nearly 
hors de combat, badly wounding her gallant com- 
mander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly afterward fell 
overboard and was drowned) , and slightly wound- 
ing four of her crew. The other gunboats engaged 
the five batteries of the enemy, while the Oneida 
pushed on without firing a shot till at 3.40 she 
opened on the Royal George, and after twenty 
minutes' combat actually succeeded in compelling 
her opponent, though of double her force, to cut 
her cables, run in, and tie herself to a wharf, where 
some of her people deserted her; here she was 
under the protection of a large body of troops, and 
the Americans could not board her in face of 
the land forces. It soon began to grow dusk, and 
Chauncy's squadron beat out through the channel, 
against a fresh head-wind. In this spirited attack 
the American loss had been confined to half a 
dozen men, and had fallen almost exclusively on 
the Oneida. The next day foul weather came on, 
and the squadron sailed for Sackett's Harbor. 
Some merchant vessels were taken, and the Simco, 
8, was chased, but unsuccessfully. 

The weather now became cold and tempestuous, 
but cruising continued till the middle of Novem- 
ber. The Canadian commanders, however, utterly 
refused to fight ; the Royal George even fleeing from 



190 Naval War of 181 2 

the Oneida, when the latter was entirely alone, 
and leaving the American commodore in undis- 
puted command of the lake. Four of the schoon- 
ers continued blockading Kingston till the middle 
of November; shortly afterward, navigation 
closed/ 

ON LAKE ERIE 

On Lake Erie there was no American naval 
force, but the army had fitted out a small brig, 
armed with six 6-pounders. This fell into the 
hands of the British at the capture of Detroit, and 
was named after that city, so that by the time a 
force of American officers and seamen arrived at 
the lake there was not a vessel on it for them to 
serve in, while their foes had eight. But we only 
have to deal with two of the latter at present. The 
Detroit, still mounting six 6-pounders, and with a 
crew of 56 men, under the command of Lieutenant 
of Marines Rolette, of the Royal Navy, assisted by 
a boatswain and gunner, and containing also 30 
American prisoners, and the Caledonia, a small 
brig mounting two 4-pounders on pivots, with a 
crew of 12 men, Canadian-English, under Mr. 
Irvine, and having aboard also 10 American 
prisoners, and a very valuable cargo of furs worth 

^ These preliminary events were not very important, and 
the historians on both sides agree almost exactly, so that I 
have not considered it necessary to quote authorities. 



Naval War of 1 812 191 

about $200,000, moved down the lake, and on 
October 7th anchored under Fort Erie.' 

Commander Jesse D. Elhott had been sent up 
to Erie some time before with instructions from 
Commodore Chauncy to construct a naval force, 
partly by building two brigs of 300 tons each,^ and 
partly by purchasing schooners to act as gunboats. 
No sailors had yet arrived ; but on the very day on 
which the two brigs moved down and anchored 
under Fort Erie, Captain Elliott received news 
that the first detachment of the promised seamen, 
51 in number, including officers,^ was but a few 
miles distant. He at once sent word to have these 
men hurried up, but when they arrived they were 
found to have no arms, for which application was 
made to the military authorities. The latter not 
only gave a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and 
muskets to the sailors, but also detailed enough 
soldiers, under Captain N. Towson and Lieutenant 
Isaac Roach, to make the total number of men 
that took part in the expedition 124. This force 

^ Letter of Captain Jesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy, 
Black Rock, October 5, 181 2. 

2 That is, of 300 tons actual capacity; measured as if they 
had been ordinary sea vessels, they each tonned 480. Their 
opponent, the ship Detroit, similarly tonned 305 actual 
measurement, or 490, computing it in the ordinary manner. 

3 The number of men in this expedition is taken from Los- 
sing's Field-Book of the War of 1812, by Benson J. Lossing, 
New York, 1869, p. 385, note, where a complete hst of the 
names is given. 



192 Naval War of 1812 

left Black Rock at one o'clock on the morning of 
the 8th in two large boats, one under the command 
of Commander Elliott, assisted by Lieutenant 
Roach, the other under Sailing-master George 
Watts and Captain Towson. After two hours' 
rowing they reached the foe, and the attack was 
made at three o'clock. Elliott laid his boat along- 
side the Detroit before he was discovered, and cap- 
tured her after a very brief struggle, in which he 
lost but one man killed, and Midshipman J. C. 
Cummings wounded with a bayonet in the leg. 
The noise of the scuffle roused the hardy provin- 
cials aboard the Caledonia, and they were thus 
enabled to make a far more effectual resistance to 
SaiHng-master Watts than the larger vessel had to 
Captain Elliott. As Watts pulled alongside he 
was greeted with a volley of musketry, but at once 
boarded and carried the brig, the twelve Canadians 
being cut down or made prisoners ; one American 
was killed and four badly wounded. The wind 
was too light and the current too strong to enable 
the prizes to beat out and reach the lake, so the 
cables were cut and they ran down stream. The 
Caledonia was safely beached under the protection 
of an American battery near Black Rock. The 
Detroit, however, was obliged to anchor but four 
hundred yards from a British battery, which, to- 
gether with some flying artillery, opened on her. 
Getting all his guns on the port side, Elliott kept 



Naval War of 1 812 193 

up a brisk cannonade till his ammunition gave 
out, when he cut his cable and soon grounded on 
Squaw Island. Here the Detroit was commanded 
by the guns of both sides, and whichever party 
took possession of her was at once driven out by 
the other. The struggle ended in her destruction, 
most of her guns being taken over to the American 
side. This was a very daring and handsome ex- 
ploit, reflecting great credit on Commander Elliott, 
and giving the Americans, in the Caledonia, the 
nucleus of their navy on Lake Erie; soon after- 
ward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario, a new de- 
tachment of seamen under Commander S. Angus 
having arrived. 

On the 28th of November, the American general, 
Smith, despatched two parties to make an attack 
on some of the British batteries. One of these 
consisted of ten boats, under the command of Cap- 
tain King of the 15th Infantry, with 150 soldiers, 
and with him went Mr. Angus with 82 sailors, in- 
cluding officers. The expedition left at one o'clock 
in the morning, but was discovered and greeted 
with a warm fire from a field battery placed in 
front of some British barracks known as the Red 
House. Six of the boats put back ; but the other 
four, containing about a hundred men, dashed on. 
While the soldiers were forming line and firing, the 
seamen rushed in with their pikes and axes, drove 
off the British, capturing their commander, Lieu- 

VOL. I. — 13. 



194 Naval War of 1812 

tenant King of the Royal Army, spiked and threw 
into the river the guns, and then took the barracks 
and burned them, after a desperate fight. Great 
confusion now ensued, which ended in Mr. Angus 
and some of the seamen going off in the boats. 
Several had been killed ; eight, among whom were 
Midshipmen Wragg, Dudley, and Holdup, all 
under twenty years old, remained with the troops 
under Captain King, and, having utterly routed the 
enemy, found themselves deserted by their friends. 
After staying on the shore a couple of hours some 
of them found two boats and got over; but Cap- 
tain King and a few soldiers were taken prisoners. 
Thirty of the seamen, including nine of the twelve 
officers, were killed or wounded — among the 
former being Sailing-masters Sisson and Watts, 
and among the latter Mr. Angus, Sailing-master 
Carter, and Midshipmen Wragg, Holdup, Graham, 
Brailesford, and Irvine. Some twenty prisoners 
were secured and taken over to the American 
shore; the enemy's loss was more severe than 
ours, his resistance being very stubborn, and a 
good many cannon were destroyed, but the ex- 
pedition certainly ended most disastrously. The 
accounts of it are hard to reconcile, but it is diffi- 
cult to believe that Mr. Angus acted correctly. 

Later in the winter. Captain Oliver Hazard 
Perry arrived to take command of the forces on 
Lake Erie. 



CHAPTER V 
1813 

ON THE OCEAN 

Blockade of the American coast — ^The Essex in the South 
Pacific — The Hornet captures the Peacock — American priva- 
teers cut out by British boats — Unsuccessful cruise of Com- 
modore Rodgers — The Chesapeake is captured by the Shannon 
— Futile gun-boat actions — DefenceofCraney Island — Cutting 
out expeditions — The Argus is captured by the Pelican — The 
Enterprise captures the Boxer — Summary. 

BY the beginning of the year 18 13 the British 
had been thoroughly aroused by the Amer- 
ican successes, and active measures were 
at once taken to counteract them. The force on 
the American station was largely increased, and 
a strict blockade begun, to keep the American 
frigates in port. The British frigates now cruised 
for the most part in couples, and orders w^ere 
issued by the Board of Admiralty that an 18- 
pounder frigate was not to engage an American 
24-pounder. Exaggerated accounts of the Amer- 
ican 44's being circulated, a new class of spar-deck 
frigates was constructed to meet them, rating 50 
and mounting 60 guns; and some 74's were cut 
down for the same purpose.' These new ships were 
all much heavier than their intended opponents. 

* James, vi., p. 206. 
195 



10 Naval War of 1812 

As New England's loyalty to the Union was, 
not unreasonably, doubted abroad, her coasts were 
at first troubled but little. A British squadron 
was generally kept cruising off the end of Long 
Island Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of 
course, America had no means of raising a block- 
ade, as each squadron contained generally a 74 or a 
razee, vessels too heavy for any in our navy to 
cope with. Frigates and sloops kept skirting the 
coasts of New Jersey, the Carolinas, and Georgia. 
Delaware Bay no longer possessed the importance 
it had during the Revolutionary War, and as the 
only war vessels in it were some miserable gun- 
boats, the British generally kept but a small force 
on that station. Chesapeake Bay became the 
principal scene of their operations; it was there 
that their main body collected, and their greatest 
efforts were made. In it a number of line-of- 
battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters had been 
collected, and early in the season Admiral Sir John 
Warren and Rear-Admiral Cockburn arrived to 
take command. The latter made numerous de- 
scents on the coast, and frequently came into con- 
tact with the local militia, who generally fled after 
a couple of volleys. These expeditions did not 
accomplish much, beyond burning the houses and 
driving off the live-stock of the farmers along 
shore, and destroying a few small towns — one of 
them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting 



Naval War of 1 812 197 

brutality.'' The Government of the United States 
was, in fact, supported by the people in its war 
policy very largely on account of these excesses, 
which were much exaggerated by American 
writers. It was really a species of civil war, and 
in such a contest, at the beginning of this century, 
it was impossible that some outrages should not 
take place. 

The American frigate Constellation had by this 
time got ready for sea, and, under the command of 
Captain Stewart, she prepared to put out early in 
January. As the number of blockaders rendered 
a fight almost certain within a few days of her de- 
parture, her crew were previously brought to the 
highest state of discipline, the men being exer- 
cised with especial care in handling the great guns 
and in firing at a target.^ However, she never 
got out; for when she reached Hampton Roads 
she fell in with a British squadron of line-of -battle 
ships and frigates. She kedged up toward Nor- 
folk, and when the tide rose ran in and anchored 
between the forts ; and a few days later dropped 
down to cover the forts which were being built at 
Craney Island. Here she was exposed to attacks 
from the great British force still lying in Hampton 

^ James (vi., 340) says: "The conduct of the British troops 
on this occasion was ' revolting to human nature ' and ' dis- 
graceful to the flag.' " 

^ Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones, p. 15 (Savan- 
nah, 1878). 



iqS Naval War of 1812 

Roads, and, fearing they would attempt to carry 
her by surprise, Captain Stewart made every 
preparation for defence. She was anchored in the 
middle of the narrow channel, flanked by gun- 
boats, her lower ports closed, not a rope left hang- 
ing over the sides; the boarding nettings, boiled 
in half -made pitch till they were as hard as wire, 
were triced outboard toward the yard-arms, and 
loaded with kentledge to fall on the attacking 
boats when the tricing lines were cut, while the 
carronades were loaded to the muzzle with musket- 
balls, and depressed so as to sweep the water near 
the ship/ Twice, a force of British, estimated by 
their foes to number 2000 men, started off at night 
to carry the Constellation by surprise ; but on each 
occasion they were discovered and closely watched 
by her guard-boats, and they never ventured to 
make the attack. However, she was unable to 
get to sea, and remained blockaded to the close of 
the war. 

At the beginning of the year, several frigates and 
smaller craft were at sea. The Chesapeake, Cap- 
tain Evans, had sailed from Boston on December 
13, 1812.^ She ran down past Madeira, the Ca- 
naries, and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and 

^ For an admirable account of these preparations, as well 
as of the subsequent events, see Cooper, ii., 242. 

^Statistical History of the U. S. Navy, by Lieut. G. E. Em- 
mons. 



Naval War of 1 812 199 

for six weeks cruised to the south of the line be- 
tween longitudes 16° and 25°. Thence she steered 
to the west, passing near Surinam, over the same 
spot on which the Hornet had sunk the Peacock 
but a day previous. Cruising northward through 
the West Indies, she passed near the Bermudas, 
where she was chased by a 74 and a frigate; es- 
caping from them she got into Boston on April 
9th, having captured five merchantmen, and 
chased unsuccessfully for two days a brig-sloop. 
The term of two years for which her crew were en- 
listed now being up, they, for the most part, left, 
in consequence of some trouble about the prize- 
money. Captain Evans being in ill-health. Cap- 
tain James Lawrence was appointed to command 
her. He reached Boston about the middle of 
May,^ and at once set about enlisting a new crew, 
and tried, with but partial success, to arrange 
matters with the old sailors, who were now almost 
in open mutiny. 

When the year 181 2 had come to an end, the 
Essex, 32, was in the South Atlantic, and Captain 
Porter shortly afterward ran into St. Catharines 
to water. Being at a loss where to find his 

^ He was still on the Hornet at New York on May loth, 
as we know from a letter of Biddle's, written on that date 
(in Letters of Masters-Commandant, 1S13, No. 58), and so 
could hardly have been with the Chesapeake two weeks before 
he put out ; and had to get his crew together and train them 
during that time. 



200 Naval War of 1812 

consorts, he now decided to adopt the exceed- 
ingly bold measure of doubling Cape Horn and 
striking at the British whalers in the Pacific. 
This was practically going into the enemy's 
waters, the Portuguese and Spanish countries 
being entirely tmder the influence of Britain, 
while there were no stations where Porter could 
revictual or repair in safety. However, the 
Essex started, doubled the Horn, and on March 
13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. 
Her adventurous cruise in the Pacific was the 
most striking feature of the war; but as it has 
been most minutely described by Commodore 
Porter himself, by his son, Admiral Porter, by 
Admiral Farragut, and by Cooper, I shall barely 
touch upon it. 

On March 20th, the Essex captured the Peruvian 
corsair Nereyda, 16, hove her guns and small arms 
overboard, and sent her into port. She made the 
island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and 
thence went to the Gallipagos, getting everything 
she wanted from her prizes. Then she went to 
Tumbez, and returned to the Gallipagos; thence 
to the Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso 
again. By this year's campaign in the Pacific, 
Captain Porter had saved all our ships in those 
waters, had not cost the Government a dollar, 
living purely on the enemy, and had taken from 
him nearly 4000 tons of shipping and 400 men, 



Naval War of 1 812 201 

completely breaking up his whaling trade in the 
South Pacific. 

The cruise was something sui generis in modern 
warfare, recalling to mind the cruises of the early- 
English and Dutch navigators. An American 
ship was at a serious disadvantage in having no 
harbor of refuge away from home ; while on almost 
every sea there were British, French, and Spanish 
ports into which vessels of those nations could run 
for safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a 
small frigate to cruise a year and a half in enemy's 
waters, and to supply herself during that time, 
purely from captured vessels, with everything — 
cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and 
medicines, and even money to pay the officers and 
men ! Porter's cruise was the very model of what 
such an expedition should be, harassing the enemy 
most effectually at no cost whatever. Had the 
Essex been decently armed with long guns, in- 
stead of carronades, the end might have been as 
successful as it was glorious. The whalers were 
many of them armed letters-of -marque, and, 
though of course unable to oppose the frigate, 
several times smart skirmishes occurred in at- 
tacking them with boats, or in captured ships; 
as when Lieutenant Downs and 20 men in the 
prize Georgiana, after a short brush, captured 
the Hector, with 25 men, two of whom were 
killed and six wounded; and when, under similar 



202 Naval War of 1 812 

circumstances, the prize Greenwich, of 25 men, 
captured the Seringapatam of 40. The cruise of 
the Essex, the first American man-of-war ever in 
the Pacific, a year and a half out and many 
thousand miles away from home, was a good 
proof of Porter's audacity in planning the 
trip and his skill and resource in carrying 
it out. 

To return now to the Hornet. Thi ; vessel had 
continued blockading the Bonne Citoyenne until 
January 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived 
toward evening and chased her into port. As 
the darkness came on the Hornet wore, stood out 
to sea, passing into the open without molestation 
from the 74, and then steered toward the north- 
east, cruising near the coast, and making a few 
prizes, among which was a brig, the Resolution, 
with $23,000 in specie aboard, captured on Feb- 
ruary 14th. On the 24th of February, while near- 
ing the mouth of the Demerara River, Captain 
Lawrence discovered a brig to leeward, and chased 
her till he ran into quarter less five, when, having 
no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just within the bar 
a man-of-war brig was lying at anchor ; and while 
beating round Caroband Bank, in order to get at 
her, Captain Lawrence discovered another sail 
edging down on his weather-quarter.' The brig 
at anchor was the Espihgle, of 18 guns, 3 2 -pound 

I Letter of Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 203 

carronades, Captain John Taylor ^ ; and the sec- 
ond brig seen was the Peacock, Captain William 
Peake,^ which, for some unknown reason, had ex- 
changed her 3 2 -pound carronades for 24's. She 
had sailed from the Espibgle's anchorage the same 
morning at 10 o'clock. At 4.20 p.m. the Peacock 
hoisted her colors; then the Hornet beat to 
quarters and cleared for action. Captain Law- 
rence kept close by the wind, in order to get the 
weather-gage; when he was certain he could 
weather the enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the 
Hornet hoisted her colors. The ship and the brig 
now stood for each other, both on the wind, the 
Hornet being on the starboard and the Peacock on 
the port tack, and at 5.25 they exchanged broad- 
sides, at half pistol-shot distance, while going in 
opposite directions, the Americans using their lee 
and the British their weather battery. The guns 
were fired as they bore, and the Peacock suffered 
severely, while her antagonist's hull was unin- 
jured, though she suffered slightly aloft and had 
her pennant cut off by the first shot fired. ^ One 
of the men in the mizzen-top was killed by a round 
shot, and two more were wounded in the main- 
top.'* As soon as they were clear. Captain Peake 

^ James, vi., 278. ^ Ibid. 

3 Cooper, p. 200. 

4 See entry in her log for this day (in " Log-Book of Hornet, 
Wasp, and Argus, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813,") 
in the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington. 



204 Naval War of 1812 

put his helm hard up and wore, firing his star- 
board guns; but the Hornet had watched him 
closely, bore up as quickly, and coming down at 
5.35, ran him close aboard on the starboard quar- 
ter. Captain Peake fell at this moment, together 
with many of his crew, and, unable to withstand 
the Hornet's heavy fire, the Peacock surrendered 
at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; 
and directly afterward hoisted her ensign union- 
down in the fore-rigging as a signal of distress. 
Almost immediately, her mainmast went by the 
board. Both vessels then anchored, and Lieut. 
J. T. Shubrick, being sent on board the prize, 
reported her sinking. Lieut. D. Conner was 
then sent in another boat to try to save the 
vessel; but though they threw the guns over- 
board, plugged the shot holes, tried the pumps, 
and even attempted bailing, the water gained so 
rapidly that the Hornet's officers devoted them- 
selves to removing the wounded and other pris- 
oners ; and while thus occupied the short tropical 
twilight left them. Immediately afterward, the 
prize settled, suddenly and easily, in 5^ fathoms 
water, carrying with her three of the Hornet's 
people and nine of her own, who were rummaging 
below; meanwhile four others of her crew had 
lowered her damaged stern-boat, and in the con- 
fusion got off unobserved and made their way to 
the land. The foretop still remained above water, 



Naval War of 1 812 205 

and four of the prisoners saved themselves by- 
running up the rigging into it. Lieutenant Con- 
ner and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come 
on board) saved themselves, together with most 
of their people and the remainder of the Peacock's 
crew, by jumping into the launch, which was lying 
on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship 
with pieces of boards in default of oars. 

The Hornet's complement at this time was 150, 
of whom she had 8 men absent in a prize and 7 on 
the sick list,' leaving 1 3 5 fit for duty in the action ^ ; 
of these one man was killed and two wounded, all 
aloft. Her rigging and sails were a good deal cut, 
a shot had gone through the foremast, and the 
bowsprit was slightly damaged; the only shot 
that touched her hull merely glanced athwart her 
bows, indenting a plank beneath the cat-head. 
The Peacock's crew had amounted to 134, but 4 
were absent in a prize, and but 1 2 2 ^ fit for action ; 
of these she lost her captain and 7 men killed and 
mortally wounded, and her master, i midshipman, 
and 28 men severely and slightly wounded, — in all 
8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her 
antagonist's loss. She suffered under the disad- 
vantage of light metal, having 24's opposed to 

^ Letter of Captain Lawrence. 

2 Letter of Lieut. D. Conner, April 26, 1813. 

3 Letter of Lieut. F. W. Wright (of the Peacock) , April 
17, 1813. 



2o6 Naval War of 1812 

32's; but judging from her gunnery this was not 
much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have inflicted 
nearly as great damage. She was well handled 
and bravely fought; but her men showed a mar- 
vellous ignorance of gunnery. It appears that she 
had long been known as "the yacht," on account 
of the tasteful arrangement of her deck; the 
breechings of the carronades were lined with white 
canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy 
the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating 
screws.' In other words. Captain Peake had con- 
founded the mere incidents of good discipline with 
the essentials.* 

The Hornefs victory cannot be regarded in any 
other light than as due, not to the heavier metal, 
but to the far more accurate firing of the Amer- 
icans; "had the guns of the Peacock been of the 
largest size they could not have changed the re- 
sult, as the weight of shot that do not hit is of no 
great moment." Any merchant-ship might have 
been as well handled and bravely defended as she 
was ; and an ordinary letter-of -marque would have 
made as creditable a defence. 

During the entire combat the Espi^gle was not 
more than four miles distant and was plainly visi- 
ble from the Hornet; but for some reason she did 

* James, vi., 280. 

^Codrington {Memoirs, i., 310) comments very forcibly on 
the uselessness of a mere martinet. 



/ 



I 
I 

I 




207 



2o8 Naval War of 1812 

not come out, and her commander reported that 
he knew nothing of the action till the next day. 
Captain Lawrence, of course, was not aware of this, 
and made such exertions to bend on new sails, 
stow his boats, and clear his decks that by nine 
o'clock he was again prepared for action,' and at 
2 P.M. got under way for the N.W. Being now 
overcrowded with people and short of water, he 
stood for home, anchoring at Holmes's Hole in 
Martha's Vineyard on the 19th of March. 

On their arrival at New York the officers of the 
Peacock published a card expressing in the warm- 
est terms their appreciation of the way they and 
their men had been treated. Say they: "We 
ceased to consider ourselves prisoners ; and every- 
thing that friendship could dictate was adopted 
by you and the officers of the Hornet to remedy 
the inconvenience we would otherwise have ex- 
perienced from the unavoidable loss of the whole 
of our property and clothes owing to the sudden 
sinking of the Peacock.'' ^ This was signed by the 
first and second lieutenants, the master, surgeon, 
and purser. 





Tonnage 


Guns 


Weight 
Metal 


Men 


Loss 


Hornet 


480 


10 


279 


^is 


3 


Peacock 


477 


10 


210 


122 


38 



- Letter of Captain Lawrence. 

2 Quoted in full in Niles's Register and Lossing's Field- 
Book. 



Naval War of 1 812 209 

Relative Relative Loss 

Force Inflicted 

Hornet i . oo i . oo 

Peacock 83 .08 

That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 1 1, 
the relative execution was about as 1 3 is to i . 

The day after the capture, Captain Lawrence 
reported 277 souls aboard, including the crew of 
the English brig Resolution, which he had taken, 
and of the American brig Hunter, prize to the Pea- 
cock. As James, very ingeniously, tortures these 
figures into meaning what they did not, it may be 
well to show exactly what the 277 included. Of 
the Hornet's original crew of 150, 8 were absent in 
a prize, i killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 
7 sick) 138; of the Peacock's original 134, 4 were 
absent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4 es- 
caped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally 
wounded) 112; there were also aboard 1 6 other 
British prisoners, and the Hunter's crew of 1 1 men 
— making just 277.' According to Lieutenant 
Conner's letter, written in response to one from 
Lieutenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in 
the Peacock's crew when she began action ; but it 
is, of course, best to take each commander's 

^The 277 men were thus divided into: Hornet's crew, 13S; 
Peacock's crew, 112; Resolution's crew, 16; Hunter's crew, 11. 
James quotes "270" men, which he divides as follows: 
Hornet, 160; Peacock, \oi; Hu}itcr,g — leaving out the Reso- 
lution's crew, II of the Peacock's, and 2 of the Hunter's. 

VOL. I. — 14. 



2IO Naval War of 1812 

account of the number of men on board his ship 
that were fit for duty. 

On January 17th, the Viper, 12, Lieut. J. D. 
Henly, was captured by the British frigate Nar- 
cissus, 32, Captain Lumly. 

On February 8th, while a British squadron, con- 
sisting of the four frigates Belvidera (Captain 
Richard Byron), Maidstone, Junon, and Statira, 
were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was 
observed in the northeast standing down Chesa- 
peake Bay.' This was the Lottery, letter-of- 
marque, of six 12-pounder carronades and 25 men, 
Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore 
to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under the 
command of Lieutenant Kelly Nazer, were sent 
against her, and, a calm coming on, overtook her. 
The schooner opened a well-directed fire of round 
and grape, but the boats rushed forward and 
boarded her, not carrying her till after a most ob- 
stinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 
19 of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, 
were killed or wounded. The best war ship of a 
regular navy might be proud of the discipline and 
courage displayed by the captain and crew of the 
little Lottery. Captain Byron on this, as well as 
on many another occasion, showed himself to be 
as humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain 

'James, vi., 325. 



Naval War of 1812 211 

Southcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on 
board Byron's frigate, where he was treated with 
the greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, 
and when he died his body was sent ashore with 
every mark of the respect due to so brave an 
officer. Captain Stewart (of the Constellation) 
wrote Captain Byron a letter of acknowledgment 
for his great courtesy and kindness.^ 

On March i6th, a British division of five boats 
and 105 men, commanded by Lieutenant James 
Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer 
schooner Dolphin of 12 guns and 70 men, and the 
letters-of -marque, Racer, Arab, and Lynx, each of 
six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant Polkinghorne, 
after pulling fifteen miles, found the four schooners 
all prepared to receive him, but in spite of his 
great inferiority in force he dashed gallantly at 
them. The Arab and Lynx surrendered at once; 
the Racer was carried after a sharp struggle, in 
which Lieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded, 
and her guns turned on the Dolphin. Most of the 
latter's crew jumped overboard; a few rallied 
round their captain, but they were at once scat- 
tered as the British seamen came aboard. The 
assailants had 13, and the privateersmen 16 men 
killed and wounded in the fight. It was certainly 

^ The correspondence between the two captains is given in 
full in Niles's Register, which also contains fragrnentary notes 
on the action, principally as to the loss incurred. 



212 Naval War of 1812 

one of the most brilliant and daring cutting-out 
expeditions that took place during the war, and 
the victors well deserved their success. The pri- 
vateersmen (according to the statement of the 
Dolphin'' s master, in Niles's Register) were panic- 
struck, and acted in anything but a brave man- 
ner. All irregular fighting-men do their work by- 
fits and starts. No regular cruisers could behave 
better than did the privateers Lottery, Chasseur, 
and General Armstrong; none would behave as 
badly as the Dolphin, Lynx, and Arab. The same 
thing appears on shore. Jackson's irregulars at 
New Orleans did as weh, or almost as well, as 
Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's 
troops would never have suffered from such a 
panic as overcame the militia at Bladensburg. 

On April 9th, the schooner Norwich, of 14 guns 
and 61 men. Sailing-master James Monk, captured 
the British privateer Caledonia, of 10 guns and 41 
men, after a short action, in which the privateer 
lost 7 men. 

On April 30th, Commodore Rodgers, in the 
President, 44, accompanied by Captain Smith in 
the Congress, z^, sailed on his third cruise.' On 
May 2d, he fell in with and chased the British sloop 
Curlew, 18, Captain Michael Head, but the latter 
escaped by knocking away the wedges of her 
masts and using other means to increase her rate 

^Letter of Commodore Rodgers, September 30, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 213 

of sailing. On the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., 
long. 60° W., the Congress parted company, and 
sailed off toward the southeast, making four prizes, 
of no great value, in the North Atlantic " ; when 
about in long. 35° W. she steered south, passing to 
the south of the line. But she never saw a man- 
of-war, and during the latter part of her cruise not 
a sail of any kind ; and, after cruising nearly eight 
months, returned to Portsmouth Harbor on De- 
cember 14th, having captured but four merchant- 
men. Being unfit to cruise longer, owing to her 
decayed condition, she was disarmed and laid up ; 
nor was she sent to sea again during the war.^ 

Meanwhile, Rodgers cruised along the eastern 
edge of the Grand Bank until he reached latitude 
48°, without meeting anything, then stood to the 
southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. 
Then he crowded sail to the northeast after a Ja- 
maica fleet of which he had received news, but 
which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th, in 
lat. 46° long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped 

^Letter of Captain Smith, December 15, 18 13. 

'James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the 
Tenedos, during part of 1814; but was too much awed by the 
fate of the Chesapeake to come out during the "long block- 
ade" of Captain Parker. Considering the fact that she was 
too decayed to put to sea, had no guns aboard, no crew, and 
was, in fact, laid up, the feat of the Tenedos was not very 
wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded" her quite as 
well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the way James 
alters a fact by suppressing half of it. 



214 Naval War of 1812 

his course toward the North Sea, still without any 
good luck befalling him. On June 27th, he put 
into North Bergen in the Shetlands for water, and 
thence passed the Orkneys and stretched toward 
the North Cape, hoping to intercept the Arch- 
angel fleet. On July 19th, when off the North 
Cape, in lat. 71° 52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in 
with two sail of the enemy, who made chase; 
after four days' pursuit the commodore ran his 
opponents out of sight. According to his letter, 
the two sail were a line-of-battle ship and a frig- 
ate ; according to James, they were the 1 2 -pounder 
frigate Alexandria, Captain Cathcart, and Spit- 
fire, 16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from the 
logs of the two British ships, and it would seem 
that he is correct, as it would not be possible for 
him to falsify the logs so utterly. In case he is 
true, it was certainly carrying caution to an ex- 
cessive degree for the commodore to retreat be- 
fore getting some idea of what his antagonists 
really were. His mistaking them for so much 
heavier ships was a precisely similar error to that 
made by Sir George Collier and Lord Stuart at a 
later date about the Cyane and Levant. James 
wishes to prove that each party perceived the 
force of the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) 
between the "gallantry of one party and pusil- 
lanimity of the other." This is nonsense, and, as 
in similar cases, James overreaches himself by 



Naval War of 1 812 215 

proving too much. If he had made an 18- 
pounder frigate Hke the Congress flee from another 
i8-pounder, his narrative would be within the 
bounds of possibiHty, and would need serious 
examination. But the little 12-pounder Alex- 
andria, and the ship-sloop with her 18-pound car- 
ronades, would not have stood the ghost of a 
chance in the contest. Any man who would have 
been afraid of them would also have been afraid 
of the Little Belt, the sloop Rodgers captured be- 
fore the war. As for Captains Cathcart and Ellis, 
had they known the force of the President, and 
chased her with a view of attacking her, their con- 
duct would have only been explicable on the 
ground that they were afflicted with emotional 
insanity. 

The President now steered southward and got 
into the mouth of the Irish Channel; on August 
2d she shifted her berth and almost circled Ireland ; 
then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked 
south along the coast. On September 23d, a little 
south of Nantucket, she decoyed under her guns 
and captured the British schooner Highflyer, 6, 
Lieutenant William Hutchinson, and 45 men ; and 
went into Newport on the 27th of the same month, 
having made some twelve prizes. 

On May 24th, Commodore Decatur, in theUnited 
States, which had sent ashore six carronades, and 
now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by 



2i6 Naval War of 1812 

Captain Jones in the Macedonian, 38, and Captain 
Biddle in the Wasp, 20, left New York, passing 
through Hell Gate, as there was a large blockading 
force off the Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the 
mainmast of the States was struck by lightning, 
which cut off the broad pendant, shot down the 
hatchway into the doctor's cabin, put out his 
candle, ripped up the bed, and, entering between 
the skin and ceiling of the ship, tore off two or 
three sheets of copper near the water-line, and 
disappeared without leaving a trace! The Mace- 
donian, which was close behind, hove all aback, in 
expectation of seeing the States blown up. 

At the end of the Sound, Commodore Decatur 
anchored to watch for a chance of getting out. 
Early on June ist he started; but in a couple of 
hours met the British Captain R. D. Oliver's 
squadron, consisting of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. 
These chased him back, and all his three ships ran 
into New London. Here, in the mud of the 
Thames River, the two frigates remained block- 
aded till the close of the war ; but the little sloop 
slipped out later, to the enemy's cost. 

We left the Chesapeake, 38, being fitted out at 
Boston by Captain James Lawrence, late of the 
Hornet. Most of her crew, as already stated, 
their time being up, left, dissatisfied with the 
ship's ill luck, and angry at not having received 
their due share of prize-money. It was very hard 



Naval War of 1 812 217 

to get sailors, most of the men preferring to ship 
in some of the numerous privateers where the 
disciphne was less strict and the chance of prize- 
money much greater. In consequence of this, an 
unusually large number of foreigners had to be 
taken, including about forty British and a num- 
ber of Portuguese. The latter were peculiarly 
troublesome; one of their number, a boatswain's 
mate, finally almost brought about a mutiny 
among the crew, which was only pacified by giving 
the men prize-checks. A few of the Constitution s 
old crew came aboard, and these, together with 
some of the men who had been on the Chesapeake 
during her former voyage, made an excellent 
nucleus. Such men needed very little training at 
either guns or sails ; but the new hands were un- 
practised, and came on board so late that the last 
draft that arrived still had their hammocks and 
bags lying in the boats stowed over the booms 
when the ship was captured. The officers were 
largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant, 
Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former 
cruise; the third and fourth lieutenants were not 
regularly commissioned as such, but were only 
midshipmen acting for the first time in higher posi- 
tions. Captain Lawrence himself was of course 
new to all, both officers and crew.' In other 

' On the day on which he sailed to attack the Shannon, 
Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: 



2i8 Naval War of 1812 

words, the Chesapeake possessed good material, 
but in an exceedingly unseasoned state. 

Meanwhile, the British frigate Shannon, 38, Cap- 
tain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, was cruising off the 
mouth of the harbor. To give some idea of the 
reason why she proved herself so much more for- 
midable than her British sister frigates, it may be 
well to quote, slightly condensing, from James : 

"There was another point in which the gener- 
ality of British crews, as compared with any one 
American crew, were miserably deficient ; that is, 
skill in the art of gunnery. While the American 
seamen were constantly firing at marks, the Brit- 
ish seamen, except in particular cases, scarcely 
did so once in a year; and some ships could be 
named on board which not a shot had been fired 
in this way for upward of three years. Nor was 
the fault wholly the captain's. The instructions 
under which he was bound to act forbade him to 
use, during the first six months after the ship had 
received her armament, more shots per month 
than amoimted to a third in number of the upper- 
deck guns ; and, after these six months, only half 

"Lieutenant Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with the 
ship. At the urgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce, I 
have granted him, also, permission to go on shore; one in- 
ducement for my granting his request was his being at 
variance with every officer in his mess." — Captains' Letters, 
vol. xxix. No. I , in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither 
officers nor men had shaken together. 



Naval War of 1 812 219 

the quantity. Many captains never put a shot 
in the guns till an enemy appeared; they em- 
ployed the leisure time of the men in handling the 
sails and in decorating the ship." Captain Broke 
was not one of this kind. "From the day on 
which he had joined her, the 14th of September, 
1806, the Shannon began to feel the effect of her 
captain's proficiency as a gunner and zeal for the 
service. The laying of the ship's ordnance so 
that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direc- 
tion is justly deemed a most important operation, 
as upon it depends in a great measure the true aim 
and destructive effect of the shot; this was at- 
tended to by Captain Broke in person. By 
draughts from other ships, and the usual means to 
which a British man-of-war is obliged to resort, 
the Shannon got together a crew; and, in the 
course of a year or two, by the paternal care and 
excellent regulations of Captain Broke, the ship's 
company became as pleasant to command as it 
was dangerous to meet." The Shannon's guns 
were all carefully sighted, and, moreover, "every 
day, for about an hour and a half in the fore- 
noon, when not prevented by chase or the state of 
the weather, the men were exercised at training the 
guns, and for the same time in the afternoon in the 
use of the broadsword, pike, musket, etc. Twice 
a week the crew fired at targets, both with great 
guns and musketry; and Captain Broke, as an 



2 20 Naval War of 1812 

additional stimulus beyond the emulation excited, 
gave a pound of tobacco to every man that put 
a shot through the bull's eye." He would fre- 
quently have a cask thrown overboard and sud- 
denly order some one gun to be manned to sink 
the cask. In short, the Shannon was very greatly 
superior, thanks to her careful training, to the 
average British frigate of her rate, while the 
Chesapeake, owing to her having a raw and in- 
experienced crew, was decidedly inferior to the 
average American frigate of the same strength. 

In force, the two frigates compared pretty 
equally,' the American being the superior in just 
about the same proportion that the Wasp was to 
the Frolic, or, at a later date, the Hornet to the 
Penguin. The Chesapeake carried 50 guns (26 in 
broadside), twenty-eight long i8's on the gun- 
deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 
18, eighteen 3 2 -pound carronades, and one 12- 
pound carronade (which was not used in the fight, 
however). Her broadside, allowing for the short 
weight of metal, was 542 lbs. ; her complement, 
379 men. The Shannon carried 52 guns (26 in 
broadside), twenty-eight long iS's on the gun- 
deck, and on the spar-deck four long 9's, one long 
6, sixteen 32-pound carronades, and three 12- 
pound carronades (two of which were not used in 
the fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs. ; her crew 

^ Taking each commander's account for his own force. 



Naval War of 1 812 221 

consisted of 330 men, 30 of whom were raw hands. 
Early on the morning of June ist, Captain Broke 
sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American 
prisoner, a letter of challenge which, for courteous- 
ness, manliness, and candor, is the very model of 
what such an epistle should be. Before it reached 
Boston, however, Captain Lawrence had weighed 
anchor to attack the Shannon, which frigate was 
in full sight in the offing. It has been often said 
that he engaged against his judgment, but this 
may be doubted. His experience with the Bonne 
Citoyenne, Espiegle, and Peacock had not tended 
to give him a very high idea of the navy to which 
he was opposed, and there is no doubt that he was 
confident of capturing the Shannon.'' It was 
most unfortunate that he did not receive Broke's 
letter, as the latter in it expressed himself willing 
to meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he 
might appoint; and there would thus have been 
some chance of the American crew having time 
enough to get into shape. 

At midday of June i, 18 13, the Chesapeake 
weighed anchor, stood out of Boston Harbor, and 

^ In his letter written just before sailing (already quoted on 
p. 218), he says: "An English frigate is now in sight from our 
deck. ... I am in hopes to give a good account of her 
before night." My account of the action is mainly taken 
from James's Naval History and Brighton's Memoir of Ad- 
miral Broke (according to which the official letter of Captain 
Broke was tampered with) ; see also the letter of Lieutenant 



222 Naval War of 1812 

at I P.M. rounded the Light-house. The Shannon 
stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 hauled up 
and reefed topsails. At 4 p.m., she again bore 
away with her foresail brailed up, and her main- 
topsail braced flat and shivering, that the Chesa- 
peake might overtake her. An hour later, Boston 
Light-house bearing west distant about six leagues, 
she again hauled up, with her head to the south- 
east, and lay to under topsails, topgallantsails, 
jib, and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze 
freshened, the Chesapeake took in her studding- 
sails, topgallantsails, and royals, got her royal 
yards on deck, and came down very fast under 
topsails and jib. At 5.00, to keep under com- 
mand and be able to wear if necessary, the 
Shannon filled her main-topsail and kept a close 
luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25 
the Chesapeake hauled up her foresail, and, with 
three ensigns flying, steered straight for the 
Shannon's starboard quarter. Broke was afraid 
that Lawrence would pass under the Shannon's 
stern, rake her, and engage her on the quarter; 
but, either overlooking or waiving this advantage, 
the American captain luffed up within 50 yards 
upon the Shannon's starboard quarter, and 

George Budd, June 15, 18 13; the report of the Court of In- 
quiry, Commodore Bainbridge presiding, and the Court- 
martial held on board frigate United States, April 15, 1814^ 
Commodore Decatur presiding. 



Naval War of 1 812 223 

squared his main-yard. On board the Shannon, 
the captain of the 14th gun, WilHam Mindham, 
had been ordered not to fire till it bore into the 
second main-deck port forward; at 5.50 it was 
fired, and then the other guns in quick succession 
from aft forward, the Chesapeake replying with 
her whole broadside. At 5.53 Lawrence, finding 
he was forging ahead, hauled up a little. The 
Chesapeake's broadsides were doing great damage, 
but she herself was suffering even more than her 
foe ; the men in the Shannon's tops could hardly 
see the deck of the American frigate through the 
cloud of splinters, hammocks, and other wreck 
that was flying across it. Man after man was 
killed at the wheel; the fourth lieutenant, the 
master, and the boatswain were slain ; and at 5.56 
having had her jib -sheet and fore-topsail tie shot 
away, and her spanker brails loosened so that the 
sail blew out, the Chesapeake came up into the 
wind somewhat, so as to expose her quarter to her 
antagonist's broadside, which beat in her stern- 
ports and swept the men from the after guns. 
One of the arm-chests on the quarter-deck was 
blown up by a hand-grenade thrown from the 
Shannon.^ The Chesapeake was now seen to have 

^ This explosion may have had more effect than is com- 
monly supposed in the capture of the Chesapeake. Commo- 
dore Bainbridge, writing from Charlestown, Mass., on June 2, 
1813 (see Captains' Letters, vol. xxix., No. 10), says: "Mr. 



2 24 Naval War of 1812 

stern-way on and to be paying slowly off ; so the 
Shannon put her helm a-starboard and shivered 
her mizzen-topsail, so as to keep off the wind and 
delay the boarding. But at that moment her jib- 
stay was shot away, and, her headsails becoming 
becalmed, she went off very slowly. In conse- 
quence, at 6 P.M. the two frigates fell aboard, the 
Chesapeake's quarter pressing upon the Shannon's 
side just forward the starboard main-chains, and 
the frigates were kept in this position by the fluke 
of the Shannon's anchor catching in the Chesa- 
peake's quarter port. 

The Shannon's crew had suffered severely, but 
not the least panic or disorder existed among 
them. Broke ran forward, and seeing his foes 
flinching from the quarterdeck guns, he ordered 
the ships to be lashed together, the great guns to 
cease firing, and the boarders to be called. The 
boatswain, who had fought in Rodney's action, 

Knox, the pilot on board, left the Chesapeake at 5 p.m. . . . 
At 6 P.M., Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12 
minutes past six both ships were laying alongside one another 
as if in the act of boarding; at that moment an explosion took 
place on board the Chesapeake, which spread a fire on her 
upper deck from the foremast to the mizzen-mast, as high as 
her tops, and enveloped both ships in smoke for several min- 
utes. After it cleared away, they were seen separate, with the 
British flag hoisted on board the Chesapeake over the Amer- 
ican." James denies that the explosion was catised by a 
hand-grenade, though he says there were some of these 
aboard the Shannon. It is a point of no interest. 



Naval War of 1 812 225 

set about fastening the vessels together, which the 
grim veteran succeeded in doing, though his right 
arm was Hterahy hacked off by a blow from a cut- 
lass. All was confusion and dismay on board the 
Chesapeake. Lieutenant Ludlow had been mor- 
tally wounded and carried below ; Lawrence him- 
self, while standing on the quarter-deck, fatally 
conspicuous by his full-dress uniform and com- 
manding stature, was shot down, as the vessels 
closed, by Lieutenant Law of the British marines. 
He fell dying, and was carried below, exclaiming : 
"Don't give up the ship!" — a phrase that has 
since become proverbial among his countrymen. 
The third lieutenant, Mr. W. S. Cox, came on 
deck, but, utterly demoralized by the aspect of 
affairs, he basely ran below without staying to 
rally the men, and was court-martialled afterward 
for so doing. At 6.02, Captain Broke stepped 
from the Shannon's gangway rail on to the muzzle 
of the Chesapeake' s aftermost carronade, and 
thence over the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, 
followed by about twenty men. As they came 
aboard, the Chesapeake' s foreign mercenaries and 
the raw natives of the crew deserted their quarters ; 
the Portuguese boatswain's mate removed the 
gratings of the berth-deck, and he ran below, fol- 
lowed by many of the crew, among them one of 
the midshipmen named Deforest. On the quar- 
ter-deck almost the only man that made any 

VOL. I. — 15. 



2 26 Naval War of 1 812 

resistance was the chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who 
advanced, firing his pistol at Broke, and in return 
nearly had his arm hewed off by a stroke from the 
latter' s broad Toledo blade. On the upper deck 
the only men who behaved well were the marines, 
but of their original number of 44 men, 14, includ- 
ing Lieutenant James Broom and Corporal Dixon, 
were dead, and 20, including Sergeants Twin and 
Harris, wounded, so that there were left but one 
corporal and nine men, several of whom had been 
knocked down and bruised, though reported un- 
wounded. There was thus hardly any resistance, 
Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till 
they were joined by the rest of the boarders under 
Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The Chesa- 
peake's mizzen-topmen began firing at the board- 
ers, mortally wounding a midshipman, Mr. 
Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt ; but one of 
the Shannon's long 9's was pointed at the top and 
cleared it out, being assisted by the English main- 
topmen, under Midshipman Coshnahan. At the 
same time the men in the Chesapeake's maintop 
were driven out of it by the fire of the Shannon's 
fore-topmen, under Midshipman Smith. Lieuten- 
ant George Budd, who was on the main-deck, now 
for the first time learned that the English had 
boarded, as the upper-deck men came crowding 
down, and at once called on his people to follow 
him; but the foreigners and novices held back, 



Naval War of 1812 227 

and only a few of the veterans followed him up. 
As soon as he reached the spar-deck, Budd, fol- 
lowed by only a dozen men, attacked the British 
as they came along the gangways, repulsing them 
for a moment, and killing the British purser, Aid- 
ham, and captain's clerk, Dunn ; but the handful 
of Americans were at once cut down or dispersed, 
Lieutenant Budd being wounded and knocked 
down the main hatchway. "The enemy," writes 
Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but in dis- 
order." Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally 
wounded, stiniggled up on deck, followed by two 
or three men, but was at once disabled by a sabre 
cut. On the forecastle a few seamen and marines 
turned to bay. Captain Broke was still leading 
his men with the same brilliant personal courage 
he had all along shown. Attacking the first Amer- 
ican, who was armed with a pike, he parried a blow 
from it, and cut down the man; attacking an- 
other he was himself cut down, and only saved by 
the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, who 
slew his assailant. One of the American marines, 
using his clubbed musket, killed an Englishman, 
and so stubborn was the resistance of the little 
group that for a moment the assailants gave back, 
having lost several killed and wounded; but im- 
mediately afterward they closed in and slew their 
foes to the last man. The British fired a volley 
or two down the hatchway, in response to a couple 



2 28 Naval War of 1812 

of shots fired up ; all resistance was at an end, and 
at 6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun had 
been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had 
come aboard, the colors of the Chesapeake were 
struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61 were killed or 
mortally wounded, including her captain, her 
first and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of 
marines, the master (White), boatswain (Adams), 
and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and 
slightly wounded, including both her other lieu- 
tenants, 5 midshipmen, and the chaplain; total, 
148; the loss falling almost entirely upon the 
American portion of the crew. 

Of the Shannon's men, 2)2) were killed outright 
or died of their wounds, including her first 
lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk, and one mid- 
shipman, and 50 wounded, including the captain 
himself and the boatswain; total, 83. 

The Chesapeake was taken into Halifax, where 
Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow were 
both buried with military honors. Captain Broke 
was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieu- 
tenants Wallis and Falkiner were both made 
commanders. 

The British writers accuse some of the American 
crew of treachery ; the Americans, in turn, accuse 
the British of revolting brutality. Of course, in 
such a fight, things are not managed with urbane 
courtesy, and, moreover writers are prejudiced. 



Naval War of 1 812 229 

Those who would Hke to hear one side, are referred 
to James ; if they wish to hear the other, to the 
various letters from officers published in Niles's 
Register, especially vol. v., p. 142. 

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower 
masts, especially the two mizzen-masts, were 
badly wounded. The Americans at that period 
were fond of using bar shot, which were of very 
questionable benefit, being useless against a ship's 
hull, though said to be sometimes of great help in 
unrigging an antagonist from whom one was de- 
sirous of escaping, as in the case of the President 
and Endymion. 



/ 



S.SO 



t ••*« 



SiS3 
5SS 

^00 V'W'^*^ ''' QUBiAPBAKB 




^ ^^' 

J^-"^^^- 
-'^"' 



SBANtmH 



e.o4 e.00 

^^^ ess s^SO 

Chesapeake struck by Shannon struck by 

29 eighteen-pound shot, 12 eighteen-pound shot, 

25 thirty-two-pound shot, 13 thirty-two-pound shot, 

2 nine-pound shot, 14 bar shot, 

306 grape, 119 grape, 

362 shot. 158 shot. 

It is thus seen that the Shannon received from 

shot alone only about half the damage the 



230 Naval War of 1812 

Chesapeake did ; the latter was thoroughly 
beaten at the guns, in spite of what some 
American authors say to the contrary. And 
her victory was not in the slightest degree to 
be attributed to, though it may have been slightly 
hastened by, accident. Training and discipline 
won the victory, as often before; only in this 
instance the training and discipline were against 
us. 

It is interesting to notice that the Chesapeake 
battered the Shannon's hull far more than either 
the Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian did the hulls 
of their opponents, and that she suffered less in 
return (not in loss but in damage) than they did. 
The Chesapeake was a better fighter than either the 
Java, Guerriere, or Macedonian, and could have 
captured any one of them. The Shannon, of 
course, did less damage than any of the American 
44's, probably just about in the proportion of the 
difference in force. 

Almost all American writers have treated the 
capture of the Chesapeake as if it was due simply 
to a succession of unfortunate accidents; for ex- 
ample, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism, 
says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its 
short duration, are "altogether the results of the 
chances of war," and that it was mainly decided 
by "fortuitous events as unconnected with any 
particular merit on the one side as they are with 



Naval War of 1812 231 

any particular demerit on the other." ' Most 
naval men consider it a species of treason to re- 
gard the defeat as due to anything but extraor- 
dinary ill-fortune. And yet no disinterested 
reader can help acknowledging that the true 
reason of the defeat was the very simple one that 
the Shannon fought better than the Chesapeake. 
It has often been said that up to the moment 
when the ships came together the loss and damage 
suffered by each were about the same. This is 
not true, and even if it was, would not affect the 
question. The heavy loss on board the Shannon 
did not confuse or terrify the thoroughly trained 
men, with their implicit reliance on their leaders ; 
and the experienced officers were ready to defend 
any point that was menaced. An equal or greater 
amount of loss aboard the Chesapeake disheartened 
and confused the raw crew, who simply had not 
had the time or chance to become well disciplined. 
Many of the old hands, of course, kept their wits 
and their pluck, but the novices and the disaffected 
did not. Similarly with the officers ; some, as the 
Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their 
posts, and all being new to each other and the 

^ The worth of such an explanation is very aptly gauged in 
General Alexander S. Webb's The Peninsula; JMcClellan's 
Campaign of 1862 (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks 
of "those unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are 
vaguely described as the 'fortune of war,' but which usually 
prove to be the superior ability or resources of the antagonist." 



232 Naval War of 1 812 

ship, could not show to their best. There is no 
doubt that the Chesapeake was beaten at the guns 
before she was boarded. Had the ships not come 
together, the fight would have been longer, the 
loss greater, and more nearly equal ; but the re- 
sult would have been the same. Cooper says that 
the enemy entered with great caution, and so 
slowly that twenty resolute men could have re- 
pulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Cap- 
tain Broke and his few followers to leap on board, 
unsupported, and then they only waited for the 
main body to come up ; and no twenty men could 
have repulsed such boarders as followed Broke. 
The fight was another lesson, with the parties re- 
versed, to the effect that want of training and 
discipline is a bad handicap. Had the Chesa- 
peake's crew been in service as many months as 
the Shannon's had been years, such a captain as 
Lawrence would have had his men perfectly in 
hand ; they would not have been cowed by their 
losses, nor some of the officers too demoraHzed to 
act properly, and the material advantages which 
the Chesapeake possessed, although not very great, 
would probably have been enough to give her a 
good chance of victory. It is well worth noticing 
that the only thoroughly disciplined set of men 
aboard (all according to James himself, by the 
way, native Americans) , namely, the marines, did 
excellently, as shown by the fact that three 



Naval War of 1812 233 

fourths of their number were among the killed and 
wounded. The foreigners aboard the Chesapeake 
did not do as well as the Americans, but it is non- 
sense to ascribe the defeat in any way to them ; it 
was only rendered rather more disastrous by 
their actions. Most of the English authors give 
very fair accounts of the battle, except that they 
hardly allude to the peculiar disadvantages under 
which the Chesapeake suffered when she entered 
into it. Thus, James thinks the Java was un- 
prepared because she had only been to sea six 
weeks; but does not lay any weight on the fact 
that the Chesapeake had been out only as many 
hours. 

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that 
written by M. de la Graviere.' " It is impossible 
to avoid seeing in the capture of the Chesapeake a 
new proof of the enormous power of a good organi- 
zation, when it has received the consecration of a 
few years' actual service on the sea. On this oc- 
casion, in effect, two captains equally renowned, 
the honor of two navies, were opposed to each 
other on two ships of the same tonnage and num- 
ber of guns. Never had the chances seemed better 
balanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded 
the Shannoyi for nearly seven years, while Captain 
Lawrence had only commanded the Chesapeake 
for a few days. The first of these frigates had 

* Guerres Mariiimcs, ii., 272. 



234 Naval War of 1812 

cruised for eighteen months on the coast of 
America; the second was leaving port. One had 
a crew long accustomed to habits of strict obedi- 
ence; the other was manned by men who had 
just been engaged in mutiny. The Americans 
were wrong to accuse fortune on this occasion. 
Fortune was not fickle; she was merely logical. 
The Shannon captured the Chesapeake on the ist 
of June, 1 813, but on the 14th of September, 1806, 
the day when he took command of his frigate, 
Captain Broke had begun to prepare the glorious 
termination to this bloody affair." 

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a 
man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas, who 
was admired as much for his dauntless bravery as 
he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it 
must be confessed that he acted rashly. And 
after he had sailed, it was, as Lord Howard Doug- 
lass had pointed out, a tactical error, however 
chivalric, to neglect the chance of luffing across the 
Shannon's stern to rake her; exactly as it was a 
tactical error of his equally chivalrous antagonist 
to have let him have such an opportunity. Hull 
would not have committed either error, and would, 
for the matter of that, have been an overmatch 
for either commander. But it must always be 
remembered that Lawrence's encounters with the 
English had not been such as to give him a high 
opinion of them. The only foe he had fought had 



Naval War of 1 812 235 

been inferior in strength, it is true, but had hardly 
made any effective resistance. Another sloop, of 
equal, if not superior force, had tamely submitted 
to blockade for several days, and had absolutely 
refused to fight. And there can be no doubt that 
the Chesapeake, unprepared though she was, would 
have been an overmatch for the Guerrihe, Mace- 
donian, or Java. Altogether, it is hard to blame 
Lawrence for going out, and in every other re- 
spect his actions have never been, nor will be, 
mentioned, by either friend or foe, without the 
warmest respect. But that is no reason for in- 
sisting that he was ruined purely by an adverse 
fate. We will do far better to recollect that as 
much can be learned from reverses as from vic- 
tories. Instead of flattering ourselves by saying 
the defeat was due to chance, let us try to find out 
what the real cause was, and then take care that it 
does not have an opportunity to act again. A 
little less rashness would have saved Lawrence's 
life and his frigate, while a little more audacity 
on one occasion would have made Commodore 
Chauncy famous forever. And whether a lesson 
is to be learned or not, a historian should remem- 
ber that his profession is not that of a panegyrist. 
The facts of the case unquestionably are: that 
Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the en- 
emy's harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally 
equal and in reality sHghtly superior force ; and 



236 Naval War of 181 2 

that this is the only single-ship action of the war 
in which the victor was weaker in force than his 
opponent. So much can be gathered by reading 
only the American accounts. Moreover, accident 
had little or nothing to do with the gaining of the 
victory. The explanation is perfectly easy : Law- 
rence and Broke were probably exactly equal in 
almost everything that goes to make up a first- 
class commander, but one had trained his crew for 
seven years, and the other was new to the ship, to 
the officers, and to the men, and the last to each 
other. The Chesapeake's crew must have been of 
fine material, or they would not have fought so 
well as they did. 

So much for the American accounts. On the 
other hand, the capture of the Chesapeake was, 
and is, held by many British historians to "con- 
clusively prove" a good many different things; 
such as, that if the odds were anything like equal, 
a British frigate could always whip an American, 
that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would in- 
variably be the case, etc.; and as this was the 
only single-ship action of the war in which the 
victor was the inferior in force, most British writers 
insist that it reflected more honor on them than all 
the frigate actions of 181 2 put together did on the 
Americans. 

These assertions can be best appreciated by 
reference to a victory won by the French in the 



Naval War of 1812 237 

year of the battle of the Nile. On the 14th of 
December, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the 
French 24-gun corvette Bayonnaise captured, by 
boarding, the English 3 2 -gun frigate Ambuscade. 
According to James, the Ambuscade threw at a 
broadside 262 pounds of shot, and was manned by 
190 men, while the Bayonnaise threw 150 pounds, 
and had on board supernumeraries and passenger 
soldiers enough to make in all 2 50 men. According 
to the French historian Rouvier,' the broadside 
force was 246 pounds against 80 pounds; accord- 
ing to Troude,^ it was 270 pounds against 112. 
M. Leon Guerin, in his voluminous but exceedingly 
prejudiced and one-sided work,^ makes the differ- 
ence even greater. At any rate, the English vessel 
was vastly the superior in force, and was captured 
by boarding, after a long and bloody conflict in 
which she lost 46, and her antagonist over 50, 
men. During all the wars waged with the Repub- 
lic and the Empire, no English vessel captured a 
French one as much superior to itself as the Am- 
buscade was to the Bayonnaise, precisely as in the 
War of 181 2 no American vessel captured a British 
opponent as much superior to itself as the Chesa- 

^ Histoire des Marins Frangais sous la Repuhlique, par 
Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Paris, 1868. 

^ Batailles Navales. 

3 Histoire Maritime de France (par L(§on Guerin, Historien 
titulaire de la Marine, Membre de la Legion d'Honneur), vi., 
142 (Paris, 1852). 



238 Naval War of 181 2 

peake was to the Shannon. -Yet no sensible man 
can help acknowledging, in spite of these and a 
few other isolated instances, that at that time the 
French were inferior to the English, and the latter 
to the Americans. 

It is amusing to compare the French histories of 
the English with the English histories of the 
Americans, and to notice the similarity of the ar- 
guments they use to detract from their opponents' 
fame. Of course I do not allude to such writers as 
Lord Howard Douglass or Admiral de la Graviere, 
but to men like William James and Leon Guerin, 
or even O. Troude. James is always recounting 
how American ships ran away from British ones, 
and Guerin tells as many anecdotes of British ships 
who fled from French foes. James reproaches the 
Americans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of 
warfare, instead of " bringing to in a bold and be- 
coming manner." Precisely the same reproaches 
are used by the French writers, who assert that the 
Enghsh would not fight "fairly," but acquired an 
advantage by manoeuvring. James lays great 
stress on the American long guns ; so does Lieuten- 
ant Rouvier on the British carronades. James 
always tells how the Americans avoided the British 
ships, when the crews of the latter demanded to 
be led aboard; Troude says the British always 
kept at long shot, while the French sailors "de- 
manderent a grands cris, I'abordage." James says 



Naval War of 1812 239 

the Americans "hesitated to grapple" with their 
foes " unless they possessed a twofold superiority " ; 
Guerin that the English "never dared attack" ex- 
cept when they possessed "une superiorite enor- 
me." The British sneer at the "mighty dollar"; 
the French at the "eternal guinea." The former 
consider Decatur's name as " sunk" to the level of 
Porter's or Bainbridge's ; the latter assert that the 
" presumptuous Nelson" was inferior to any of the 
French admirals of the time preceding the Repub- 
lic. Says James : " The Americans only fight well 
when they have the superiority of force on their 
side " ; and Lieutenant Rouvier : " Never have the 
English vanquished us with an undoubted in- 
feriority of force." 

On June 12, 18 13, the small cutter Surveyor, of 
six 1 2 -pound carronades, was lying in York River, 
in the Chesapeake, under the command of Mr. Wil- 
liam S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men.' 
At nightfall she was attacked by the boats of the 
Narcissus frigate, containing about 50 men, under 
the command of Lieutenant John Creerie.^ None 
of the carronades could be used ; but Mr. Travis 
made every preparation that he could for defence. 
The Americans waited till the British were within 
pistol-shot before they opened their fire ; the latter 

^ Letter of W. S. Travis, June i6, 1813. 
2 James, vi., 334. 



240 Naval War of 1812 

dashed gallantly on, however, and at once carried 
the cutter. But, though brief, the struggle was 
bloody ; 5 of the Americans were wounded, and of 
the British 3 were killed and 7 wounded. Lieu- 
tenant Creerie considered his opponents to have 
shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. 
Travis his sword, with a letter as complimentary 
to him as it was creditable to the writer.' 

As has been already mentioned, the Americans 
possessed a large force of gunboats at the begin- 
ning of the war. Some of these were fairly sea- 
worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop or 
schooner-rigged, and armed with one or two long, 
heavy guns, and sometimes with several light 
carronades to repel boarders. ^ Gunboats of this 

^The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows: "Your gallant 
and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more 
than double your number, on the night of the 12th instant, 
excited such admiration on the part of your opponents as I 
have seldom witnessed, and induced me to return you the 
sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of mine. Our 
poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly, if not 
solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise. 
In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous 
arrangement aboard the Surveyor, or the detennined manner 
in which her deck was disputed inch by inch. I am, sir," etc. 

2 According to a letter from Captain Hugh G. Campbell (in 
the Naval Archives, Captains' Letters, 1812, vol. ii., Nos. 21 
and 192), the crews were distributed as follows: ten men and 
a boy to a long 32, seven men and a boy to a long 9, and five 
men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of petty officers. 
Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men, and 



Naval War of 1812 241 

kind, together with the few small cutters owned by 
the Government, were serviceable enough. They 
were employed all along the shores of Georgia and 
the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in pro- 
tecting the coasting trade by convoying parties of 
small vessels from one port to another, and pre- 
venting them from being molested by the boats of 
any of the British frigates. They also acted as 
checks upon the latter in their descents upon the 
towns and plantations, occasionally capturing 
their boats and tenders, and forcing them to be 
very cautious in their operations. They were very 
useful in keeping privateers off the coast, and 
capturing them when they came too far in. The 
exploits of those on the southern coast will be 
mentioned as they occurred. Those in Long Island 
Sound never came into collision with the foe, ex- 
cept for a couple of slight skirmishes at very long 
range; but in convoying little fleets of coasters, 
and keeping at bay the man-of-war boats sent to 
molest them, they were invaluable ; and they also 
kept the Sound clear of hostile privateers. 

Many of the gunboats were much smaller than 
those just mentioned, trusting mainly to their 
sweeps for motive power, and each relying for 
offence on one long pivot giin, a 12- or i8-pounder. 

rather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have been 
withdrawn from the gunboats, as this may make the com- 
manders of the latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly. 

VOL. I.— 16, 



242 Naval War of 1812 

In the Chesapeake there was quite a large number 
of these small gallies, with a few of the larger kind, 
and here it was thought that, by acting together 
in flotillas, the gunboats might in fine weather do 
considerable damage to the enemy's fleet by de- 
stroying detached vessels, instead of confining 
themselves to the more humble tasks in which 
their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At 
this period Denmark, having lost all her larger ships 
of war, was confining herself purely to gun-brigs. 
These were stout little crafts, with heavy guns, 
which, acting together, and being handled with 
spirit and skill, had on several occasions in calm 
weather captured small British sloops, and had 
twice so injured frigates as to make their return to 
Great Britain necessary; while they themselves 
had frequently been the object of successful cut- 
ting-out expeditions. Congress hoped that our 
gunboats would do as well as the Danish ; but for 
a variety of reasons they failed utterly in every 
serious attack that they made on a man-of-war, 
and were worse than useless for all but the various 
subordinate employments above mentioned. The 
main reason for this failure was in the gunboats 
themselves. They were utterly useless except in 
perfectly calm weather, for in any wind the heavy 
guns caused them to careen over so as to make it 
difficult to keep them right side up, and impossible 
to fire. Even in smooth water they could not be 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 243 

fought at anchor, requiring to be kept in position 
by means of sweeps ; and they were very unstable, 
the recoil of the guns causing them to roll so as to 
make it difficult to aim with any accuracy after the 
first discharge, while a single shot hitting one put 
it hors de combat. This last event rarely happened, 
however, for they were not often handled with any 
approach to temerity, and, on the contrary, usu- 
ally made their attacks at a range that rendered it 
as impossible to inflict as to receive harm. It does 
not seem as if they were very well managed ; but 
they were such ill-conditioned craft that the best 
officers might be pardoned for feeling uncomfort- 
able in them. Their operations throughout the 
war offer a painfully ludicrous commentary on 
Jefferson's remarkable project of having our na\'y 
composed exclusively of such craft. 

The first aggressive attempt made with the gun- 
boats was characteristically futile. On June 20th, 
15 of them, under Captain Tarbell, attacked the 
Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed 
in Hampton Roads, with the Barossa, 36, and 
Laurestiniis, 24, near her. The gunboats, while 
still at very long range, anchored, and promptly 
drifted round so that they could n't shoot. Then 
they got under way, and began gradually to draw 
nearer to the Jimon. Her defence was very- 
feeble; after some hasty and ill-directed volleys 
she endeavored to beat out of the way. But 



244 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

meanwhile, a slight breeze having sprung up, the 
Barossa, Captain Sherriff , approached near enough 
to take a hand in the affair, and at once made it 
evident that she was a more dangerous foe than 
the Jimon, though a lighter ship. Ks soon as they 
felt the effects of the breeze the gunboats became 
almost useless, and, the Barossa' s fire being ani- 
mated and well aimed, they withdrew. They had 
suffered nothing from the jfunon, but during the 
short period she was engaged, the Barossa had 
crippled one boat and slightly damaged another; 
one man was killed and two wounded. The 
Barossa escaped unscathed and the Junon was 
but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the 
Barossa was the only one that came off with 
credit, the Junon behaving, if anything, rather 
worse than the gunboats. There was no longer 
any doubt as to the amount of reliance to be 
placed on the latter.^ 

I Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats, they 
acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bla- 
densburg. The British Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, 
thus writes of their deeds on that occasion {Campaign at 
Washington, p. 119). "Of the sailors, however, it would be 
injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct merits. 
They were employed as gxinners, and not only did they serve 
their guns with a quickness and precision which astonished 
their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually 
bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till their 
leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves 
deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the 



Naval War of 1 812 245 

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, 
one 64, four frigates, two sloops, and three trans- 
ports was anchored off Craney Island. On the 
northwest side of this island was a battery of 18- 
pounders, to take charge of which Captain Cassin, 
commanding the naval forces at Norfolk, sent 
ashore 100 sailors of the Constellation, under the 
command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and 
Saunders, and fifty marines under Lieutenant 
Breckenridge.' On the morning of the 2 2d they 
were attacked by a division of 1 5 boats, containing 
700 men,^ seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiers 
of the io2d regiment, the whole under the com- 
mand of Captain Pechell, of the San Domingo, 74. 
Captain Hanchett led the attack in the Diadem's 
launch. The battery's guns were not fired till the 
British were close in, when they opened with de- 
structive effect. While still some seventy yards 
from the guns the Diadem's launch grounded, and 
the attack was checked. Three of the boats were 
now sunk by shot, but the water was so shallow 
that they remained above water; and while the 
fighting was still at its height, some of the Con- 
stellation's crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, 

field." Certainly such men could not be accused of lack of 
courage. Something else is needed to account for the failure 
of the gun-boat system. 

^ Letter of Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813. 

2 James, vi., 337. 



246 Naval War of 181 2 

waded out and took possession of them.' A few of 
their crew threw away their arms and came ashore 
with their captors ; others escaped to the remain- 
ing boats, and immediately afterward the flotilla 
made off in disorder, having lost 91 men. The 
three captured barges were large, strong boats, 
one, called the Centipede, being fifty feet long, and 
more formidable than many of the American gun 
vessels. The Constellation's men deserve great 
credit for their defence, but the British certainly 
did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When 
the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so 
shallow and the bottom so good that the Americans 
on shore, as just stated, at once waded out to them ; 
and if, in the heat of the fight, Tatnall and his sea- 
men could get out to the boats, the 700 British ought 
to have been able to get in to the battery, whose 
150 defenders would then have stood no chance.^ 
On July 14, 1 81 3, the two small vessels Scorpion 

^ Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall, by Charles C. Jones, Jr. 
(Savannah, 1878), p. 17. 

2 James comments on this repulse as "a defeat as discredit- 
able to those that caused it as honorable to those that suffered 
in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in par- 
ticular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this na- 
ture, always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather than 
on numbers." These comments read particularly well when 
it is remembered that the assailants outnumbered the assailed 
in the proportion of 5 to i. It is monotonous work to have 
to supplement a history by a running commentary on James's 
mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while to prove once 



Naval War of 1812 247 

and Asp, the latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, 
got under way from out of the Yeocomico Creek/ 
and at 10 a.m. discovered in chase the British 
brig-sloops Contest, Captain James Rattray, and 
Mohawk, Captain Henry D. Byng.^ The Scorpion 
beat up the Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing Asp 
had to re-enter the creek; the two brigs anchored 
off the bar and hoisted out their boats, under the 
command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry ; where- 
upon the Asp cut her cable and ran up the creek 
some distance. Here she was attacked by three 
boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty 
men, with two light guns, beat off ; but they were 
joined by two others, and the five carried the Asp, 
giving no quarter. Mr. Sigourney and 10 of his 
men were killed or wounded, while the British 
also suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (includ- 
ing Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving 
Americans reached the shore, rallied under Mid- 
shipman H. McClintock (second in command), 
and when the British retired, after setting the Asp 
on fire, at once boarded her, put out the flames, 

for all the utter unreliability of the author who is accepted 
in Great Britain as the great authority about the war. Still, 
James is no worse than his compeers. In the American Cog- 
geshall's History of Privateers, the misstatements are as gross 
and the sneers in as poor taste — the British, instead of the 
Americans, being the objects. 

^Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July 15, 1813. 

2 James, vi., 343. 



248 Naval War of 181 2 

and got her in fighting order; but they were not 
again molested. 

On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain 
Sanders, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse, were 
in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on the out- 
side of Crow's Shoal ; the frigate anchored within 
supporting distance, and while in this position the 
two ships were attacked by the American flotilla 
in those waters, consisting of eight gunboats, 
carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two 
heavier block-sloops,' commanded by Lieutenant 
Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a dis- 
tance that an hour's cannonading did no damage 
whatever to anybody ; and during that time gun- 
boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile 
and a half away from her consorts. Seeing this, the 
British made a dash at her in seven boats, contain- 
ing 140 men, led by Lieutenant Philip Westphal. 
Mr. Shead anchored and made an obstinate defence 
but at the first discharge the gun's pintle gave 
way, and the next time it was fired the gun-car- 
riage was almost torn to pieces. He kept up a 
spirited fire of small-arms, in reply to the boat- 
carronades and musketry of the assailants; but 
the latter advanced steadily and carried the gun- 
boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded, 
while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded.^ 

' Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1S13. 
2 Letter of Mr. Shead, August 5, 1S13. 



Naval War of 1812 249 

The defence of No. 121 was very creditable, but 
otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with 
the British; whether because the gunboats were 
themselves so worthless or because they were not 
handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even 
to the grounded sloop, that would seem to have 
been at their mercy." 

On June i8th, the American brig-sloop Argus, 
commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Allen, 
late first of the United States, sailed from New York 
for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that 
country, aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 
nth, having made one prize on the way. On 
July 14th, she again sailed, and cruised in the chops 
of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after 
ship, and creating the greatest consternation 
among the London merchants; she then cruised 
along Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, 
where the work of destruction went on. The labor 
was very severe and harassing, the men being able 
to get very little rest.^ On the night of August 

' The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the gun- 
boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is 
a letter from Mr. Angus {Masters-Commandant Letters, 1813, 
No. 3; see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate's 
shot passed over them, while theirs could not even reach the 
sloop. He also encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the 
other gun-boat officers, which rtms: "We, the officers of 
the vessels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against 
the powder as being unfit for service." 

2 Court of Inquiry into loss of Argus, 18 15 



250 Naval War of 181 2 

13th, a brig laden with wine from Oporto was cap- 
tured and burnt, and, unluckily, many of the crew 
succeeded in getting at some of the cargo. At 5 
A.M. on the 14th, a large brig-of-war was discov- 
ered standing down under a cloud of canvas.' This 
was the British brig-sloop Pelican, Captain John 
Fordyce Maples, which, from information received 
at Cork three days previous, had been cruising es- 
pecially after the Argus, and had at last found 
her; St. David's Head bore east five leagues (lat. 
52°i5'N. and 5° 50' W.). 

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her 
lofty masts and long spars, could easily have es- 
caped from her heavier antagonist; but Captain 
Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could 
not get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and 
ran easily along on the starboard tack, while the 
Pelican came down on him with the wind (which 
was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 a.m., the 
Argus wore and fired her port guns within grape 
distance, the Pelican responding with her starboard 
battery, and the action began with great spirit on 
both sides. ^ At 6.04, a round shot carried off Cap- 
tain Allen's leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he 
stayed on deck till he fainted from loss of blood. 
Soon the British fire carried away the main braces, 

'^ Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 18 15. 
^ Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thomborough, 
August 14, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 251 

mainspring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the 
Argus; the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was 
wounded in the head by a grape-shot and carried 
below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no 
relation of the captain), continued to fight the ship 
with great skill. The Pelican's fire continued 
very heavy, the Argus losing her spritsail-yard and 
most of the standing rigging on the port side of the 
foremast. At 6.14, Captain Maples bore up to 
pass astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen 
luffed into the wind and threw the main-top sail 
aback, getting into a beautiful raking position ' ; 
had the men at the guns done their duty as well as 
those on the quarter-deck did theirs, the issue of 
the fight would have been very different ; but, as 
it was, in spite of her favorable position, the raking 
broadside of the Argus did little damage. Two or 
three minutes afterward the Argus lost the use of 
her after-sails through having her preventer-main- 
braces and top sail tie shot away, and fell off be- 
fore the wind, when the Pelican at 6.18 passed her 
stem, raking her heavily, and then ranged up on 
her starboard quarter. In a few minutes the 
wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every descrip- 
tion were shot away, and the Argus became utterly 
unmanageable. The Pelican continued raking her 
with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her 
broadside and took a position on her starboard 
^ Letter of Lieutenant Watson. 



252 Naval War of 1812 

bow, when at 6.45, the brigs fell together, and 
the British "were in the act of boarding when 
the Argus struck her colors," 'at 6.45 a.m. The 
Pelican carried, besides her regular armament, 
two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside 
weight of metal was thus ^ : 

1x6 
1x6 

I X 12 

8 X 32 

or 280 pounds against the Argus's: 

I X 12 

9 X 24 

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent, for light weight 
of metal, 210 pounds. The Pelican's crew con- 
sisted of but 116 men, according to the British 
account, though the American reports make it 
much larger. The Argus had started from New 
York with 137 men, but having manned and sent 
in several prizes, her crew amounted, as near as 
can be ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low, in his Naval 
History, published just after the event, makes it 
but 99. James makes it 121. As he placed the 
crew of the Enterprise at 125, when it was really 
102 ; that of the Hornet at 162, instead of 135; of 

' Letter of Captain Maples. 
2 James, vi., 320. 



Naval War of 1812 253 

the Peacock at 185, instead of 166 ; of the Nautilus 
at 106 instead of 95, etc., it is safe to presume 
that he has overestimated it by at least 20, which 
brings the number pretty near to the American 
accounts. The Pelican lost but 2 men killed and 
5 wounded. Captain Maples had a narrow escape, 
a spent grape-shot striking him in the chest with 
some force, and then falling on the deck. One 
shot had passed through the boatswain's and one 
through the carpenter's cabin ; her sides were filled 
with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much 
injured; her foremast, main-topmast, and royal 
masts were slightly wounded, and two of her car- 
ronades dismounted. 

The injuries of the Argus have already been de- 
tailed ; her hull and lower masts were also tolerably 
well cut up. Of her crew. Captain Allen, two mid- 
shipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed 
or mortally wounded ; her first lieutenant and 1 3 
seamen severely and slightly wounded; total, 10 
killed and 14 wounded. 

In reckoning the comparative force, I include 
the Englishman's 6-pound stem-chaser, which 
could not be fired in broadside with the rest of the 
guns, because I include the Argus's 12 -pound bow- 
chaser, which also could not be fired in broadside 
as it was crowded into the bridle-port. James, of 
course, carefully includes the latter, though leaving 
out the former. 



254 



Naval War of 1 812 



COMPARISON 

Weight 
Tons No. Guns Metal 

Argus 298 10 210 

Pelican 467 1 1 280 

Comparative 
Force 

Argus 82 

Pelican i . 00 

«#5 




Men 


Loss 


104 


24 


116 


7 


Comparative 
Inflicted 


Loss 


.29 




1 .00 




tLOO A.M 



PEL/CAM 



Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war, 
this is the least creditable to the Americans. The 
odds in force, it is true, were against the Argus, 
about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this is 
neither enough to account for the loss inflicted 
being as 10 to 3, nor for her surrendering when she 
had been so little ill-used. It was not even as if 
her antagonist had been an unusually fine vessel of 
her class. The Pelican did not do as well as either 
the Frolic previously, or the Reindeer afterward, 
though perhaps rather better than the Avon, Pen- 
guin, or Peacock. With a comparatively unman- 
ageable antagonist, in smooth water, she ought to 
have sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But 
the Pelican's not having done particularly well 
merely makes the conduct of the Americans look 
worse; it is just the reverse of the Chesapeake' s 



Naval War of 1 812 255 

case, where, paying the highest credit to the Brit- 
ish, we still thought the fight no discredit to us. 
Here we can indulge no such reflection. The 
officers did well, but the crew did not. Cooper 
says: "The enemy was so much heavier that it 
may be doubted whether the Argus would have 
captured her antagonist under any ordinary cir- 
cumstances." This I doubt; such a crew as the 
Wasp's or Hornefs probably would have been 
successful. The trouble with the guns of the 
Argus was not so much that they were too small, 
as that they did not hit; and this seems all the 
more incomprehensible when it is remembered that 
Captain Allen is the very man to whom Commo- 
dore Decatur, in his official letter, attributed the 
skilful gun-practice of the frigate United States. 
Cooper says that the powder was bad ; and it has 
also been said that the men of the Argus were 
over-fatigued and were drunk, in which case they 
ought not to have been brought into action. Be- 
sides imskilfulness, there is another very serious 
count against the crew. Had the Pelican been 
some distance from the Argus, and in a position 
where she could pour in her fire with perfect im- 
punity to herself, when the surrender took place, 
it would have been more justifiable. But, on the 
contrary, the vessels were touching, and the Brit- 
ish boarded just as the colors were hauled down ; it 
was certainly very disgraceful that the Americans 



256 Naval War of 181 2 

did not rally to repel them, for they had still 
four fifths of their number absolutely untouched. 
They certainly ought to have succeeded, for board- 
ing is a difficult and dangerous experiment; and 
if they had repulsed their antagonists they might 
in turn have carried the Pelican. So that, in sum- 
ming up the merits of this action, it is fair to say 
that both sides showed skilful seamanship and un- 
skilful gimnery; that the British fought bravely 
and that the Americans did not. 

It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, 
where a weaker American sloop was taken by a 
stronger British one, with two or three others, 
where both the comparative force and the result 
were reversed. Comparing it, therefore, with the 
actions between the Hornet and Peacock (British), 
the Wasp and Avon, and the Peacock (American) 
and Epervier, we get four actions, in one of which, 
the first-named, the British were victorious, and in 
the other three the Americans. 



Force 

Pelican (British) i ■ oo 

Argus (American) 82 

Hornet (American) i • 00 

Peacock (British) 83 

Wasp (American) i • 00 

Avon (British) 80 

Peacock (American) i . 00 

Epervier (British) 81 



Comparative Per cent 
Loss Inflicted Loss 


I .00 


06 


.29 


23 


I .00 


02 


.07 


31 


I .00 


02 


.07 


33 


I .00 


01 


.08 


20 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 257 

It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the 
superiority of force on the side of the victor was 
each time about the same. The Argus made a 
much more effectual resistance than did either the 
Peacock, Avon, or Epervter, while the Pelican did 
her work in poorer form than either of the vic- 
torious American sloops ; and, on the other hand, 
the resistance of the Argus did not by any means 
show as much bravery as was shown in the de- 
fence of the Peacock or Avon, although rather more 
than in the case of the Epervter. 

This is the only action of the war where it is 
almost impossible to find out the cause of the in- 
feriority of the beaten crew. In almost all other 
cases we find that one crew had been carefully 
drilled, and so proved superior to a less-trained 
antagonist; but it is incredible that the man to 
whose exertions, when first lieutenant of the States, 
Commodore Decatur ascribes the skilfulness of 
that ship's men, should have neglected to train his 
own crew; and this had the reputation of being 
composed of a fine set of men. Bad powder 
would not account for the surrender of the Argus 
when so little damaged. It really seems as if the 
men must have been drunk or over-fatigued, as has 
been so often asserted. Of course, drunkenness 
would account for the defeat, although not in the 
least altering its humiliating character. 

"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument; 

VOL. I.— 17 



258 Naval War of 181 2 

still it may be as well to call to mind here two en- 
gagements in which British sloops suffered much 
more discreditable defeats than the Argus did. 
The figures are taken from James ; as given by the 
French historians, they make even a worse show- 
ing for the British. 

A short time before our war, the British brig 
Carnation, 18, had been captured, by boarding, 
by the French brig, Palinure, 16, and the British 
brig Alacrity, 18, had been captured, also by 
boarding, by the corvette Abeille, 20. 

The following was the comparative force, etc., 
of the combatants : 

Weight Metal No. Crew Loss 

Carnation 262 

Palinure 174 

Alacrity 262 

Abeille 260 

In spite of the pride the British take in their 
hand-to-hand prowess, both of these ships were 
captured by boarding. The Carnation was cap- 
tured by a much smaller force, instead of by a much 
larger one, as in the case of the Argus; and if the 
Argus gave up before she had suffered greatly, the 
Alacrity surrendered when she had suffered still 
less. French historians asserted that the capture 
of the two brigs proved that " French valor could 
conquer British courage"; and a similar opinion 



117 


40 


100 


20 


100 


18 


130 


19 



Naval War of 1812 259 

was very complacently expressed by British his- 
torians after the defeat of the Argus. All that the 
three combats really "proved" was, that in eight 
encounters between British and American sloops 
the Americans were defeated once; and in a far 
greater number of encounters between French and 
British sloops the British were defeated twice. No 
one pretends that either navy was invincible ; the 
question is : Which side averaged best ? 

At the opening of the war we possessed several 
small brigs ; these had originally been fast, handy 
little schooners, each armed with twelve long 6's, 
and with a crew of 60 men. As such, they were 
effective enough ; but when afterward changed into 
brigs, each armed with a couple of extra guns, and 
given 40 additional men, they became too slow to 
run, without becoming strong enough to fight. 
They carried far too many guns and men for their 
size, and not enough to give them a chance with 
any respectable opponent; and they were almost 
all ignominiously captured. The single exception 
was the brig Enterprise. She managed to escape 
capture owing chiefly to good luck, and once 
fought a victorious engagement, thanks to the 
fact that the British possessed a class of vessels 
even worse than our own. She was kept near the 
land, and finally took up her station off the eastern 
coast, where she did good service in chasing away 



26o Naval War of 1 812 

or capturing the various Nova Scotian or New 
Brunswick privateers, which were smaller and less 
formidable vessels than the privateers of the 
United States, and not calculated for fighting. 

By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and 
over-manning herself, the Enterprise, now under 
the command of Lieutenant William Burrows, 
mounted fourteen 18-pound carronades and two 
long 9's, with 102 men. On September 5th, while 
standing along shore near Penguin Point, a few 
miles to the eastward of Portland, Me., she discov- 
ered, at anchor inside, a man-of-war brig,' which 
proved to be H. M. S. Boxer, Captain Samuel Blyth, 
of 12 carronades, i8-pounders, and two long 6's, 
with but 66 men aboard, 1 2 of her crew being ab- 
sent.^ The Boxer at once hoisted three British en- 
signs and bore up for the Enterprise, then standing 
in on the starboard tack; but when the two brigs 
were still four miles apart it fell calm. At midday, 
a breeze sprang up from the southwest, giving the 
American the weather-gage, but the latter ma- 
noeuvred for some time to windward to try the 
comparative rates of sailing of the vessels. At 3 
P.M., Lieutenant Burrows hoisted three ensigns, 

1 Letter from Lieutenant Edward R. McCall to Commodore 
Hull, September 5, 18 13. 

2 James, Naval Occurrences, 264. The American accounts 
give the Boxer 104 men, on very insuflEicient grounds. Simi- 
larly, James gives the Enterprise 123 men. Each side will be 
considered authority for its own force and loss. 



Naval War of 1 812 261 

shortened sail, and edged away toward the enemy, 
who came gallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed 
his colors to the mast, telling his men they should 
never be struck while he had life in his body . ' Both 
crews cheered loudly as they neared each other, 
and, at 3.15, the two brigs being on the starboard 
tack not a half pistol-shot apart, they opened fire, 
the American using the port, and the English the 
starboard, battery. Both broadsides were very 
destructive, each of the commanders falling at the 
very beginning of the action. Captain Blyth was 
struck by an 18-pound shot while he was standing 
on the quarter-deck ; it passed completely through 
his body, shattering his left arm and killing him 
on the spot. The command, thereupon, devolved 
on Lieutenant David McCreery. At almost the 
same time, his equally gallant antagonist fell. 
Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his men, 
laid hold of a gun-tackle fall to help the crew of a 
carronade run out the gun ; in doing so he raised one 
leg against the bulwark, when a canister shot struck 
his thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting a 
fearful wound. ^ In spite of the pain he refused to 
be carried below, and lay on the deck, crying out 
that the colors must never be struck. Lieutenant 
Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30, 
the Enterprise ranged ahead, rounded to on the 

^ Naval Chronicle, xxxii., p. 462. 
2 Cooper, Naval History, {., p. 259. 



262 Naval War of 1 812 

starboard tack, and raked the Boxer with the star- 
board guns. At 3 . 3 5 , the Boxer lost her main-top- 
mast and topsail yard, but her crew still kept up 
the fight bravely, with the exception of four men 
who deserted their quarters, and were afterward 
court-martialed for cowardice.' The Enterprise 



"leaass 



sJs 
&Sfff 



,J^ 



^.jjaMiaBIIOlia. ^5^iJ 




3JtS /" 



%. .-• 




s.so *^* ~^'^^sax£f 



now set her foresail and took position on the 
enemy's starboard bow, delivering raking fires; 
and at 3.45 the latter surrendered, when entirely 
unmanageable and defenceless. Lieutenant Bur- 
rows would not go below until he had received the 
sword of his adversary, when he exclaimed: " I am 
satisfied; I die contented." 

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the 
Boxer, which had been hulled repeatedly, and had 
three 18 -pound shot through her foremast, her 
topgallant forecastle almost cut away, and several 
of her guns dismounted. Three men were killed 
and seventeen wounded, four mortally. The En- 

^ Minutes of court-martial held aboard H. M. S. Surprise, 
January 8, 1814. 



Naval War of 1812 263 

terprise had been hulled by one round and many 
grape; one 18-pound ball had gone through her 
foremast, and another through her mainmast, and 
she was much cut up aloft. Two of her men were 
killed and ten wounded, two of them (her com- 
mander and Midshipman Kervin Waters) mor- 
tally. The British court-martial attributed the 
defeat of the Boxer "to a superiority in the ene- 
my's force, principally in the number of men, as 
well as to a greater degree of skill in the direction 
of her fire, and to the destructive effects of the first 
broadside." But the main element was the su- 
periority in force, the difference in loss being very 
nearly proportional to it ; both sides fought with 
equal bravery and equal skill. This fact was ap- 
preciated by the victors, for at a naval dinner given 
in New York shortly afterward, one of the toasts 
offered was: " The crew of the Boxer: enemies by 
law, but by gallantry brothers." The two com- 
manders were both buried at Portland, with all 
the honors of war. The conduct of Lieutenant 
Burrows needs no comment. He was an officer 
greatly beloved and respected in the service. 
Captain Blyth, on the other side, had not only 
shown himself on many occasions to be a man of 
distinguished personal courage, but was equally 
noted for his gentleness and humanity. He had 
been one of Captain Lawrence's pall-bearers, and 
but a month previous to his death had received a 



264 Naval War of 181 2 

public note of thanks from an American colonel, 
for an act of great kindness and courtesy.' 

The Enterprise, under Lieutenant-Commander 
Renshaw, now cruised ofif the southern coast, 
where she made several captures. One of them was 
a heavy British privateer, the Mars, of fourteen 
long 9's and 75 men, which struck after receiving 
a broadside that killed and wounded four of her 
crew. The Enterprise was chased by frigates on 
several occasions; being once forced to throw 
overboard all her guns but two, and escaping only 
by a shift in the wind. Afterward, as she was 
unfit to cruise, she was made a guardship at 
Charlestown ; for the same reason, the Boxer was 
not purchased into the service. 

On October 4th, some volunteers from the New- 
port flotilla captured, by boarding, the British 
privateer Dart,'' after a short struggle, in which 
two of the assailants were wounded and several of 
the privateersmen, including the first officer, were 
killed. 

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in 
command of the President, sailed again from Provi- 
dence, Rhode Island. On the 25th, in lat. 19° N. 
and long. 35° W., the President, during the night, 
fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the 

^ Naval Chronicle, xxxii., 466. 

^ Letter of Mr. Joseph Nicholson, October 5, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 265 

headmost fired at her, when she made off. These 
were thought to be British, but were in reaHty the 
two French 40 -gun frigates Nymphe and Meduse, 
one month out of Brest. After this little encoun- 
ter, Rodgers headed toward the Barbadoes, and 
cruised to windward of them. 

On the whole, the ocean warfare of 181 3 was de- 
cidedly in favor of the British, except during the 
first few months. The Hornet's fight with the 
Peacock was an action similar to those that took 
place in 181 2, and the cruise of Porter was unique 
in our annals, both for the audacity with which 
it was planned, and the success with which it was 
executed. Even later in the year, the Argus and 
the President made bold cruises in sight of the 
British coasts, the former working great havoc 
among the merchantmen. But by that time the 
tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. 
From the beginning of summer, the blockade was 
kept up so strictly that it was with difficulty any of 
our vessels broke through it; they were either 
chased back or captured. In the three actions 
that occurred, the British showed themselves 
markedly superior in two, and in the third the 
combatants fought equally well, the result being 
fairly decided by the fuller crew and slightly 
heavier metal of the Enterprise. The gunboats, 
to which many had looked for harbor defence. 



266 Naval War of 1 8i 2 

proved nearly useless, and were beaten off with 
ease whenever they made an attack. 

The lessons taught by all this were the usual 
ones. Lawrence's victory in the Hornet showed 
the superiority of a properly trained crew to one 
that had not been properly trained ; and his de- 
feat in the Chesapeake pointed exactly the same 
way, demonstrating in addition the folly of taking 
a raw levy out of port, and, before they have had 
the slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting 
them against skilled veterans. The victory of 
the Enterprise showed the wisdom of having the 
odds in men and metal in our favor, when our an- 
tagonist was otherwise our equal; it proved, what 
hardly needed proving, that, whenever possible, a 
ship should be so constructed as to be superior in 
force to the foes it would be likely to meet. As 
far as the capture of the Argus showed anything, 
it was the advantage of heavy metal and the abso- 
lute need that a crew should fight with pluck. 
The failure of the gunboats ought to have taught 
the lesson (though it did not) that too great econ- 
omy in providing the means of defence may prove 
very expensive in the end, and that good officers 
and men are powerless when embarked in worth- 
less vessels. A similar point was emphasized by 
the strictness of the blockade, and the great in- 
convenience it caused : namely, that we ought to 
have had ships powerful enough to break it. 



Naval War of 1 812 267 

We had certainly lost ground during this year; 
fortunately, we regained it during the next two. 

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN 

Name Guns Tonnage 

Peacock 20 477 

Boxer 14 i8r 

Highflyer 6 96 

40 754 

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN 

Name Guns Tonnage 

Chesapeake 50 1265 

Argus 20 298 

Viper 10 148 

80 17 1 1 

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED 
Name Rig Guns Tonnage Where Built Cost 

Rattlesnake Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. $18,000 

Alligator Sch'r 4 80 

Asp Sloop 3 56 • 2,600 

PRIZES MADE 

Name of Ship No. of Prizes 

President 13 

Congress 4 

Chesapeake 6 

Essex 14 

Hornet 3 

Argus 21 

Small craft 18 

79 



CHAPTER VI 
1813 

ON THE LAKES 

Ontario. — Comparison of the rival squadrons — Chauncy 
takes York and Fort George — Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's 
Harbor, but keeps command of the lake — Chauncy sails — 
Yeo's partial victory off Niagara — Indecisive action off the 
Genesee — Chauncy 's part al victory off BurHngton, which 
gives him the command of the lake — Erie. — Perry's success 
in creating a fleet — His victory — Champlain. — Loss of the 
Growler and Eagle — Summary. 

ONTARIO 

WINTER had almost completely stopped 
preparations on the American side. 
Bad weather put an end to all com- 
munication with Albany or New York, and so pre- 
vented the transit of stores, implements, etc. It 
was worse still with the men, for the cold and ex- 
posure so thinned them out that the new arrivals 
could at first barely keep the ranks filled. It was, 
moreover, exceedingly difficult to get seamen to 
come from the coast to serve on the lakes, where 
work was hard, sickness prevailed, and there was 
no chance of prize-money. The British govern- 
ment had the great advantage of being able to 

268 



Naval War of 1812 269 

move its sailors where it pleased, while in the 
American service, at that period, the men enlisted 
for particular ships, and the only way to get them 
for the lakes at all was by inducing portions of 
crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither.^ 
However, the work went on in spite of interrup- 
tions. Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, 
largely owing to the energy and capacity of the 
head builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as 
much as any naval officer in giving us an effective 
force on Ontario), the Madison was equipped, a 
small despatch sloop, the Lady of the Lake, pre- 
pared, and a large new ship, the General Pike, 28, 
begun, to mount 13 guns in each broadside and 2 
on pivots. 

Meanwhile, Sir George Prevost, the British com- 
mander in Canada, had ordered two 24-gun ships 
to be built, and they were begun; but he com- 
mitted the mistake of having one laid down in 
Kingston and the other in York, at the opposite 
ends of the lake. Earle, the Canadian commodore, 

^ Cooper, ii., 357. One of James's most comical misstate- 
ments is that on the lakes the American sailors were all 
"picked men." On p. 367, for example, in speaking of the 
battle of Lake Erie, he says: "Commodore Perry had picked 
crews to all his vessels." As a matter of fact, Perry had once 
sent in his resignation solely on account of the very poor 
quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been induced to 
withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly average excel- 
lence, but then the average American sailor was a very good 
specimen. 



2 70 Naval War of 1812 

having proved himself so incompetent, was re- 
moved ; and, in the beginning of May, Captain Sir 
James Lucas Yeo arrived, to act as commander-in- 
chief of the naval forces, together with four cap- 
tains, eight lieutenants, twenty-four midshipmen, 
and about 450 picked seamen, sent out by the 
home government especially for service on the 
Canada lakes. ^ 

The comparative force of the two fleets or 
squadrons, it is hard to estimate. I have already 
spoken of the difficulty in finding out what guns 
were mounted on any given ship at a particular 
time, and it is even more perplexing with the 
crews. A schooner would make one cruise with 
but thirty hands; on the next it would appear 
with fifty, a number of militia having volunteered 
as marines. Finding the militia rather a nuisance, 
they would be sent ashore, and on her third cruise 
the schooner would substitute half a dozen frontier 
seamen in their place. It was the same with the 
larger vessels. The Madison might at one time 
have her full complement of 200 men; a month's 
sickness would ensue, and she would sail with but 
1 50 effectives. The Pike's crew of 300 men at one 
time would shortly afterward be less by a third, in 
consequence of a draft of sailors being sent to the 
upper lakes. So it is almost impossible to be per- 
fectly accurate ; but, making a comparison of the 

^James, vi., 353. 



Naval War of 1812 



271 



various authorities, from Lieutenant Emmons to 
James, the following tables of the forces may be 
given as very nearly correct. In broadside force, 
I count every pivot gun, and half of those that 
were not on pivots. 



Name 
Pike... 



CHAUNCY S SQUADRON 

Broadside 
RiK Tonnage Crew Metal; lbs. Armament 

Ship 875 300 360 28 long 24's 



Madison. . 
Oneida. . . 
Hamilton. 



Scourge. . 
Conquest. 



Tompkins. 

Julia 

Growler. . . 
Ontario . . . 



Fair American. . 
Pert 

Asp 

Lady of the Lake 
14 



( ( 


593 


200 


364 




24 


short 


32's 


Brig 


243 


100 


172 


( 


16 


1 ( 

long 


24's 
32 


Sch'r 


112 


50 


80 


1 




<< 


24 
6's 




no 


50 


80 


1 


8 short 


32 

I2'S 










( 




long 


32 




82 


40 


50 


1 


4 




12 

6's 

32 




96 


40 


62 


] 






12 

6's 




82 


35 


44 


] 






32 

12 




81 


35 


44 


1 

i 






32 

12 

32 




53 


35 


44 






12 




53 


30 


36 


1 






24 
12 




5° 


25 


24 








24 




57 


25 


24 








24 




89 


15 


9 








9 




2576 


9S0 


1399 




112 







272 



Naval War of 181 2 



This is not materially different from James's 
account (p. 356), which gives Chauncy 114 guns, 
1 1 93 men, and 2121 tons. The Lady of the Lake, 
however, was never intended for anything but a 
despatch boat, and the Scourge and Hamilton were 
both lost before Chauncy actually came into col- 
lision with Yeo. Deducting these, in order to 
compare the two foes, Chauncy had left 1 1 vessels 
of 2265 tons, with 865 men and 92 guns throwing 
a broadside of 1230 pounds. 



YEO'S SQUADRON 



Broadside 
Name Rig Tonnage Crew Metal; lbs. Armament 



Wolfe Ship 637 220 

Royal George.. . . " 510 

Melville Brig 279 

Moira " 262 

Sydney Smith.. . Sch'r 216 

Beresford " 187 70 



200 360 



100 210 



100 153 

80 



1 long 24 
8 " 18 

•^92 -j 4 short 68 

L 10 " 32 

3 long 18 

2 short 68 
16 " 32 

2 long 18 
12 short 32 

2 long 9 
short 24 



( 2 long 12 
^'^ t 10 short 32 



87 



I long 24 
I " 9 
6 short i8's 



2091 770 1374 92 



Naval War of 1 812 273 

This differs but slightly from James, who gives 
Yeo 92 guns, throwing a broadside of 1374 pounds, 
but only 717 men. As the evidence in the court- 
martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official 
accounts (on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, 
convict him of very much underrating the force in 
men of the British on Erie and Champlain, it can 
be safely assumed that he has underestimated the 
force in men on Lake Ontario. By comparing the 
tonnage he gives to Barclay's and Downie's squad- 
rons with what it really was, we can correct his 
account of Yeo's tonnage. 

The above figures would apparently make the 
two squadrons about equal, Chauncy having 95 
men more, and throwing at a broadside 144 
pounds shot less than his antagonist. But the 
figures do not by any means show all the truth. 
The Americans greatly excelled in the number 
and calibre of their long guns. Compared thus, 
they threw at one discharge 694 pounds of long- 
gun metal' and 536 pounds of carronade metal; 
while the British only threw from their long guns 
180 pounds, and from their carronades 1194. This 
unequal distribution of metal was very much in 
favor of the Americans. Nor was this all. The 
Pike, with her fifteen long 24's in battery, was an 
overmatch for any one of the enemy's vessels, and 
bore the same relation to them that the Confiance, 
at a later date, did to Macdonough's squadron. 



VOL. I, — 18 



2 74 Naval War of 1812 

She should certainly have been a match for the 
Wolfe and Melville together, and the Madison and 
Oneida for the Royal George and Sydney Smith. In 
fact, the three heavy American vessels ought to 
have been an overmatch for the four heaviest of 
the British squadron, although these possessed the 
nominal superiority. And in ordinary cases the 
eight remaining American gun vessels would cer- 
tainly seem to be an overmatch for the two 
British schooners, but it is just here that the diffi- 
culty of comparing the forces comes in. When 
the water was very smooth and the wind light, the 
long 32's and 24's of the Americans could play 
havoc with the British schooners, at a distance 
which would render the carronades of the latter 
useless. But the latter were built for war, pos- 
sessed quarters, and were good cruisers, while 
Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, with- 
out quarters, crank, and so loaded down with 
heavy metal that whenever it blew at all hard 
they could with difficulty be kept from upsetting, 
and ceased to be capable even of defending them- 
selves. When Sir James Yeo captured two of 
them he would not let them cruise with his other 
vessels at all, but sent them back to act as gun- 
boats, in which capacity they were serving when 
recaptured ; this is a tolerable test of their value 
compared to their opponents. Another disad- 
vantage that Chauncy had to contend with, was 



Naval War of 1 812 275 

the difference in the speed of the various vessels. 
The Pike and Madison were fast, weatherly ships ; 
but the Oneida was a perfect slug, even going free, 
and could hardly be persuaded to beat to wind- 
ward at all. In this respect, Yeo was much better 
off; his six ships were regular men-of-war, with 
quarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough 
to be able to act with uniformity, and not needing 
to pay much regard to the weather. His force 
could act as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. 
Enough wind to make a good working breeze for 
his larger vessels put all his smaller ones hors de 
combat; and in weather that suited the latter, the 
former could not move about at all. When speed 
became necessary, the two ships left the brig hope- 
lessly behind, and either had to do without her, or 
else perhaps let the critical moment slip by while 
waiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners 
sailed quite as slowly; and, finally, it was found 
out that the only way to get all the vessels into 
action at once was to have one half the fleet tow the 
other half. It was certainly difficult to keep the 
command of the lake when, if it came on to blow, 
the commodore had to put into port under penalty 
of seeing a quarter of his fleet founder before his 
eyes. These conflicting considerations render it 
hard to pass judgment ; but, on the whole, it would 
seem as if Chauncy was the superior in force, for, 
even if his schooners were not counted, his three 



276 Naval War of 181 2 

square-rigged vessels were at least a match for the 
four square-rigged British vessels, and the two 
British schooners would not have counted very 
much in such a conflict. In calm weather, he was 
certainly the superior. This only solves one of the 
points in which the official letters of the two com- 
manders differ: after every meeting each one in- 
sists that he was inferior in force, that the weather 
suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away, 
and got the worst of it; all of which will be con- 
sidered farther on. 

In order to settle toward which side the balance 
of success inclined, we must remember that there 
were two things the combatants were trying to 
do, viz. : 

(i) To damage the enemy directly by capturing 
or destroying his vessels. This was the only ob- 
ject we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers, 
but on the lakes it was subordinated to — 

(2) Getting the control of the lake, by which in- 
valuable assistance could be rendered to the army. 
The most thorough way of accomplishing this, of 
course, was by destroying the enemy's squadron ; 
but it could also be done by building ships too 
powerful for him to face, or by beating him in 
some engagement which, although not destroying 
his fleet, would force him to go into port. If one 
side was stronger, then the weaker party by skilful 
manoeuvring might baffle the foe, and rest sat- 



Naval War of 1 812 277 

isfied by keeping the sovereignty of the lake dis- 
puted; for, as long as one squadron was not un- 
disputed master it could not be of much assistance 
in transporting troops, attacking forts, or other- 
wise helping the military. 

In 1813, the Americans gained the first point by 
being the first to begin operations. They were 
building a new ship, afterward the Pike, at Sack- 
ett's Harbor; the British were building two new 
ships, each about two thirds the force of the Pike, 
one at Toronto (then called York), one at Kings- 
ton. Before these were built, the two fleets were 
just on a par ; the destruction of the Pike would 
give the British the supremacy; the destruction 
of either of the British ships, provided the Pike 
were saved, would give the Americans the su- 
premacy. Both sides had already committed 
faults. The Americans had left Sackett's Harbor 
so poorly defended and garrisoned that it invited 
attack, while the British had fortified Kingston 
very strongly, but had done little for York, and, 
moreover, ought not to have divided their forces 
by building ships in different places. 

Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for 
service on April 19th, and on the 25th he made 
sail with the Madison, Lieutenant-Commander El- 
liott, floating his own broad pennant; Oneida, 
Lieutenant Woolsey; Hamilton, Lieutenant Mc- 
Pherson; Scourge, Mr. Osgood; Tompkins, Lieu- 



278 Naval War of 181 2 

tenant Brown; Conquest, Lieutenant Pettigrew; 
Growler, Mr. Mix; Julia, Mr. Trant; Asp, Lieuten- 
ant Smith; Pert, Lieutenant Adams; American, 
Lieutenant Chauncy ; Ontario, Mr. Stevens ; Lady 
of the Lake, Mr. Hinn ; and Raven, transport, hav- 
ing on board General Dearborn and 1700 troops, to 
attack York, which was garrisoned by about 700 
British regulars and Canadian militia under Major- 
General Sheaf e. The new 24-gun ship was almost 
completed, and the Gloucester lo-gun brig was in 
port ; the guns of both vessels were used in defence 
of the port. The fleet arrived before York early 
on April 27th, and the debarkation began at about 
8 A.M. The schooners beat up to the fort under a 
heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from 
their long guns; while the troops went ashore 
under the command of Brigadier- General Pike. 
The boats were blown to leeward by the strong 
east wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but 
landed the troops under cover of the grape thrown 
by the vessels. The schooners now beat up to 
within a quarter of a mile from the principal work, 
and opened heavily upon it, while at the same 
time General Pike and the main body of the troops 
on shore moved forward to the assault, using their 
bayonets only. The British regulars and Cana- 
dian militia, outnumbered three to one (including 
the American sailors), and with no very good de- 
fensive works, of course had to give way, having 



Naval War of 1 812 279 

lost heavily, especially from the fire of the vessels. 
An explosion immediately afterward killed or 
wounded 250 of the victors, including General Pike. 
The Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed, 
including midshipmen Hatfield and Thompson, 
and 8 wounded ' ; and of the army,^ 14 killed and 
32 wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killed and 
180 wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. 
The British regulars lost 130 killed and wounded, 
including 40 by the explosion ^ ; together with 50 
Canadians and Indians, making a total of 180, be- 
sides 290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship was burned, 
her guns taken away, and the Gloucester sailed 
back to Sackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many 
military and naval stores were destroyed, and 
much more shipped to the Harbor. The great 
fault that the British had committed was in letting 
the defences of so important a place remain so 
poor, and the force in it so small. It was impos- 
sible to resist very long when Pike's troops were 
landed, and the fleet in position. On the other 
hand, the Americans did their work in good style ; 
the schooners were finely handled, firing with 
great precision and completely covering the troops, 
who, in turn, were disembarked and brought into 
action very handsomely. 

^ Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1S13. 

2 James, Military Occurrences (London, icSiS) , i., p. 151, 

3 Lossing's Field-Book of the War of 181 2, p. 581. The ac- 
counts vary somewhat. 



28o Naval War of 1812 

After being detained in York a week by bad 
weather, the squadron got out, and for the next 
fortnight was employed in conveying troops and 
stores to General Dearborn. Then it was deter- 
mined to make an attack on Fort George, where 
the British General Vincent was stationed with 
from 1000 ' to 1800 2 regulars, 600 militia, and 
about 100 Indians. The American troops num- 
bered about 4500, practically under the command 
of Colonel Scott. On May 26th, Commodore 
Chauncy carefully reconnoitred the place to be 
attacked, and in the night made soundings along 
the coast, and laid buoys so as to direct the small 
vessels, who were to do the fighting. At 3 a.m. on 
the 27th, the signal was made to weigh, the heavy 
land artillery being on the Madison, and the other 
troops on the Oneida, the Lady of the Lake, and in 
batteaux, many of which had been captured at 
York. The Julia, Growler, and Ontario moved in 
and attacked a battery near the light-house, open- 
ing a cross-fire which silenced it. The troops were 
to be disembarked farther along the lake, near a 
battery of one long 24, managed by Canadian 
militia. The Conquest and Tompkins swept in 
under fire to this battery, and in ten minutes killed 
or drove off the artillerymen, who left the gun 
spiked, and then opened on the British. "The 

^ James, Military Occurrences, i., p. 151. 
^ Lossing, 596. 



Naval War of 1812 281 

American ships with their heavy discharges of 
round and grape too well succeeded in thinning 
the British ranks." ^ Meanwhile, the troop-boats, 
under Captain Perry and Colonel Scott, dashed in, 
completely covered by a heavy fire of grape directed 
point-blank at the foe by the Hamilton, Scourge, 
and Asp. "The fire from the American shipping 
committed dreadful havoc among the British, and 
rendered their efforts to oppose the landing of the 
enemy ineffectual," ^ Colonel Scott's troops, thus 
protected, made good their landing and met the 
British regulars ; but the latter were so terribly cut 
up by the tremendous discharges of grape and 
canister from the schooners that, in spite of their 
gallantry and discipline, they were obliged to re- 
treat, blowing up and abandoning the fort. One 
sailor was killed and two wounded ^ ; seventeen 
soldiers were killed and forty-five wounded * ; mak- 
ing the total American loss sixty-five. Of the 
British regulars 52 were killed, 44 wounded, and 
262 "wounded and missing," s in addition to 
about forty Canadians and Indians hors de combat 
and nearly 500 militia captured; so that in this 
very brilliant affair the assailants suffered hardly 
more than a fifth of the loss in killed and wounded 

^ James, Military Occurrences, i., p. 151. 

^ Loc. cit. 

3 Letter of Commodore Chatmcy, May 29, 18 13. 

■* Letter of General Dearborn, May 27, 18 13. 

s Letter of Brigadier-General Vincent, May 28, 1813. 



282 Naval War of 1 812 

that the assailed did; which must be attributed 
to the care with which Chauncy had reconnoitred 
the ground and prepared the attack, the excehent 
handhng of the schooners, and the exceedingly de- 
structive nature of their fire. The British bat- 
teries were very weak, and, moreover, badly 
served. Their regular troops fought excellently; 
it was impossible for them to stand against the fire 
of the schooners, which should have been engaged 
by the batteries on shore ; and they were too weak 
in numbers to permit the American army to land 
and then attack it when away from the boats. The 
Americans were greatly superior in force, and yet 
deserve very much credit for achieving their ob- 
ject so quickly, with such sHght loss to them- 
selves, and at such a heavy cost to the foe. The 
effect of the victory was most important, the Brit- 
ish evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, and 
leaving the river in complete possession of the 
Americans for the time being. This offered the 
opportunity for despatching Captain Perry up 
above the falls to take out one captured brig (the 
Caledonia) and four purchased schooners, which had 
been lying in the river, unable to get past the Brit- 
ish batteries into Lake Erie. These five vessels 
were now carried into that lake, being tracked up 
against the current by oxen, to become a most im- 
portant addition to the American force upon it. 
While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at 



Naval War of 1 812 2815 



o 



the west end of the lake, the Wolfe, 24, was 
launched and equipped at Kingston, making the 
British force on the lake superior to that of the 
Americans. Immediately, Sir George Prevost and 
Sir James Lucas Yeo, the commanders-in-chief of 
the land and water forces in the Canadas, decided 
to strike a blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy 
the General Pike, 28, thus securing to themselves 
the superiority for the rest of the season. Ac- 
cordingly, they embarked on May 27th, in the 
Wolfe, Royal George, Moira, Prince Regent, Simco, 
and Seneca, with a large number of gunboats, 
barges, and batteaux; and on the next day saw 
and attacked a brigade of nineteen boats trans- 
porting troops to Sackett's Harbor, under com- 
mand of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelve boats 
were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in them 
captured; but Lieutenant Aspinwall and 100 men 
succeeded in reaching the Harbor, bringing up the 
total number of regulars there to 500 men. General 
Brown having been summoned to take the chief 
command. About 400 militia also came in, but 
were of no earthly service. There were, however, 
200 xMbany volunteers, under Colonel J\Iills, who 
could be relied on. The defences were miserably 
inadequate, consisting of a battery of one long 
gun, and a block-house. 

On the 29th, Sir George Prevost and 800 regu- 
lars landed, being covered by the gunboats under 



284 Naval War of 181 2 

Sir James Lucas Yeo. The American militia fled 
at once, but the regulars and volunteers held their 
ground in and around the block-house. "At this 
point the further energies of the [British] troops 
became unavailing. The [American] block-house 
and stockade could not be carried by assault nor 
reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided 
with them; the fire of the gunboats proved in- 
sufficient to attain that end; light and adverse 
winds continued, and our larger vessels were still 
far off." ^ The British re-embarked precipitately. 
The American loss amounted to 23 killed and 114 
wounded ; that of the British to 5 2 killed and 211 
wounded,^ most of the latter being taken prisoners. 
During the fight some of the frightened Americans 
set fire to the store-houses, the Pike and Gloucester; 
the former were consumed, but the flames were 
extinguished before they did any damage to either 
of the vessels. This attack differed especially 
from those on Fort George and York, in that the 
attacking force was relatively much weaker ; still, 
it ought to have been successful. But Sir George 
could not compare as a leader with Colonel Scott 
or General Pike ; and Sir James did not handle the 
gunboats by any means as well as the Americans 
did their schooners in similar attacks. The ad- 
mirers of Sir James lay the blame on Sir George, 

^ Letter of Adjutant-General Baynes, May 30, 18 13. 
^ James, Military Occurrences, p. 173. 



Naval War of 1812 285 

and vice versa; but, in reality, neither seems to have 
done particularly well. At any rate, the affair 
was the reverse of creditable to the British. 

The British squadron returned to Kingston, and 
Chauncy, having heard that they were out, came 
down the lake and went into port about June 2d. 
So far the Americans had had all the success, and 
had controlled the lake; but now Yeo's force was 
too formidable to be encountered until the Pike 
was built, and the supremacy passed undisputed 
into his hands, while Chaimcy lay in Sackett's 
Harbor. Of course, with the Pike soon to be 
built, Yeo's uncontested superiority could be of 
but short duration; but he used his time most 
actively. He sailed from Kingston on the 3d of 
June, to co-operate with the British army at the 
head of the lake, and intercept all supplies going 
to the Americans. On the 8th, he discovered a 
small camp of the latter near Forty Mile Creek, 
and attacked it with the Beresford, Sydney Smith, 
and gunboats, obliging the Americans to leave 
their camp, while their equipages, provisions, 
stores, and batteaux fell into the hands of the 
British, whose troops occupied the post, thus 
assisting in the series of engagements which ended 
in the humiliating repulse of General Wilkin- 
son's expedition into Canada. On the 13th, two 
schooners and some boats bringing supplies to the ' 
Americans were captured, and, on the i6th, a depot 



286 Naval War of 1812 

of provisions at the Genesee River shared the 
same fate. On the 19th, a party of British soldiers 
were landed by the fleet at Great Sodas, and took 
off 600 barrels of flour. Yeo then returned to 
Kingston, where he anchored on the 27th, having 
done good service in assisting the land forces.' As 
a small compensation, on the i8th of the same 
month, the Lady of the Lake, Lieutenant Wolcott 
Chauncy, captured off Presque Isle the British 
schooner Lady Murray, containing i ensign, 15 
soldiers, and 6 sailors, together with stores and 
ammunition. 

During the early part of July, neither squadron 
put out in force; although on the first of the 
month Commodore Yeo made an abortive attempt 
to surprise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it 
when it was discovered. IMeanwhile, the Ameri- 
cans were building a new schooner, the Sylph, and 
the formidable corvette Pike was made ready to 
sail by July 21st. On the same day, the entire 
American squadron, or fleet, sailed up to the head 
of the lake and reached Niagara on the 27th. 
Here Colonel Scott and some of his regulars were 
embarked, and on the 30th a descent was made 
upon York, where 11 transports were destroyed, 

* Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29, 
1813. 

2 Letter of Lieutenant Wolcott Chauncy to Commodore 
Chauncy, Jtme 18, 1813. 



Naval War of 1 812 287 

5 cannon^ a quantity of flour, and some ammuni- 
tion carried off, and the barracks burned On the 
3d of August, the troops were disembarked at the 
Niagara, and 1 1 1 officers and men were sent up to 
join Perry on Lake Erie. As this left the squad- 
ron much deranged, 150 mihtia were subsequently 
lent it by General Boyd, but they proved of no 
assistance (beyond swelling the number of men 
Yeo captured in the Growler and Julia from 70 
individuals to 80), and were again landed. 

Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from 
Kingston on August 2d, and, on the 7th, the two 
fleets, for the first time, came in sight of one 
another, the Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, 
the British six miles to windward, in the W.N.W. 
Chauncy's squadron contained one corvette, one 
ship-sloop, one brig-sloop, and ten schooners, 
manned by about 965 men, and throwing at a 
broadside 1390 lbs. of shot, nearly 800 of which 
were from long guns. Yeo's included two ship- 
sloops, two brig-sloops, and two schooners, manned 
by 770 men, and throwing at a broadside 1374 lbs., 
but 180 being from long gtins. But Yeo's vessels 
were all built with bulwarks, while ten of Chauncy's 
had none; and, moreover, his vessels could all 
sail and manoeuvre together, while, as already re- 
marked, one half of the American fleet spent a 
large part of its time towing the other half. The 
Pike would, at ordinary range, be a match for the 



288 Naval War of 1 812 

Wolfe and Melville together ; yet, in actual weight 
of metal she threw less than the former ship alone. 
In calm weather, the long guns of the American 
schooners gave them a great advantage ; in rough 
weather, they could not be used at all. Still, on 
the whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo was 
advancing to attack a superior fleet. 

All through the day of the 7th, the wind blew 
light and variable, and the two squadrons went 
through a series of manoeuvres, nominally to 
bring on an action. As each side flatly contra- 
dicts the other, it is hard to tell precisely what the 
manoeuvres were; each captain says the other 
avoided him, and that he made all sail in chase. 
At any rate, it was just the weather for Chauncy 
to engage in. 

That night the wind came out squally; and 
about I A.M. on the morning of the 8th, a heavy 
gust struck the Hamilton and Scourge, forcing 
them to careen over till the heavy guns broke 
loose, and they foundered, but sixteen men escap- 
ing; which accident did not open a particularly 
cheerful prospect to the remainder of the schoon- 
ers. Chauncy's force was, by this accident, re- 
duced to a numerical equality with Yeo's, having, 
perhaps, a hundred more men,' and throwing 144 

^ This estimate as to men is a mere balancing of proba- 
bilities. If James underestimates the British force on On- 
tario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain, Yeo had as 



Naval War of 1 812 289 

lbs. less shot at a broadside. All through the two 
succeeding days the same manoeuvring went on; 
the question as to which avoided the fight is sim- 
ply one of veracity between the two commanders, 
and, of course, each side, to the end of time, will 
believe its own leader. But it is not of the least 
consequence, as neither accomplished anything. 

On the loth, the same tedious evolutions were 
continued, but at 7 p.m. the two squadrons were 
tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward, the 
breeze being fresh from the S.W. Commodore 
Chauncy formed his force in two lines on the port 
tack, while Commodore Yeo approached from be- 
hind and to windward, in single column, on the 
same tack. Commodore Chauncy' s weather line 
was formed of the Julia, Growler, Pert, Asp, On- 
tario, and American, in that order; and the lee 
line of the Pike, Oneida, Madison, Tompkins, and 
Conquest. Chauncy formed his weather line of 
the smaller vessels, directing them, when the 
British should engage, to edge away and form to 
leeward of the second line, expecting that Sir 
James would fellow them down. At 11 the 

many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in one of his letters 
(preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval 
Archives) , says : "I enclose the muster-rolls of all my ships," 
but I have not been able to find them, and in any event the 
complements were continually changing completely. The 
point is not important, as each side certainly had plenty of 
men on this occasion. 

VOL. I. — 19 




~ ci3 1; u « 

a a " tn ^ rt 

t (U o a — 






u 






s 



v 






v 



^"^ 2c: etc 

? m o rt « O 



I 



290 



Naval War of 1 812 291 

weather line opened fire at very long range; at 
1 1 . 1 5 it was returned, and the action became gen- 
eral and harmless; at 11.30, the weather line bore 
up and passed to leeward, except the Julia and 
Growler, which tacked. The British ships kept 
their luff and cut off the two that had tacked; 
while Commodore Chauncy's lee line " edged away 
two points, to lead the enemy down, not only to 
engage him to more advantage, but to lead him 
from the Julia and Growler." ' Of course, the 
enemy did not come down, and the Julia and 
Growler were not saved. Yeo kept on till he had 
cut off the two schooners, fired an ineffectual 
broadside at the other ships, and tacked after the 
Growler and Julia. Then, when too late, Chauncy 
tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners, 
meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they 
were overtaken, and, after making a fruitless 
effort to run the gauntlet through the enemy's 
squadron by putting before the wind, were cap- 
tured. Yeo's account is simple: "Came within 
gunshot of Pike and Madison, when they imme- 
diately bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, and 
made all sail for Niagara, leaving two of their 
schooners astern, which we captured." ^ The 
British had acted faultlessly, and the honor and 
profit gained by the encounter rested entirely 

^ Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy, August 13, 1813. 
2 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, August 10, 18 13. 



292 Naval War of 181 2 

with them. On the contrary, neither Chauncy 
nor his subordinates showed to advantage. 

Cooper says that the hne of battle was "singu- 
larly well adapted to draw the enemy down," and 
"admirable for its advantages and ingenuity." 
In the first place, it is an open question whether 
the enemy needed drawing down ; on this occasion 
he advanced boldly enough. The formation may 
have been ingenious, but it was the reverse of 
advantageous. It would have been far better to 
have had the strongest vessels to windward, and 
the schooners, with their long guns, to leeward, 
where they would not be exposed to capture by 
any accident happening to them. Moreover, it 
does not speak well for the discipline of the fleet 
that two commanders should have directly dis- 
obeyed orders. And when the two schooners did 
tack, and it was evident that Sir James would cut 
them off, it was an extraordinary proceeding for 
Chauncy to "edge away two points ... to 
lead the enemy from the Growler and Julia.'' It 
is certainly a novel principle, that if part of a 
force is surrounded, the true way to rescue it is to 
run away with the balance, in hopes that the 
enemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once. 
Sir James would have been placed between two 
fires, and it would have been impossible for him 
to capture the schooners. As it was, the British 
commander had attacked a superior force in 



Naval War of 1 812 293 

weather that just suited it, and yet had cap- 
tured two of its vessels without suffering any in- 
jury beyond a few shot holes in the sails. The 
action, however, was in no way decisive. All next 
day, the nth, the fleets were in sight of one 
another, the British to windward, but neither 
attempted to renew the engagement. The wind 
grew heavier, and the villainous little American 
schooners showed such strong tendencies to upset, 
that two had to run into Niagara Bay to anchor. 
With the rest, Chauncy ran down the lake to Sack- 
ett's Harbor, which he reached on the 13th, pro- 
visioned his squadron for five weeks, and that 
same evening proceeded up the lake again. 

The advantage in this action had been entirely 
with the British, but it is simply nonsense to say, 
as one British historian does, that "on Lake On- 
tario, therefore, we at last secured a decisive pre- 
dominance, which we maintained until the end 
of the war." ^ This "decisive" battle left the 
Americans just as much in command of the lake 
as the British; and even this very questionable 
" predominance" lasted but six weeks, after which 
the British squadron was blockaded in port most 

^ History of the British Navy, by Charles Duke Yonge (Lon- 
don, 1866), iii., p. 24. It is apparently not a work of any 
authority, but I quote it as showing probably the general feel- 
ing of British writers about the action and its results, which 
can only proceed from extreme partisanship and ignorance of 
the subject. 



294 Naval War of 1 812 

of the time. The action has a parallel in that 
fought on the 2 2d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert 
Calder's fleet of fifteen sail of the line against the 
Franco-Spanish fleet of twenty sail of the line, 
under M. Villeneuve.' The two fleets engaged in a 
fog, and the English captured two ships, when both 
sides drew off, and remained in sight of each other 
the next day without either renewing the action, 
"A victory, therefore, it was that Sir Robert Cal- 
der had gained, but not a 'decisive' nor a 'bril- 
liant' victory." ^ This is exactly the criticism 
that should be passed on Sir James Lucas Yeo's 
action of the loth of August. 

From the 13th of August to the loth of Septem- 
ber both fleets were on the lake most of the time, 
each commodore stoutly maintaining that he was 
chasing the other; and each expressing in his 
letters his surprise and disgust that his opponent 
should be afraid of meeting him, " though so much 
superior in force." The facts are, of course, diffi- 
cult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that 
Yeo was determined to engage in heavy, and 
Chauncy in light, weather ; and that the party to 

^ Batailles Navales de la France, par O. Troude, iii., 352. It 
seems rather ridiculous to compare these lake actions, fought 
between small flotillas, with the gigantic contests which the 
huge fleets of Europe waged in contending for the supremacy 
of the ocean; but the difference is one of degree and not of 
kind, and they serve well enough for purposes of illustration 
or comparison. ^ James's Naval History, iv., 14. 



Naval War of 1 812 295 

leeward generally made off. The Americans had 
been reinforced by the Sylph schooner, of 300 tons 
and 70 men, carrying four long 32's on pivots, and 
six long 6's. Theoretically, her armament would 
make her formidable; but practically, her guns 
were so crowded as to be of little use, and the next 
year she was converted into a brig, mounting 24- 
pound carronades. 

On the I ith of September, a partial engagement, 
at very long range in light weather, occurred near 
the mouth of the Genesee River; the Americans 
suffered no loss whatever, while the British had 
one midshipman and three seamen killed and 
seven wounded, and afterward ran into Amherst 
Bay. One of their brigs, the Melville, received a 
shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, 
the guns had to be run in on one side and out on 
the other. Chauncy describes it as a running 
fight of three and a half hours, the enemy then 
escaping into Amherst Bay.' James (p. 38) says 
that " at sunset a breeze sprang up from the west- 
ward, when Sir James steered for the American 
fleet; but the American commodore avoided a 
close action, and thus the affair ended." This is 
a good sample of James's trustworthiness; his 
account is supposed to be taken from Commodore 
Yeo's letter,^ which says: "At sunset a breeze 

^ Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, September 13, 1813. 
^ Letter to Admiral Warren, September 12, 18 13. 



296 Naval War of 181 2 

sprang up from the westward, when I steered for 
the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy 
could not keep the weather-gage, but be obliged 
to meet us on equal terms. This, however, he 
carefully avoided doing." In other words, Yeo 
did not steer for, but away from Chauncy. Both 
sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran 
away, and it is only a question as to whether 
Chauncy followed him or not. Of course, in such 
light weather, Chauncy' s long guns gave him a 
great advantage. He had present ten vessels, the 
Pike, Madison, Oneida, Sylph, Tompkins, Con- 
quest, Ontario, Pert, American, and Asp, throwing 
1 288 lbs. of shot, with a total of 98 guns. Yeo had 
92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1374 lbs. Never- 
theless, Chauncy told but part of the truth in writ- 
ing as he did: "I was much disappointed at Sir 
James refusing to fight me, as he was so much 
superior in point of force, both in guns and men, 
having upward of 20 guns more than we have, and 
heaves a greater weight of shot." His inferiority 
in long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantage in 
such a very light wind ; but in his letter he makes 
a marvellous admission of how little able he was 
to make good use of even what he had. He says : 
" I found it impossible to bring them to close ac- 
tion. We remained in this mortifying situation 
five hours, having only six guns in all the squad- 
ron that would reach the enemy (not a carronade 



Naval War of 1 812 297 

being fired)." Now, according to James himself 
(Naval Occurrences, p. 297), he had in his squad- 
ron two long 24's, thirteen long i8's, two long 12's, 
and three long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at 
very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof 
of culpable incompetency on his part that he did 
not think of doing what Elliott and Perry did in 
similar circumstances on Lake Erie — substitute 
all his long guns for some of the carronades on 
the engaged side. Chauncy could place in broad- 
side seven long 32's, eighteen long 24's, four long 
12's, eight long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long 
guns, throwing 752 lbs. of shot, to Yeo's 20 
long guns, throwing ^t,7^ lbs. of shot. The odds 
were thus more than two to one against the Brit- 
ish in any case; and their commander's lack of 
resource made them still greater. But it proved 
a mere skirmish, with no decisive results. 

The two squadrons did not come in contact 
again till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Ameri- 
cans had the weather-gage, the wind being fresh 
from the east. Yeo tacked and stretched far out 
into the lake, while Chauncy steered directly for 
his centre. When the squadrons were still a 
league apart, the British formed on the port tack, 
with their heavy vessels ahead; the Americans 
got on the same tack and edged down toward 
them, the Pike ahead, towing the Asp; the Tomp- 
kins, under Lieutenant Bolton Finch, next; the 



298 Naval War of 181 2 

Madison next, being much retarded by having a 
schooner in tow; then the Sylph, with another 
schooner in tow, the Oneida, and the two other 
schooners. The British, fearing their sternmost 
vessels would be cut off, at 12.10 came round on 

ASP T 

^^ ^^ PIKE 




ROYAL CiQRGE 






4 



the starboard tack, beginning with the Wolfe, 
Commodore Yeo, and Royal George, Captain Wil- 
liam Howe Mulcaster, which composed the van of 
the line. They opened with their starboard guns 
as soon as they came round. When the Pike was 
a-beam of the Wolfe, which was past the centre of 



Naval War of 1 812 299 

the British Hne, the Americans bore up in succes- 
sion for their centre. 

The Madison was far back, and so was the Sylph, 
neither having cast off their tows; so the whole 
brunt of the action fell on the Pike, Asp, and 
Tompkins. The latter kept up a most gallant and 
spirited fire till her foremast was shot away. But 
already the Pike had shot away the Wolfe's main- 
topmast and main-yard, and inflicted so heavy a 
loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not very 
heroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all 
the canvas he could on her forward spars, and she 
ran completely past all her own vessels, who, of 
course, crowded sail after her. The retreat of the 
commodore was most ably covered by the Royal 
George, under Captain Mulcaster, who was un- 
questionably the best British officer on the lake. 
He luffed up across the commodore's stern, and 
delivered broadsides in a manner that won the 
admiration even of his foes. The Madison and 
Sylph, having the schooners in tow, could not 
overtake the British ships, though the Sylph 
opened a distant fire ; the Pike kept on after them, 
but did not cast off the Asp, and so did not gain; 
and at 3.15 the pursuit was relinquished,' when 
the enemy were running into the entirely unde- 
fended port of Burlington Bay, whence escape 
would have been impossible. The Tompkins had 

I Letter of Commodore Chauncy, September 28, 1813. 



300 Naval War of 1 812 

lost her foremast, and the Pike her fore-topgallant- 
mast, with her bowsprit and mainmast wounded ; 
and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, 
almost all by the guns of the Royal George. These 
were the only injuries occasioned by the enemy's 
fire, but the Pike's starboard bow-chaser burst, 
killing or wounding twenty-two men, besides 
blowing up the topgallant forecastle, so that the 
bow pivot-gun could not be used. Among the 
British ships, the Wolfe lost her main-topmast, 
mizzen-topmast, and main-yard; and the Royal 
George her fore-topmast; both suffered a heavy 
loss in killed and wounded, according to the report 
of the British officers captured in the transports 
a few days afterward. 

As already mentioned, the British authorities 
no longer published accounts of their defeats, so 
Commodore Yeo's report on the action was not 
made public. Brenton merely alludes to it as 
follows (vol. ii., p. 503) : "The action of the 28th 
of September, 18 13, in which Sir James Yeo in the 
Wolfe had his main- and mizzen-topmasts shot 
away, and was obliged to put before the wind, 
gave Mulcaster an opportunity of displaying a 
trait of valor and seamanship which elicited the 
admiration of friends and foes, when he gallantly 
placed himself between his disabled commo- 
dore and a superior enemy." James speaks in 
the vaguest terms. He first says: "Commodore 



Naval War of 1 812 301 

Chauncy, having the weather-gage, kept his fav- 
orite distance," which he did because Commodore 
Yeo fled so fast that he could not be overtaken; 
then James mentions the injuries the Wolfe re- 
ceived, and says that "it was these and not, as 
Mr. Clark says, ' a manoeuvre of the commodore's' 
that threw the British in confusion." In other 
words, it was the commodore's shot and not his 
manoeuvring that threw the British into confu- 
sion — a very futile distinction. Next he says that 
"Commodore Chauncy would not venture within 
carronade range," whereas he was within carro- 
nade range of the Wolfe and Royal George, but the 
latter did not wait for the Madison and Oneida to 
get within range with their carronades. The rest 
of his article is taken up with exposing the ab- 
surdities of some of the American writings, mis- 
called histories, which appeared at the close of the 
war. His criticisms on these are very just, but 
afford a funny instance of the pot calling the 
kettle black. This much is clear, that the British 
were beaten and forced to flee, when but part of 
the American force was engaged. But in good 
weather the American force was so superior that 
being beaten would have been no disgrace to Yeo, 
had it not been for the claims advanced both by 
himself and his friends, that on the whole he was 
victorious over Chauncy. The Wolfe made any- 
thing but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the 



302 Naval War of 1812 

work to the gallant ^lulcaster, in the Royal George, 
who shares with Lieutenant Finch of the Tomp- 
kins most of the glory of the day. The battle, if 
such it may be called, completely established 
Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of the 
remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston. 
So Chauncy gained a victory which established 
his control over the lakes; and, moreover, he 
gained it by fighting in succession, almost single- 
handed, the two heaviest ships of the enemy. But 
gaining the victory was only what should have 
been expected from a superior force. The ques- 
tion is. Did Chauncy use his force to the best 
advantage? And it cannot be said that he did. 
When the enemy bore up it was a great mistake 
not to cast off the schooners which were being 
towed. They were small craft, not of much use 
in the fight, and they entirely prevented the 
Madison from taking any part in the contest, and 
kept the Sylph at a great distance ; and, by keep- 
ing the Asp in tow, the Pike, which sailed faster 
than any of Yeo's ships, was distanced by them. 
Had she left the Asp behind and run in to engage 
the Royal George, she could have mastered, or, at 
any rate disabled, her ; and had the swift Madison 
cast off her tow she could also have taken an 
effective part in the engagement. If the Pike 
could put the British to flight almost single- 
handed, how much more could she not have done 



Naval War of 1 812 303 

when assisted by the Madison and Oneida f The 
cardinal error, however, was made in discontinu- 
ing the chase. The British were in an almost 
open roadstead, from which they could not pos- 
sibly escape. Commodore Chauncy was afraid 
that the wind would come up to blow a gale, and 
both fleets would be thrown ashore; and, more- 
over, he expected to be able to keep a watch over 
the enemy, and to attack him at a more suitable 
time. But he utterly failed in this last ; and had 
the American squadron cast off their tows and 
gone boldly in, they certainly ought to have been 
able to destroy or capture the entire British force 
before a gale could blow up. Chauncy would have 
done well to keep in mind the old adage, so pe- 
culiarly applicable to naval affairs, " L'audace ! 
tou jours l'audace! et encore l'audace!" Whether 
the fault was his or that of his subordinates, it is 
certain that while the victory of the 28th of Sep- 
tember definitely settled the supremacy of the 
lake in favor of the Americans, yet this victory 
was by no means so decided as it should have 
been, taking into account his superiority in force 
and advantage in position, and the somewhat 
spiritless conduct of his foe. 

Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted 
till the evening of the 31st. There was no longer 
any apprehension of molestation from the British, 
so the troop transports were sent down the lake 



304 Naval War of 1812 

by themselves, while the squadron remained to 
watch Yeo. On October 2d he was chased, but 
escaped by his better sailing ; and next day false 
information induced Chauncy to think Yeo had 
eluded him and passed down the lake, and he 
accordingly made sail in the direction of his sup- 
posed flight. On the 5th, at 3 p.m., while near the 
False Ducks, seven vessels were made out ahead, 
which proved to be British gunboats, engaged 
in transporting troops. All sail was made after 
them; one was burned, another escaped, and five 
were captured, the Mary, Dnimmond, Lady Gore, 
Confiance, and Hamilton,^ — the two latter being 
the rechristened Julia and Growler. Each gun 
vessel had from one to three guns, and they had 
aboard in all 264 men, including seven naval 
(three royal and four provincial) and ten military 
officers. These prisoners stated that in the action 
of the 28th the Wolfe and Royal George had lost 
very heavily. 

After this, Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded 
there by Chauncy for most of the time; on No- 
vember loth he came out and was at once chased 
back into port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for 
the rest of the season entirely undisturbed. Ac- 
cordingly, Chauncy was able to convert his small 
schooners into transports. On the 17th, these 
transports were used to convey iioo men of the 

^ Letter of Commodore Chauncy, October 8, 1S13. 



Naval War of 1812 305 

army of General Harrison from the mouth of 
the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy 
blockaded Yeo in Kingston. The duty of trans- 
porting troops and stores went on until the 27th, 
when everything had been accomplished; and a 
day or two afterward navigation closed. 

As between the Americans and British, the suc- 
cess of the season was greatly in favor of the 
former. They had uncontested control over the 
lake from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sep- 
tember 28th to November 29th, in all, 107 days; 
while their foes only held it from June 3d to July 
2ist, or for 48 days; and from that date to Sep- 
tember 28th, for 69 days, the two sides were con- 
tending for the mastery. York and Fort George 
had been taken, while the attack on Sackett's 
Harbor was repulsed. The Americans lost but 
two schooners, both of which were recaptured; 
while the British had one 24-gun ship, nearly 
ready for launching, destroyed, and one lo-gun 
brig taken, and the loss inflicted upon each other 
in transports, gunboats, store-houses, stores, etc., 
was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy' s 
fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the 
army for over twice the length of time Yeo's could 
(107 days to 48). 

It is more difficult to decide between the respec- 
tive merits of the two commanders. We had 
shown so much more energy than the Anglo- 



3o6 Naval War of 1812 

Canadians, that at the beginning of the year we 
had overtaken them in the building race, and the 
two fleets were about equally formidable. The 
Madison and Oneida were not quite a match for 
the Royal George and Sydney Smith (opposing 
twelve 3 2 -pound and eight 24-pound carronades 
to two long i8's, one long 12, one 68-pound and 
thirteen 3 2 -pound carronades); and our ten gun 
schooners would hardly be considered very much 
of an overmatch for the Melville, Moira, and 
Beresford. Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and 
energetic as Barclay or Mulcaster he would cer- 
tainly not have permitted the Americans, when 
the forces were so equal, to hold uncontested sway 
over the lake, and, by reducing Fort George, to 
cause disaster to the British land forces. It would 
certainly have been better to risk a battle with 
equal forces than to wait till each fleet received 
an additional ship, which rendered Chauncy's 
squadron the superior by just about the superi- 
ority of the Pike to the Wolfe. Again, Yeo did 
not do particularly well in the repulse before 
Sackett's Harbor; in the skirmish off Genesee 
River, he showed a marked lack of resource ; and 
in the action of the 28th of September (popularly 
called the " Burlington Races," from the celerity 
of his retreat), he evinced an amount of caution 
that verged toward timidity, in allowing the en- 
tire brunt of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in 



Naval War of 1812 307 

the Royal George, a weaker ship than the Wolfe. 
On the other hand, he gave able co-operation to 
the army while he possessed control of the lake; 
he made a most gallant and successful attack on a 
superior force on the loth of August; and for six 
weeks subsequently, by skilful manoeuvring, he 
prevented this same superior force from acquiring 
the uncontested mastery. It was no disgrace to 
be subsequently blockaded; but it is very ludi- 
crous in his admirers to think that he came out 
first best. 

Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assist- 
ance to the army all the while that he had control 
of the water; his attacks on York and Fort 
George were managed with consummate skill and 
success, and on the 28th of September he practi- 
cally defeated the opposing force with his own ship 
alone. Nevertheless, he can by no means be said 
to have done the best he could with the materials 
he had. His stronger fleet was kept two months 
in check by a weaker British fleet. When he first 
encountered the foe, on August loth, he ought to 
have inflicted such a check upon him as would at 
least have confined him to port and given the 
Americans immediate superiority on the lake; 
instead of which he suffered a mortifying, although 
not at all disastrous, defeat, which allowed the 
British to contest the supremacy with him for 
six weeks longer. On the 28th of September, 



3o8 Naval War of 1 812 

when he only gained a rather barren victory, it 
was nothing but excessive caution that prevented 
him from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry 
on that day commanded the American fleet, there 
would have been hardly a British ship left on 
Ontario. Chauncy was an average commander; 
and the balance of success inclined to the side of 
the Americans only because they showed greater 
energy and skill in ship-building, the crews and 
commanders on both sides being very nearly 
equal. 

LAKE ERIE 

Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed com- 
mand of Erie and the upper lakes, acting under 
Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy, he at 
once began creating a naval force which should be 
able to contend successfully with the foe. As 
already said, the latter in the beginning had ex- 
clusive control of Lake Erie; but the Americans 
had captured the Caledonia, brig, and purchased 
three schooners, afterward named the Somers, 
Tigress, and Ohio; and a sloop, the Trippe. 
These at first were blockaded in the Niagara, but 
after the fall of Fort George and retreat of the 
British forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get 
them out, tracking them up against the current 
by the most arduous labor. They ran up to 
Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two 20-gun 



Naval War of 1 812 309 

brigs were being constnicted under the directions 
of tlie indefatigable captain. Three other schoon- 
ers, the Ariel, Scorpion, and Porcupine, were also 
built. 

The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but 
had a bar on which there was less than seven feet 
of water. Hitherto this had prevented the enemy 
from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs 
from getting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay- 
had been appointed commander of the British 
forces on Lake Erie ; and he was having built at 
Amherstburg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile, he block- 
aded Perry's force, and as the brigs could not 
cross the bar with their guns in, or except in 
smooth water, they of course could not do so in 
his presence. He kept a close blockade for some 
time; but on the 2d of August he disappeared. 
Perry at once hurried foi-^^ard everything; and 
on the 4th, at 2 p.m., one brig, the Lawrence, was 
towed to that point of the bar where the water was 
deepest. Her guns were whipped out and landed 
on the beach, and the brig got over the bar by a 
hastily improvised "camel." 

"Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, 
were hauled alongside, and the work of hfting the 
brig proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of mas- 
sive timber had been run through the forward and 
after ports, and when the scows were sunk to the 
water's edge, the ends of the timbers were blocked 



3IO Naval War of 1812 

up, supported by these floating foundations. The 
plugs were now put in the scows, and the wlter 
was pumped out of them. By this process the 
brig was Hfted quite two feet, though when she 
was got on the bar it was found that she still drew 
too much water. It became necessary, in conse- 
quence, to cover up everything, sink the scows 
anew, and block up the timbers afresh. This duty 
occupied the whole night." ' 

Just as the Lawrence had passed the bar, at 8 
A.M. on the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too 
late ; Captain Barclay exchanged a few shots with 
the schooners and then drew off. The Niagara 
crossed without difficulty. There were still not 
enough men to man the vessels, but a draft arrived 
from Lake Ontario, and many of the frontiersmen 
volunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board. 
The squadron sailed on the i8th in pursuit of the 
enemy, whose ship was now ready. After cruis- 
ing about some time, the Ohio was sent down the 
lake, and the other ships went into Put-in Bay. 
On the 9th of September, Captain Barclay put out 
from Amherstburg, being so short of provisions 
that he felt compelled to risk an action with the 
superior force opposed. On the loth of Septem- 
ber, his squadron was discovered from the mast- 
head of the Lawrence in the northwest. Before 
going into details of the action we will examine the 

^ Cooper, ii., 389. Perry's letter of August 5th is very brief. 



Naval War of 1 8 1 2 311 

force of the two squadrons, as the accounts vary 
considerably. 

The tonnage of the British ships, as already 
stated, we know exactly, they having been all 
carefully appraised and measured by the builder, 
Mr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains. We 
also know the dimensions of the American ships. 
The Lawrence and Niagara measured 480 tons 
apiece. The Caledonia, brig, was about the size 
of the Hunter, or 180 tons. The Tigress, Soniers, 
and Scorpion were subsequently captured by the 
foe and were then said to measure, respectively, 
96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were 
larger than similar boats on Lake Ontario. The 
Ariel was about the size of the Hamilton; the 
Porcupine and Trippe about the size of the Asp 
and Pert. As for the guns. Captain Barclay, in 
his letter, gives a complete account of those on 
board his squadron. He has also given a com- 
plete account of the American guns, which is most 
accurate, and, if anything, underestimates them. 
At least, Emmons, in his History, gives the Trippe 
a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 
24; and Lossing, in his Field-Book, says (but I do 
not know on what authority) that the Caledonia 
had three long 24's, while Barclay gives her two long 
24's and one 32-pound carronade; and that the 
Soniers had two long 32's, while Barclay gives her 
one long 32 and one 24-pound carronade. I shall 



312 Naval War of 1812 

take Barclay's account, which corresponds with 
that of Emmons; the only difference being that 
Emmons puts a 24-pounder on the Scorpion and a 
32 on the Trtppe, while Barclay reverses this. I 
shall also follow Emmons in giving the Scorpion a 
3 2 -pound carronade instead of a 24. 

It is more difficult to give the strength of the 
respective crews. James says the Americans had 
580, all "picked men." They were just as much 
picked men as Barclay's were, and no more; that 
is, the ships had "scratch" crews. Lieutenant 
Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossing says 
he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names." In 
vol. xiv,, p. 566, of the American State Papers, is 
a list of the prize-monies owing to each man (or 
to the survivors of the killed), which gives a grand 
total of 532 men, including 136 on the Laivrence 
and 155 on the Niagara, 45 of whom were volun- 
teers — frontiersmen. Deducting these, we get 487 
men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons's 
490. Possibly, Lieutenant Emmons did not in- 
clude these volunteers; and it may be that some 
of the men whose names were down on the prize- 
list had been so sick that they were left on shore. 
Thus, Lieutenant Yamall testified before a Court 
of Inquiry, in 181 5, that there were but 131 men 
and boys of every description on board the Law- 
rence in the action ; and the Niagara was said to 
have had but 140. Lieutenant Yamall also said 





4^1^*1^ 



■ pia.u.n 




Naval War of 1 812 313 

that "but 103 men on board the Lawrence were fit 
for duty"; as Captain Perry, in his letter, said 
that 31 were unfit for duty, this would make a 
total of 134. So I shall follow the prize-money 
list; at any rate, the difference in number is 
so slight as to be immaterial. Of the 532 men 
whose names the list gives, 45 were volunteers, or 
landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabi- 
tants ; 158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know 
which, as the list gives marines, soldiers, and 
privates, and it is impossible to tell which of the 
two former heads include the last), and 329 were 
officers, seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and 
supernumeraries. Of the total number, there 
were on the day of action, according to Perry's 
report, 116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on 
board the Lawrence, 28 on board the Niagara, and 
57 on the small vessels. 

All the later American writers put the number 
of men in Barclay's fleet precisely at " 502," but I 
have not been able to find out the original author- 
ity. James {Naval Occurrences, p. 289) says the 
British had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 
Canadians, and 210 soldiers. But the letter of 
Adjutant-General E. Baynes, November 24, 1813, 
states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Bar- 
clay's squadron, of whom 23 were killed, 49 
wounded, and the balance (178) captured; and 
James himself on a previous page (284) states that 



SH Naval War of 1812 

there were 102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not 
counting the Detroit, and we know that Barclay 
originally joined the squadron with 19 sailors from 
the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors 
came up from the Dover. James gives at the end 
of his Naval Occurrences some extracts from the 
court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieuten- 
ant Thomas Stokes, of the Queen Charlotte, there 
testified that he had on board "between 120 and 
130 men, officers and all together," of whom "16 
came up from the Dover three days before." 
James, on p. 284, says her crew already consisted 
of no men; adding these 16 gives us 126 (almost 
exactly "between 120 and 130"). Lieutenant 
Stokes also testified that the Detroit had more men 
on account of being a larger and heavier vessel; 
to give her 150 is perfectly safe, as her heavier 
guns and larger size would at least need 24 men 
more than the Queen Charlotte. James gives the 
Lady Prevost 76, Hunter 39, Little Belt 15, and 
Chippeway 13 men, Canadians and soldiers, a total 
of 143; supposing that the number of British 
sailors placed on them was proportional to the 
amount placed on board the Queen Charlotte, we 
could add 2 1 . This would make a grand total of 
440 men, which must certainly be near the truth. 
This nimiber is corroborated otherwise: General 
Baynes, as already quoted, says that there were 
aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or 



Naval War of 1812 



315 



wounded. Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of 
whom 63 must therefore have been sailors or 
Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these bore 
the same proportion to their whole number as 
in the case of the soldiers, there ought to have 
been 219 sailors and Canadians, making in all 469 
men. It can thus be said with certainty that 
there were between 440 and 490 men aboard, and 
I shall take the former number, though I have no 
doubt that this is too small. But it is not a point 
of very much importance, as the battle was fought 
largely at long range, where the number of men, 
provided there were plenty to handle the sails and 
guns, did not much matter. The following state- 
ment of the comparative force must therefore be 
very nearly accurate: 



PERRY S SQUADRON 



Name Rig 

Lawrence . .Brig 
Niagara... 

Caledonia . ' ' 

Ariel Schooner 

Scorpion. . " 

Somers.. . . " 

Porcupine. " 
Tigress. . . " 
Trippe.. . .Sloop 



Tons 

480 
480 

180 

112 
86 

94 

83 
96 

60 



Total 
Crew 



Crew 
fit for 
Duty 



Broad- 
side; 
lbs. 



136 


105 


300 


155 


127 


300 


S3l 




80 


36 




48 


35 




64 


30 


184 


56 



{ 



25 
27 

35J 



32 
32 
24 



Armament 

2 long 12's 
18 short 32's 

2 long 12's 

8 short 32's 
J 2 long 24's 
\ I short 32 

4 long 12's 

i I " 32 

\ I short 32 

J I long 24 

\ I short 32 

I long 32 

I " 32 

I " 24 



vessels 



1671 532 416 936 lbs. 



3i6 



Naval War of 1 812 



During the action, however, the Lawrence and 
Niagara each fought a long 12 instead of one of 
the carronades on the engaged side, making a 
broadside of 896 lbs., 288 lbs. being from long 



guns. 



Barclay's squadron 

Broadside; 



Name 



Rig 



Tons Crew 



lbs. 



Detroit Ship 



490 150 138 



Queen Charlotte.. " 400 126 

Lady Prevost . . . Schooner 230 



Hunter Brig 



ISO 



Chippeway Schooner 70 

Little Belt Sloop 90 



86 

45 

IS 
18 



189 



75 



30 



Armament 

1 long 18 

2 " 24's 
6 " 12's 
8 " 9's 
I short 24 
I " 18 

1 long 12 

2 " 9's 
14 short 24's 

1 long 9 

2 " 6's 
10 short 12's 

4 long 6's 
2 " 4's 

2 " 2'S 

. 2 short 12's 

I long 9 
J I " 12 
I 2 " 6's 



6 vessels 



1460 440 459 lbs. 



These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 
lbs., of which 195 were from long guns. 

The superiority of the Americans in long-gun 
metal was therefore nearly as three is to two, and 
in carronade metal greater than two to one. The 



Naval War of 1 812 317 

chief fault to be found in the various American 
accounts is that they sedulously conceal the com- 
parative weight of metal, while carefully specifying 
the number of guns. Thus, Lossing says: "Bar- 
clay had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed 
greatly the advantage in action at a distance"; 
which he certainly did not. The tonnage of the 
fleets is not so very important; the above tables 
are probably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, 
impossible to tell exactly the number of men in 
the two crews. Barclay almost certainly had 
more than the 440 men I have given him, but in 
all likelihood some of them were unfit for duty, 
and the number of his effectives was most prob- 
ably somewhat less than Perry's. As the battle 
was fought in such smooth water, and part of the 
time at long range, this, as already said, does not 
much matter. The Niagara might be considered 
a match for the Detroit, and the Lawrence and 
Caledonia for the five other British vessels ; so the 
Americans were certainly very greatly superior in 
force. 

At daylight, on September loth, Barclay's squad- 
ron was discovered in the N.W., and Perry at once 
got under weigh; the wind soon shifted to the 
N.E., giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being 
very light. Barclay lay to in a close column, 
heading to the S.W. in the following order: Chip- 
peway, Master's Mate J. Campbell ; Detroit, Capt. 



3i8 Naval War of 1812 

R. H. Barclay; Hunter, Lieut. G. Bignall; Queen 
Charlotte, Capt. R. Finnis; Lady Prevost, Lieut. 
Edward Buchan; and Little Belt, by whom com- 
manded is not said. Perry came down with the 
wind on his port beam, and made the attack in 
column ahead, obliquely. First in order came the 
Ariel, Lieutenant John H. Packet; and Scorpion, 
Sailing-master Stephen Champlin, both being on 
the weather-bow of the Lawrence, Ca-pt. O. H. Perry ; 
next came the Caledonia, Lieutenant Daniel Tur- 
ner; Niagara, Captain Jesse D. Elliott; Soniers, 
Lieut. A. H. M. Conklin; Porcupine, Acting-master 
George Serrat; Tigress, Sailing-master Thomas C. 
Almy; and Trippe, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup.^ 
As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the 
American squadron approached the enemy. Perry's 
straggling line formed an angle of about fifteen 
degrees with the more compact one of his foes. 

^ The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly. 
Barclay's letter is a model of its kind for candor and gener- 
osity. Letter of Capt. R. H. Barclay to Sir James Yeo, Sep- 
tember 2, 18 13; of Lieutenant Inglis to Captain Barclay, 
September loth; of Captain Perry to the Secretary of the 
Navy, September loth and September 13th, and to General 
Harrison, September nth and September 13th. I have re- 
lied mainly on Lossing's Field-Book of the War of 1812 (es- 
pecially for the diagrams furnished him by Commodore 
Champlin), on Commander Ward's Naval Tactics, p. 76, and 
on Cooper's Naval History. Extracts from the court-martial 
on Captain Barclay are given in James's Naval Occurrences, 
Ixxxiii. 



Naval War of 1812 319 

At 11.45, "the Detroit opened the action by a shot 
from her long 24, which fell short; at 11.50, she 
fired a second which went crashing through the 
Lawrence, and was replied to by the Scorpion's 
long 32. At 11.55, the Lawrence, having shifted 
her port bow-chaser, opened with both the long 
12's, and at meridian began with her carronades, 
but the shot from the latter all fell short. At the 
same time, the action became general on both 
sides, though the rearmost American vessels were 
almost beyond the range of their own guns, and 
quite out of range of the guns of their antagonists. 
Meanwhile, the Lawrence was already suffering 
considerably as she bore down on the enemy. It 
was twenty minutes before she succeeded in get- 
ting within good carronade range, and during that 
time the action at the head of the line was between 
the long guns of the Chippeway and Detroit, 
throwing 123 potmds, and those of the Scorpion, 
Ariel, and Lawrence, throwing 104 pounds. As 
the enemy's fire was directed almost exclusively 
at the Lawrence, she suffered a great deal. The 
Caledonia, Niagara, and Somers were meanwhile 
engaging, at long range, the Hunter and Queen 
Charlotte, opposing from their long guns 96 pounds 
to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, while from 
a distance the three other American gun vessels 
engaged the Prevost and Little Belt. By 12.20, the 
Lawrence had worked down to close quarters, and 



320 Naval War of 1812 

at 12.30 the action was going on with great fury 
between her and her antagonists, within canister 
range. The raw and inexperienced American 
crews committed the same fault the British so 
often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded their 
carronades. In consequence, that of the Scorpion 
upset down the hatchway in the middle of the 
action, and the sides of the Detroit were dotted 
with marks from shot that did not penetrate. 
One of the Ariel's long 12's also burst. Barclay 
fought the Detroit exceedingly well, her guns being 
most excellently aimed, though they actually had 
to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touch- 
holes, so deficient was the ship's equipment. 
Meanwhile, the Caledonia came down, too, but the 
Niagara was wretchedly handled, Elliott keeping 
at a distance which prevented the use either of his 
carronades or of those of the Queen Charlotte, his 
antagonist; the latter, however, suffered greatly 
from the long guns of the opposing schooners, and 
lost her gallant commander, Captain Finnis, and 
first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were killed early 
in the action; her next in command, Provincial 
Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no 
good, passed the Hunter and joined in the attack 
on the Lawrence at close quarters. The Niagara, 
the most efficient and best-manned of the Ameri- 
can vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action 
by her captain's misconduct. At the end of the 



Naval War of 1 812 .^21 



line the fight went on at long range between the 
Somers, Tigress, Porcupine, and. Trippe on one side, 
and Little Belt and Lady Prevost on the other ; the 
Lady Prevost making a very noble fight, although 
her 1 2 -pound carronades rendered her almost help- 
less against the long guns of the Americans. She 
was greatly cut up, her commander, Lieutenant 
Buchan, was dangerously, and her acting first 
lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, severely, wounded, and 
she began falling gradually to leeward. 

The fighting at the head of the line was fierce 
and bloody to an extraordinary degree. The 
Scorpion, Ariel, Lawrence, and Caledonia, all of 
them handled with the most determined courage, 
were opposed to the Chippeway, Detroit, Queen 
Charlotte, and Hunter, which were fought to the 
full as bravely. At such close quarters the two 
sides engaged on about equal terms, the Ameri- 
cans being superior in weight of metal, and inferior 
in number of men. But the Lawrence had re- 
ceived such damage in working down as to make 
the odds against Perry. On each side, almost the 
whole fire was directed at the opposing large ves- 
sel or vessels ; in consequence, the Queen Charlotte 
was almost disabled, and the Detroit was also 
frightfully shattered, especially by the raking fire 
of the gunboats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Gar- 
land, being mortally wounded, and Captain Bar- 
clay so severely injured that he was obliged to 



VOL. 1.— 21 



322 Naval War of 1812 

quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command of 
Lieutenant George Inghs. But on board the Law- 
rence matters had gone even worse, the combined 
fire of her adversaries having made the grimmest 
carnage on her decks. Of the 103 men who were 
fit for duty when she began the action, 83, or over 
four fifths, were killed or wounded. The vessel 
was shallow, and the ward-room, used as a cock- 
pit, to which the wounded were taken, was mostly 
above water, and the shot came through it con- 
tinually, killing and wounding many men under 
the hands of the surgeon. 

The first lieutenant, Yamall, was three times 
wounded, but kept to the deck through all; the 
only other lieutenant on board. Brooks, of the 
marines, was mortally wounded. Every brace 
and bowline was shot away, and the brig almost 
completely dismantled ; her hull was shattered to 
pieces, many shot going completely through it, 
and the guns on the engaged side were by degrees 
all dismounted. Perry kept up the fight with 
splendid courage. As the crew fell one by one, 
the commodore called down through the skylight 
for one of the surgeon's assistants; and this call 
was repeated and obeyed till none were left ; then 
he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope? " 
and three or four of them crawled up on deck to 
lend a feeble hand in placing the last guns. Perry 
himself fired the last effective heavy gun, assisted 



Naval War of 1 812 323 



only by the purser and chaplain. A man who did 
not possess his indomitable spirit would have then 
struck. Instead, however, although failing in the 
attack so far, Perry merely determined to win by 
new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly. 
Mr. Turner, in the Caledonia, when ordered to 
close, had put his helm up, run down on the oppos- 
ing line, and engaged at very short range, though 
the brig was absolutely without quarters. The 
Niagara had thus become the next in line astern 
of the Lawrence, and the sloop Trippe, having 
passed the three schooners in front of her, was 
next ahead. The Niagara now, having a breeze, 
steered for the head of Barclay's line, passing over 
a quarter of a mile to windward of the Lawrence, 
on her port beam. She was almost uninjured, hav- 
ing so far taken very little part in the combat, 
and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leaping into a 
row-boat, with his brother and four seamen, he 
rowed to the fresh brig, where he arrived at 2.30, 
and at once sent Elliott astern to hurry up the 
three schooners. The Trippe was now very near 
the Caledonia. The Lawrence, having but four- 
teen sound men left, struck her colors, but could 
not be taken possession of before the action re- 
commenced. She drifted astern, the Caledonia 
passing between her and her foes. At 2.45 the 
schooners having closed up, Perry, in his fresh 
vessel, bore up to break Barclay's line. 



324 Naval War of 1812 

The British ships had fought themselves to a 
standstilh The Lady Prevost was crippled and 
sagged to leeward, though ahead of the others. 
The Detroit and Queen Charlotte were so disabled 
that they could not effectually oppose fresh an- 
tagonists. There could thus be but little resist- 
ance to Perry, as the Niagara stood down and 
broke the British line, firing her port guns into the 
Chippeway, Little Belt, and Lady Prevost, and the 
starboard ones into the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, 
and Hunter, raking on both sides. Too disabled 
to tack, the Detroit and Charlotte tried to wear, the 
latter running up to leeward of the former; and 
both vessels having every brace and almost every 
stay shot away, they fell foul. The Niagara 
luffed athwart their bows, within half pistol-shot, 
keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and 
musketry, while on the other side the British ves- 
sels were raked by the Caledonia and the schooners 
so closely that some of their grape-shot, passing 
over the foe, rattled through Perry's spars. Noth- 
ing further could be done, and Barclay's flag was 
struck at 3 p.m., after three and a quarter hours' 
most gallant and desperate fighting. The Chippe- 
way and Little Belt tried to escape, but were over- 
taken and brought to, respectively, by the Trippe 
and Scorpion, the commander of the latter, Mr. 
Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had the 
first, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has 



Naval War of 1 812 325 

behaved in the most humane and attentive man- 
ner, not only to myself and officers, but to all the 
wounded," writes Captain Barclay. 

The American squadron had suffered severely, 
more than two thirds of the loss falling upon the 
Lawrence, which was reduced to the condition of 
a perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being 
completely beaten in. She had, as already stated, 
22 men killed, including Lieutenant of Marines 
Brooks and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded, 
including Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting 
second lieutenant) Forrest, Sailing-master Tay- 
lor, Purser Hambleton, and Midshipmen Swart- 
out and Claxton. The Niagara lost 2 killed and 
25 wounded (almost a fifth of her effectives), 
including among the latter the second lieutenant, 
Mr. Edwards, and Midshipman Cummings. The 
Caledonia had 3 , the Somers 2 , and Trippe 2 , men 
wounded. The Ariel had i killed and 3 wounded; 
the Scorpion 2 killed, including Midshipman Lamb. 
The total loss was 123; 27 were killed and 96 
wounded, of whom 3 died. 

The British loss, falling most heavily on the 
Detroit and Queen Charlotte, amounted to 41 killed 
(including Capt. S. J. Garden, R.N., and Capt. 
R. A. Finnis) ; and 94 wounded (including Capt. 
Barclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Rou- 
lette, and Bignall) : in all 135. The first and 
second in command on every vessel were killed or 



o 



26 Naval War of 181 2 



wounded, a sufficient proof of the desperate nature 
of the defence. 

The victory of Lake Erie was most important, 
both in its material results and in its moral effect. 
It gave us complete command of all the upper 
lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that 
quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and 
our confidence in ourselves, and ensured the con- 
quest of Upper Canada; in all these respects 
its importance has not been overrated. But the 
"glory" acquired by it most certainly has been 
estimated at more than its worth. Most Ameri- 
cans, even the well educated, if asked which was 
the most glorious victory of the war, would point 
to this battle. Captain Perry's name is more 
widely known than that of any other commander. 
Every school-boy reads about him, if of no other 
sea-captain; yet he certainly stands on a lower 
grade than either Hull or Macdonough, and not a 
bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake Erie 
our seamen displayed great courage and skill ; but 
so did their antagonists. The simple truth is, 
that, where on both sides the officers and men 
were equally brave and skilful, the side which 
possessed the superiority in force, in the propor- 
tion of three to two, could not well help winning. 
The courage with which the Lawrence was de- 
fended has hardly ever been surpassed, and may 
fairly be called heroic; but equal praise belongs 



Naval War of 1812 



327 



to the men on board the Detroit, who had to 

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328 Naval War of 1 812 

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Naval War of 1 812 329 

defence. Courage is only one of the many ele- 
ments which go to make up the character of 
a first-class commander; something more than 
bravery is needed before a leader can be really 
called great. 

There happened to be circumstances which ren- 
dered the bragging of our writers over the victory 
somewhat plausible. Thus they could say with 
an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 
guns to our 54, and outnumbered us. In reality, 
as well as can be ascertained from the conflicting 
evidence, he was inferior in number; but a few 
men more or less mattered nothing. Both sides 
had men enough to work the guns and handle the 
ships, especially as the fight was in smooth water 
and largely at long range. The important fact 
was that, though we had nine guns less, yet, at a 
broadside, they threw half as much metal again 
as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our 
favor it would have been a disgrace to have been 
beaten. The water was too smooth for our two 
brigs to show at their best ; but this very smooth- 
ness rendered our gunboats more formidable than 
any of the British vessels, and the British testimony 
is unanimous that it was to them the defeat was 
primarily due. The American fleet came into 
action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the 
ships straggling badly, either owing to Perry hav- 
ing formed his line badly, or else to his having 



dd^ 



Naval War of 1 812 



failed to train the subordinate commanders how to 
keep their places. The Niagara was not fought 
well at first, Captain Elliott keeping her at a dis- 
tance that prevented her from doing any damage 
to the vessels opposed, which were battered to 
pieces by the gunboats without the chance of re- 
plying. It certainly seems as if the small vessels 
at the rear of the line should have been closer up, 
and in a position to render more effectual assist- 
ance ; the attack was made in too loose order, and, 
whether it was the fault of Perry or of his subor- 
dinates, it fails to reflect credit on the Americans. 
Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned; but in this 
instance not with very good judgment. He says 
the line-of-battle was highly judicious, but this 
may be doubted. The weather was peculiarly 
suitable for the gunboats, with their long, heavy 
guns; and yet the line-of-battle was so arranged 
as to keep them in the rear, and let the brunt of 
the assault fall on the Lawrence, with her short 
carronades. Cooper again praises Perry for steer- 
ing for the head of the enemy's line, but he could 
hardly have done anything else. In this battle 
the firing seems to have been equally skilful on 
both sides, the Detroifs long guns being peculiarly 
well served ; but the British captains manoeuvred 
better than their foes at first and supported one 
another better, so that the disparity in damage 
done on each side was not equal to the disparity 



Naval War of 1 812 331 

in force. The chief merit of the American com- 
mander and his followers was indomitable cour- 
age and determination not to be beaten. This is 
no slight merit; but it may well be doubted if it 
would have ensured victory had Barclay's force 
been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a head- 
long attack; his superior force, whether through 
his fault or his misfortune can hardly be said, 
being brought into action in such a manner that 
the head of the line was crushed by the inferior 
force opposed. Being literally hammered out of 
his own ship. Perry brought up its powerful twin- 
sister, and the already shattered hostile squadron 
was crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres 
which marked the close of the battle, and which 
ensured the capture of all the opposing ships, were 
unquestionably ver}'- fine. 

The British ships were fought as resolutely as 
their antagonists, not being surrendered till they 
were crippled and helpless, and almost all the 
officers and a large proportion of the men placed 
hors de combat. Captain Barclay handled his 
ships like a first-rate seaman. It was impossible 
to arrange them so as to be superior to his an- 
tagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature 
that in smooth water his gunboats gave him a 
great advantage, while in any sea his two brigs 
were more than a match for the whole British 
squadron. In short, our victory was due to our 



332 Naval War of 1 812 

heavy metal. As regards the honor of the affair, 
in spite of the amount of boasting it has given rise 
to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon 
as in an equally high degree creditable to both 
sides. Indeed, if it were not for the fact that the 
victory was so complete, it might be said that the 
length of the contest and the trifling disparity in 
loss reflected rather the most credit on the British. 
Captain Perry showed indomitable pluck and 
readiness to adapt himself to circumstances; but 
his claim to fame rests much less on his actual vic- 
tory than on the way in which he prepared the 
fleet that was to win it. Here his energy and 
activity deserve all praise, not only for his success 
in collecting sailors and vessels and in building the 
two brigs, but above all for the manner in which 
he succeeded in getting them out on the lake. On 
that occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay; 
indeed, the latter committed an error that the 
skill and address he subsequently showed could 
not retrieve. But it will always be a source of 
surprise that the American public should have so 
glorified Perry's victory over an inferior force, and 
have paid comparatively little attention to Mac- 
donough's victory, which really was won against 
decided odds in ships, men, and metal. 

There are always men who consider it unpatri- 
otic to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flat- 
tering; but, aside from the morality of the case, 



Naval War of 1812 333 

we never can learn how to produce a certain effect 
unless we know rightly what the causes were that 
produced a similar effect in times past. Lake 
Erie teaches us the advantage of having the odds 
on our side; Lake Champlain, that, even if they 
are not, skill can still coimteract them. It is 
amusing to read some of the pamphlets written 
"in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the 
writers apparently regarding him as a kind of 
traitor for hinting that the victory was not " Nel- 
sonic," "unsurpassed," etc. The arguments are 
stereotyped : Perry had nine fewer guns and also 
fewer men than the foe. This last point is the 
only one respecting which there is any doubt. 
Taking sick and well together, the Americans un- 
questionably had the greatest number in crew; 
but a quarter of them were sick. Even deducting 
these, they were still, in all probability, more 
numerous than their foes. 

But it is really not a point of much consequence, 
as both sides had enough, as stated, to serv^e the 
gims and handle the ships. In sea-fights, after 
there are enough hands for those purposes, addi- 
tional ones are not of so much advantage. I have 
in all my accounts summed up as accurately as 
possible the contending forces, because it is so 
customary with British writers to follow James's 
minute and inaccurate statements, that I thought 
it best to give everything exactly; but it was 



334 Naval War of 1 812 

really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it is impos- 
sible to compare forces numerically. Aside from 
a few exceptional cases, the number of men, after 
a certain point was reached, made little difference. 
For example, the Java would fight just as effectu- 
ally with 377 men, the number James gives her, as 
with 426, the number I think she really had. 
Again, my figures make the Wasp slightly supe- 
rior in force to the Frolic, as she had twenty-five 
men the most ; but, in reality, as the battle was 
fought under very short sail, and decided purely 
by gunnery, the difference in number of crew was 
not of the least consequence. The Hornet had 
nine men more than the Penguin, and it would be 
absurd to say that this gave her much advantage. 
In both the latter cases, the forces were practically 
equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds 
were in favor of the Americans. The exact re- 
verse is the case in the last action of the Constitu- 
tion. Here, the Levant and Cyane had all the men 
they required, and threw a heavier broadside 
than their foe. Expressed in numbers, the odds 
against them were not great, but numbers could 
not express the fact that carronades were opposed 
to long guns, and two small ships to one big one. 
Again, though in the action on Lake Champlain 
numbers do show a slight advantage both in 
weight of metal and number of men on the British 
side, they do not make the advantage as great as 



Naval War of 1812 335 

it really was, for they do not show that the British 
possessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of 
24-pounders, which was equal to the two chief 
vessels of the Americans, exactly as the Constitu- 
tion was superior to the Cyane and Levant.'' And 
on the same principles I think that every fair- 
minded man must admit the great superiority of 
Perry's fleet over Barclay's, though the advantage 
was greater in carronades than in long guns. 
But to admit this, by no means precludes us 

"^ It must ahvays be remembered that these rules cut both 
ways. British writers are very eloquent about the disad- 
vantage in which carronades placed the Cyane and Levant, 
but do not hint that the Essex suffered from a precisely similar 
cause, in addition to her other misfortunes; either they 
should give the Conslitniion more credit or the PhcBbe less. 
So the Confiancc, throwing 480 pounds of metal at a broad- 
side, was really equal to both the Eagle and Saratoga, who 
jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384 potmds; 
from her carronades, 96. Their long gvms threw 168; their 
carronades, 510. Now, the 32-pound carronade, mounted on 
the spar-deck of a 38-gtm frigate, was certainly much less 
formidable than the long 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it 
probably ranked more nearly with a long 12, in the ordinary 
chances of war (and it must be remembered that Downie was 
the attacking party and chose his own position, so far as 
Macdonough's excellent arrangements would let him). So 
that, in comparing the forces, the carronades should not be 
reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, and 
we get, as a mere approximation, 384-1-48 = 432, against 
168 -f- 255 = 423. At any rate, British writers, as well as 
Americans, should remember that if the Constitution was 
greatly superior to her two foes, then the Confiance was cer- 
tainly equal to the Eagle and Saratoga; and vice versa. 



336 Naval War of 1812 

from taking credit for the victory. Almost all 
the victories gained by the English over the Dutch 
in the seventeenth century were due purely to 
great superiority in force. The cases have a curi- 
ous analogy to this lake battle. Perry won with 
54 guns against Barclay's 63 ; but the odds were 
largely in his favor. Blake won a doubtful vic- 
tory on the 1 8th of February, 1653, with 80 ships 
against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels were 
twice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men 
and weight of metal greatly their superior. The 
English were excellent fighters, but no better than 
the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that 
period deserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again, 
the great victory of La Hogue was won over a very 
much smaller French fleet, after a day's hard 
fighting, which resulted in the capture of one ves- 
sel 1 This victory was most exultingly chronicled, 
yet it was precisely as if Perry had fought Barclay 
all day and only succeeded in capturing the Little 
Belt. Most of Lord Nelson's successes were cer- 
tainly won against heavy odds by his great genius 
and the daring skill of the captains who served 
under him ; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as 
the fighting went, reflected as much honor on the 
defeated Danes as on the mighty sea-chief who 
conquered them. Many a much- vaunted victory, 
both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit 
on the victors than the battle of Lake Erie did on 



Naval War of 1 812 2>2>7 

the Americans. And it must always be remem- 
bered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a 
weaker foe, does reflect credit on the nation by 
whom it is gained. It was creditable to us as a 
nation that our ships were better made and better 
armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was 
creditable to them that a few years before their 
vessels had stood in the same relation to the Dutch 
ships.' It was greatly to our credit that we had 
been enterprising enough to fit out such an effec- 
tive little flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry 
deserves the highest praise.^ 

Before leaving the subject it is worth while 
making a few observations on the men who com- 
posed the crews. James, who despised a Cana- 
dian as much as he hated an American, gives, as 
one excuse for the defeat, the fact that most of Bar- 
clay's crew were Canadians, whom he considers to 
be "sorry substitutes." On each side the regular 

^ After Lord Duncan's victory at Camperdown, James 
chronicled the fact that all the captured line-of-battle ships 
were such poor craft as not to be of as much value as so many- 
French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutch sailors 
must have done well to have made such a bloody and 
obstinate fight as they did, with the materials they had. Ac- 
cording to his own statements the loss was about propor- 
tional to the forces in action. It was another parallel to 
Perry's victory. 

^ Some of my countrymen will consider this but scant ap- 
probation, to which the answer must be that a history is not 
a panegyric. 

VOL. I.— 22 



33^ Naval War of 1 812 

sailors, from the seaboard, were not numerous 
enough to permit the battle to be fought purely 
by them. Barclay took a number of soldiers of 
the regular army, and Perry a niimber of militia, 
aboard; the former had a few Indian sharp- 
shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes. A 
great many men in each fleet were lake sailors, 
frontiersmen, and these were the especial objects 
of James's contempt; but it may be doubted if 
they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation, 
used to contests with Indians and whites, natu- 
rally forced to be good sailors and skilful in the use 
of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained by 
good men and on their own waters, the very best 
possible material. Certainly, the battle of Lake 
Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, was better con- 
tested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly 
by British. 

The difference between the American and Brit- 
ish seamen on the Atlantic was small, but on the 
lakes what little there was disappeared. A New 
Englander and an Old Englander differed little 
enough, but they differed more than a frontiers- 
man bom north of the line did from one south of 
it. These last two resembled one another more 
nearly than either did the parent. There had 
been no long-established naval school on the lakes, 
and the British sailors that came up there were 
the best of their kind; so the combatants were 



Naval War of 1812 339 

really so evenly matched in courage, skill, and all 
other fighting qualities, as to make it impossible 
to award the palm to cither for these attributes. 
The dogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful fir- 
ing and manoeuvring, and the daring and coolness 
with which cutting-out expeditions were planned 
and executed, were as marked on one side as on 
the other. The only un-English element in the 
contest was the presence among the Canadian 
English of some of the descendants of the Latin 
race from whom they had conquered the country. 
Otherwise, the men were equally matched, but the 
Americans owed their success — for the balance of 
success was largely on their side — to the fact that 
their officers had been trained in the best and 
most practical, although the smallest, na\y of the 
day. The British sailors on the lakes were as good 
as our own, but no better. None of their com- 
manders compare with Macdonough. 

Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which 
he got his fleet ready; his victory over Barclay 
was precisely similar to the quasi-victories of 
Blake over the Dutch, which have given that ad- 
miral such renown. Blake's success in attacking 
Spanish and Algerian forts is his true title to fame. 
In his engagements with the Dutch fleets (as well 
as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is 
no greater and no less than Perry's. Each made 
a headlong attack, with furious, stubborn courage, 



340 Naval War of 1812 

and by dint of sheer weight crushed or disabled a 
greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place 
on February 18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried 
but 34 guns/ and yet with it he captured the 
Prosperous of 54; which vessel was stronger than 
any in the Dutch fleet. The fact that Blake's 
battles were generally so indecisive must be 
ascribed to the fact that his opponents were, 
though inferior in force, superior in skill. No de- 
cisive defeat was inflicted on the Dutch until 
Tromp's death. Perry's operations were on a 
very small, and Blake's on a very large, scale ; but 
whereas Perry left no antagonists to question his 
claim to victory, Blake's successes were suffi- 
ciently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in 
almost every instance claiming that they had won, 
or else that it was a draw. Of course, it is absurd 
to put Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked 
with a fleet forty times the strength of the other's 
flotilla ; but the way in which the work was done 
was very similar. And it must always be remem- 
bered that when Perry fought this battle he was 
but twenty-seven years old ; and the commanders 
of his other vessels were yoimger still. 

^ La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt.-Amirat Michel 
De Ruyter (Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, why is 
Tromp always called Van Tromp by English writers? It 
would be quite as correct for a Frenchman to speak of Mac- 
Nelson. 



Naval War of 1812 341 

CHAMPLAIN 

The commander on this lake at this time was 
Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who had super- 
seded the former commander, Lieutenant Sydney 
Smith, whose name was a curious commentary on 
the close inter-relationship of the two contest- 
ing peoples. The American naval force now con- 
sisted of two sloops, the Growler and Eagle, each 
mounting eleven guns, and six gallies, mount- 
ing one gun each. Lieutenant Smith was sent 
down with his two sloops to harass the British 
gunboats, which were stationed round the head of 
Sorel River, the outlet to Lake Champlain. On 
June 3d he chased three gunboats into the river, 
the wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort 
of Isle aux Noix. A strong British land-force, 
under Major-General Taylor, now came up both 
banks of the narrow stream, and joined the three 
gunboats in attacking the sloops. The latter tried 
to beat up the stream, but the current was so 
strong and the wind so light that no headway could 
be made. The gunboats kept out of range of the 
sloop's guns, while keeping up a hot fire from 
their long 24's, to which no reply could be made; 
but the galling fire of the infantry who lined the 
banks was responded to by showers of grape. 
After three hours' conflict, at 12.30, a 24-pound 
shot from one of the gallies struck the Eagle under 



342 Naval War of 1 812 

her starboard quarter, and ripped out a whole 
plank under water. She sank at once, but it was 
in such shoal water that she did not settle entirely, 
and none of the men were drowned. Soon after- 
ward the Growler had her f orestay and main-boom 
shot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran 
ashore and was also captured. The Growler had 
I killed and 8 wounded, the Eagle 11 wounded; 
their united crews, including 34 volunteers, 
amounted to 1 1 2 men. The British gunboats suf- 
fered no loss; of the troops on shore three were 
wounded, one dangerously, by grape. i Lieuten- 
ant Smith had certainly made a very plucky fight, 
but it was a great mistake to get cooped up in a 
narrow channel, with wind and current dead 
against him. It was a very creditable success to 
the British, and showed the effectiveness of well- 
handled gunboats under certain circumstances. 
The possession of these two sloops gave the com- 
mand of the lake to the British. Macdonough at 
once set about building others, but, with ah his 
energy, the materials at hand were so deficient 
that he could not get them finished in time. On 
July 31st, 1000 British troops, under Colonel J. 
Murray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard, 

^ Letter from Major-General Taylor (British) to Major- 
General Stone, June 3, 1813. Lossing says the loss of the 
British was "probably at least one hundred," — on what au- 
thority, if any, I do not know. 



Naval War of 1812 



34: 



with the sloops Chubb and Finch (late Growler and 
Eagle) and three gunboats, landed at Plattsburg 
and destroyed all the barracks and stores both 
there and at Saranac. For some reason, Colonel 
Murray left so precipitately that he overlooked a 
picket of twenty of his men, who were captured; 
then he made descents on two or three other 
places and returned to the head of the lake by 
August 3d. Three days afterward, on August 
6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the 
President, Montgomery, and Preble, of seven guns 
each, and also six gunboats ; which force enabled 
him to prevent any more plundering expeditions 
taking place that summer, and to convoy Hamp- 
ton's troops when they made an abortive effort to 
penetrate into Canada by the Sorel River on Sep- 
tember 2 1 St. 



BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813 



Name Tons 

Ship 600 

Gloucester i8o 

Mary 80 

Drmnmond 80 

Lady Gore 80 

Schooner 80 

Detroit 490 

Queen Charlotte 400 

Lady Prcvost 230 

Hunter 180 

Chippeway 70 

Little Belt 90 



Guns 

24 
10 

3 
3 
3 
3 

19 
17 
13 
10 
I 
3 



Remarks 

Burnt on stocks. 
Taken at York. 
Burnt. 
Captured. 



12 vessels 



2560 



109 



344 Naval War of 1812 

AMERICAN LOSS * 

Name Tons Guns Remarks 

Growler 112 11 Captured. 

Eagle no 11 " 

2 vessels 222 22 

^ Excluding the Growler and Julia, which were recaptured. 



END OF VOLUME I. 



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